Jon, Gary R, list:
OK - let's try a human example, but it won't be different:
DO: loud sound. It happens to be the old oak tree falling but I
don't know that.
IO: my hearing of the loud sound. IF I am partly deaf, I hear it
differently than my cat or dog or children or...
R: the Representamen consists of both my physiological and
cognitive MEMORIES. Some are innate [the neurological; some are
learned]. This Representamen accepts the sensate data from the IO
and, according to its full knowledge base....interprets that data.
II: this is my internal interpretation. It's 'honed and constrained
and organized by the combined memories of the Representamen...and I
become conscious of an external disturbance. ..ie.. I become aware
that it is not a dream; that it is existent and that it is outside of
me and that..it might be familiar...
DI: I am articulate, conscious that this external force is outside
of me, is existent and is, since I've heard these noises before..the
sound of a tree falling and dredging up more of my memories from the
Representamen...I decide.."It's that old oak tree'.
Now - the only difference between the bird and the human - is the
Representamen is more powerful in its stock of habits; and thus, sets
up a cognitive rather than physical reaction. The bird's DI is to
flee. The human will come up with a conceptual interpretant...
Again - I emphasize the necessity of the semiosic action including
the action of habits. Jon's outline doesn't seem to include this and
I don't understand how any Interpretation can take place, except an
almost purely mechanical one, that doesn't include this force.
Certainly, the classes of signs that do NOT include Thirdness
[habit-taking] DO exist, but only as a short-term event...and even
they, are 'nestled' within the body of something that DOES function
within habits....
That is - Jon's suggestion that the bird-event is a rhematic
indexical sinsign only refers to the single event of the loud sound.
This is, as Gary R explains, the focus on the EXTERNAL. But - when
we add in the RESULT, the bird's flight - we must include the
neurological habits of the bird, which are: 'run from danger' - and
so, the Interpretant is: flight.
Edwina
Edwina
On Mon 05/02/18 8:33 AM , Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca sent:
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, Gary R - I thought Gary R's quotes were excellent, pointing out
the necessity for memory/habits and their function in semiosis. What
carries out this function of habit? The Representamen.
Edwina
On Sun 04/02/18 10:31 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Gary R., List:
Welcome back! I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you
will soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted
quotes, because frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on
our current non-human, non-cognitive example.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Edwina, Jon S, list,
At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's
interpretation than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem,
feel the tension in this matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why*
I agree, but I'll offer a few quotes hints towards a direction I think
might be fruitful (emphasis added by me in all cases).
1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23
…we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether
to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination,
provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought…
1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38
A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes
its interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign.
[—] [A] sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing
else but that thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back
toward the object, the other forward toward the interpretant, in this
case collapse into an immediate present. The type of a sign is memory,
which takes up the deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion
of it to future memory.
1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that
is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps
a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the
interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its
object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in
reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground
of the representamen. “Idea” is here to be understood in a sort of
Platonic sense , very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that sense
in which we say that one man catches another man’s idea, in which
we say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at some
previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which when a man
continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so far
as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that
is to have a like content, it is the same idea, and is not at each
instant of the interval a new idea.
1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6
… a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or
sign. So that it appears that every species of actual cognition is of
the nature of a sign. [—]
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718
482-5690 [4]
Links:
------
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'gary.richm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4] http://webmail.primus.ca/tel:(718)%20482-5690
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