BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }As
usual - I have a different outline. I think there are multiple Signs
involved. I understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often DI.
That's the basic format.

        1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign

        - a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot].  DO is the
stove. R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling. 

        2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign

        - spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of
experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to heat.

        3. Mother hears cry: Both a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign and a Rhematic
Indexical Legisign

        - mother's FEELING on hearing the cry; mother's connecting this cry
with her child and with pain 

        DO is the cry; R is her knowledge base that a cry is pain; and
indexically,  that it is her child's pain

        4. Mother decides what to do: Argument Symbolic Legisign

        - mother thinks how to treat a burn. DO is the events in #3; R is
her knowledge base. DI is the ice and lotions. 

        5. Mother treats child: Dicent Symbolic Legisign

        - mother treats child. DO is the burn AND the DI of #4, the ice and
lotions; R is her knowledge

        That's how I see it.

        Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge
base - whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I
disagree with Jon that the R is the cry of the child...

 On Thu 08/02/18  8:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt
 Gary R., List:
 I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate
Object as  the partial  combination of attributes of the Dynamic
Object by which the Sign denotes  it.  It is partial because (as you
said) knowing the DO in its fullness is an impossibility.  It does
not itself  predicate anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that
would make it a Sign in its own right, rather than a  part  of a
Sign--but it seems to me that it must somehow involve enough of the
DO's attributes to ground  (as you said) its association with the DO.
 Collateral Experience would then be  the aggregate of previous IOs 
by which someone is already acquainted  with the DO, and thus
recognizes  the Sign as denoting it.  What do you think? 
  As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of
semiosis should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of
interest, because that will affect how we classify everything else. 
For example, consider the girl's scream as the Sign.  It seems to me
that its DO is the burning of her hand, its IO is the pain that she
feels, its R is the sound that she makes, its II is the range of
possible effects that this might have, and its DI is the response of
her mother.  All of these assignments are somewhat arbitrary, though,
because various other things are also happening--both internal and
external to the girl--that would warrant a different yet equally
valid analysis, even if the terminological definitions are exactly
the same.  In that sense, I am constructing a  diagram  that embodies
what I discern to be the significant  relations among the parts of the
(in this case) hypothetical situation.  Again, what do you think? 
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran [1] - [2] 
 On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 5:12 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Jeff, Jon S, Edwina, Gary f, Helmut, list,
 I agree with Jon S that there is value in theoretical as well as
practical (pragmatic) analyses of the Sign and pragmaticism more
generally. While, as I noted in a post of a few days ago, it would
seem that we have been concentrating on the theoretical much more
than the practical for the last several months, while there is surely
a place for discussions of both on the list. Still, I hope Mary's
questions and Dan's comments will encourage forum members to initiate
threads on pragmatism which are less theoretical. 
 But first, thanks for this interesting, albeit perhaps controversial
post, Jeff. You concluded:
 JD: Putting the matter in simpler terms, it might be good to ask how
inner and outer apply to signs that stand in relations of similarity
to their objects (e.g., icons), and then take up the question of how
it applies to an individual substantial object, a general
conception--and then to a thinking being like us who sees the world
in terms of what is internal to thought and what is external to
thought. The phenomena in our experience of inner (e.g., subjective)
and outer (e.g., objective) is, I take it, being explained in terms
of the way the distinction is applied in the cases of these
relatively simpler kinds of things--largely because that is how
greater clarity can be achieved. 
 I'm interested in this matter of outer-inner from several standpoint
including in terms of Peirce's notion of "signs of signs," an
expression he introduces tentatively late in his work on semeiotic in
a letter to Victoria Welby. 
 I'd also like to discuss further, but not much in this post, the
Immediate Object--which seems, along with the Representamen, to be a
continuing bone of contention for some. I would, however, note that
Gary f has already given us as a springboard for discussion by
offering a rather useful quote of Peirce's from a letter to William
James in one of the Lowell threads. I think that quotation still
needs to be further unpacked/analyzed. But, in addition, in an
off-list note Gary f commented: 
 Gf: Quotes from the Logic Notebook and a couple of other sources. .
. make Peirce’s definitions and actual usage of the term immediate
object very clear: it’s the “part of the sign which indicates or
represents the dynamic object” (but does not  predicate anything of
that object, such as recognizing it as a member of a general class
would do).
 The IO is that “ part of the sign which indicates or represents
the dynamic object” (but does not predicate anything of that
object)." But, again, I would suggest as I did earlier that it
indicates the Ground  of the Object, not the Object in its fullness,
an impossibility. But I can imagine that some might argue that it
indeed does indicates the DO itself, known through collateral
 But for now let me return to my thought-experiment based on Peirce's
example of how we learn, "A child learns a lesson."  
 So, again, the example (developed a little): A young child told not
to touch the hot stove nevertheless touches it to find out for
herself. She fulls back her hand as she screams in pain at which
point her mother, hearing her scream, rushes to her and quickly puts
ice and then ointment on her fingers.
 I would suggest that something involved in 'hot stove burners' (the
direct object) might be seen as a sign (or signs, say of heat, etc.)
for some here. What is the putative sign here?
 Then the child's mind in relation to the DO (having 'determined' her
IO, 'selecting', so to speak, some few out of all the possible
characteristics/attributes of the DO, these being most likely iconic
signs) forms a ground, or basis, of her semiosis, an internal sign,
that is, her IO-R-DI. So, what is her Immediate Object? What is her
 Now her DI would seem to be her scream: that is another sign, an
external  sign for her mother which is (or involves) a DO which,
again, 'determines' her internal IO-R-DI, running to the child, etc.
What is the Dynamic Object for her mother.
 Her mother's thoughts and actions represent other signs, etc.
 I'd like to hear from folk on the list how they might characterize
the Signs and semiosis involved in this example.
 Gary R 
  Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718
482-5690 [4] 

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