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}Jon Awbrey, list:

        Thanks for your post - and specifically, for your comment:

        "the greater significance of the transformation he suggests at these
points is  
  not the shift from one type of interpreter to another, however
compelling the consideration of life-forms in general as  
  sign-processing agents may be, but the change of perspective that
pulls our exclusive focus on representative agents of  
  semiosis back to a properly relational point of view and the
triadic sign relations that generate competent semiotic  
  conduct"

        I agree -  it's the change in perspective; it's the relational
nature of semiosis.....that is the key issue.

        In addition, I think that the role of the Representamen in this
relational and transformative nature is the key in the triad.

        Edwina
 On Fri 09/02/18  8:52 AM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
 Peircers, Ontologgers, 
 These issues go way way back and my notes tell me I've been trying 
 to write something along these lines for at least a year but I was 
 prompted to return to the question by a post from John Sowa to the 
 Peirce List, so I've copied that below. 
 There's a better-formatted copy of this whole post on my blog: 
 Sign Relations • Comment 10 

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/02/09/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-comment-10/
[1] 
 Re: Peirce List Discussion 
 https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-01/thrd3.html#00041
[2] 
 JFS: 
 https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-01/msg00111.html [3] 
 Three-Headed Dogs and Triadic Sign Relations 
 ============================================ 
 Peirce's “Sop to Cerberus” got tossed about quite a bit in our
discussions across the Web this millennium.  Here's a  
 record of one occasion from the days when our discussions bridged
over multiple perspectives, in this instance the  
 Peirce List and its parallel Arisbe List, the French SemioCom, and
the Standard Upper Ontology Working Group: 
 “Sop To Cerberus” (21 May 2001) 
 • Arisbe 

http://web.archive.org/web/20061013225526/http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2001-May/000545.html
[4] 
 • Ontology 

http://web.archive.org/web/20081204201402/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02683.html
[5] 
 There is a critical passage where Peirce explains the relationship
between his popular illustrations and his technical  
 theory of signs. 
 It is clearly indispensable to start with an accurate and broad
analysis of the nature of a Sign.  I define a Sign as  
 anything which is so determined by something else, called its
Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which  
 effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately
determined by the former.  My insertion of “upon a  
 person” is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own
broader conception understood.  (Peirce 1908, Selected  
 Writings, p. 404). 
 I have long connected this passage with Peirce's much earlier
“metaphorical argument” where he changes the addressee of  
 a word — that to which it stands for something — from a person,
to that person's memory, to “a particular remembrance or  
 image in that memory”, to wit, “the one which is the mental
equivalent of the word … in short, its interpretant.” 
 * “Semiotics Formalization” (23 Sep 2000) • Standard Upper
Ontology 

http://web.archive.org/web/20081204111005/http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg01113.html
[6] 
 Here is a passage from Peirce that is decisive in clearing up the
relationship between the interpreter and the  
 interpretant … 
 I think we need to reflect upon the circumstance that every word
implies some proposition or, what is the same thing,  
 every word, concept, symbol has an equivalent term — or one which
has become identified with it, — in short, has an  
 interpretant. 
 Consider, what a word or symbol is;  it is a sort of representation.
 Now a representation is something which stands for  
 something.  I will not undertake to analyze, this evening, this
conception of standing for something — but, it is  
 sufficiently plain that it involves the standing to something for
something.  A thing cannot stand for something without  
 standing to something for that something.  Now, what is this that a
word stands to?  Is it a person? 
 We usually say that the word homme stands to a Frenchman for man. 
It would be a little more precise to say that it  
 stands to the Frenchman's mind — to his memory.  It is still more
accurate to say that it addresses a particular  
 remembrance or image in that memory.  And what image, what
remembrance?  Plainly, the one which is the mental equivalent  
 of the word homme — in short, its interpretant.  Whatever a word
addresses then or stands to, is its interpretant or  
 identified symbol.  … 
 The interpretant of a term, then, and that which it stands to are
identical.  Hence, since it is of the very essence of  
 a symbol that it should stand to something, every symbol — every
word and every conception — must have an interpretant —  
 or what is the same thing, must have information or implication. 
(Peirce 1866, Chronological Edition 1, pp. 466–467). 
 As I read the long arc of Peirce’s work, the greater significance
of the transformation he suggests at these points is  
 not the shift from one type of interpreter to another, however
compelling the consideration of life-forms in general as  
 sign-processing agents may be, but the change of perspective that
pulls our exclusive focus on representative agents of  
 semiosis back to a properly relational point of view and the triadic
sign relations that generate competent semiotic  
 conduct.  But Peirce made this transformation early on in his work,
and even more strikingly in its first trials.  
 Viewed in that light I think I share Peirce’s despair that its
full impact has yet to be felt. 
 References 
 ========== 
 * Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and
Hypothesis”, Lowell Lectures of 1866, pp. 357–504 in  
 Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1,
1857–1866, Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University  
 Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982. 
 * Peirce, C.S. (1908), “Letters to Lady Welby”, Chapter 24, pp.
380–432 in Charles S. Peirce : Selected Writings (Values  
 in a Universe of Chance), Edited with Introduction and Notes by
Philip P. Wiener, Dover Publications, New York, NY, 1966. 
 Resources 
 ========= 
 * C.S. Peirce • Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension 
 ( http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_06/v2_06.htm [7] ) 
 * Information = Comprehension × Extension 
 (
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension
[8] ) 
 • Selection 18 
 (
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension#Selection_18
[9] ) 
 * Interpreters and Interpretants 
 (
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Interpreters_and_Interpretants
[10] ) 
 Regards, 
 Jon 
 On 1/20/2018 11:19 AM, John F Sowa wrote: 
 > Edwina and Gary R, 
 >  
 > I changed the subject line to biosemiosis in order to emphasize
that 
 > Peirce had intended semiosis to cover the full realm of all living

 > things.  Note what he wrote in a letter to Lady Welby: 
 >  
 > CSP, MS 463 (1908) 
 >> I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something
else, 
 >> called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person,
which 
 >> effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby
mediately 
 >> determined by the former. My insertion of “upon a person” is
a sop 
 >> to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader
conception 
 >> understood. 
 >  
 > I believe that "despair" is the primary reason why he didn't say
more. 
 > His insistence on continuity implied that the faculties of the
human 
 > mind must be continuous with the minds (or quasi-minds) of all
living 
 > things anywhere in the universe.  But if he had said that, he
would 
 > have been denounced by a huge number of critics from philosophy, 
 > psychology, science, religion, and politics. 
 >  
 > Edwina 
 >> I do think that limiting Peircean semiosis to the human
conceptual 
 >> realm is a disservice to Peircean semiosis... I won't repeat my 
 >> constant reference to 4.551. 
 >  
 > Gary 
 >> I believe, you've had to depend on CP 4.551 as much as you have 
 >> (there are a very few other suggestions scattered through his
work, 
 >> but none of them are much developed). 
 >  
 > The reason why there are so few is that Peirce felt a need to 
 > throw a "sop to Cerberus" in order to get people to take his ideas

 > seriously.  I'm sure that he would gladly have written much more 
 > if they were ready to listen. 
 >  
 > For a very important and carefully worded quotation, see CP 2.227:

 >> all signs used by a "scientific" intelligence, that is to say, 
 >> by an intelligence capable of learning by experience. 
 >  
 > That comment certainly includes all large animals.  In addition 
 > to explicit statements about signs, it's important to note his 
 > anecdotes about dogs and parrots.  He observed some remarkable 
 > performances, which implied "scientific intelligence".  Although 
 > he didn't say so explicitly, he wouldn't have made the effort 
 > to write those anecdotes if he didn't think so. 
 >  
 > Since Peirce talked about "crystals and bees" in CP 4.551, he must

 > have been thinking about the continuity to zoosemiosis, and from
that 
 > to the intermediate stages of phytosemiosis, biosemiosis by
microbes, 
 > crystal formation, and eventually to all of chemistry and physics.

 > He would have been delighted to learn about the signs called DNA 
 > and the semiosis that interprets those signs in all aspects of
life. 
 >  
 > Many people have observed strong similarities with Whitehead's 
 > process philosophy.  ANW also had a continuity of mind-like things

 > from the lowest levels to something he called God.  He wrote most 
 > of his philosophical books at Harvard, and he also wrote some 
 > sympathetic words about Peirce.  He admitted that he hadn't read 
 > much of Peirce's work, but Clarence Irving Lewis, the chairman of 
 > the philosophy dept. at that time, had studied Peirce's MSS in 
 > great detail.  And Whitehead was also the thesis advisor for the 
 > two graduate students, Hartshorne and Weiss, who edited the CP. 
 > ANW must have absorbed much more than he cited in his references. 
 >  
 > We should also remember that there are thousands of pages of MSS 
 > that have not yet been transcribed and studied.  Nobody knows how 
 > much more might be discovered about all these issues.  But the 
 > fragments that do exist show that he had intended much more. 
 >  
 > John 
 >  
 --  
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