Edwina, List:

I agree that there are multiple Signs involved in Gary R.'s thought
experiment; the girl's scream is only one of them.  As I said, any
analysis--even using consistent terminology--will be somewhat arbitrary,
since semiosis is *continuous*.

While I have gained a much better understanding and appreciation of your
model in recent days, I still cannot agree with it; mainly because, in my
reading of Peirce, I have yet to come across a passage where he defines or
uses "Representamen" as you do, for a "knowledge base."  Instead, he writes
about the "utterer" and "interpreter" of a Sign, eventually generalizing
this to a "Quasi-utterer" and a "Quasi-interpreter," which are both
"Quasi-minds" that become "welded" in the Sign (CP 4.551; 1906) when
it serves as a medium for communication of an idea or form between them (EP
2:391 and EP 2:544n2; 1906).  The process is no different when the two
Quasi-minds are "the mind of yesterday" and "the mind of tomorrow into
which yesterday's has grown" (EP 2:388; 1906).

The Representamen, on the other hand, is more like what some have called a
"sign-vehicle" (cf. CP 1.339; undated), although I am not a fan of that
particular term.  It is "something which stands to somebody for something
in some respect or capacity" (CP 2.228; c. 1897); something having the
character "by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental
effect [its Interpretant], it may stand in place of another thing [its
Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899); "that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902); and
"[t]he concrete subject that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903).  "Indeed,
representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a
sign, or *representamen*, of some kind, *outward or inward*, mediating
between an object and an interpreting thought" (CP 1.480; c. 1896, emphases
added).  Furthermore ...

CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of
repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt
good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or
any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same
representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same
with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs,
it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A
representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of
repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact
represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903)


Not "knowledge bases," but things like proverbs, diagrams, pictures,
physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens.  In
fact, according to Peirce, each of these is the *same *Representamen *whenever
*it is embodied in a Replica, although I would say that it is part of a
different *Sign *when the Immediate Object or Immediate Interpretant is
different.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 8:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> As usual - I have a different outline. I think there are multiple Signs
> involved. I understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often DI. That's the
> basic format.
>
> 1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign
>
> - a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot].  DO is the stove.
> R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling.
>
> 2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign
>
> - spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of
> experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to heat.
>
> 3. Mother hears cry: Both a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign and a Rhematic
> Indexical Legisign
>
> - mother's FEELING on hearing the cry; mother's connecting this cry with
> her child and with pain
>
> DO is the cry; R is her knowledge base that a cry is pain; and
> indexically,  that it is her child's pain
>
> 4. Mother decides what to do: Argument Symbolic Legisign
>
> - mother thinks how to treat a burn. DO is the events in #3; R is her
> knowledge base. DI is the ice and lotions.
>
> 5. Mother treats child: Dicent Symbolic Legisign
>
> - mother treats child. DO is the burn AND the DI of #4, the ice and
> lotions; R is her knowledge
>
> That's how I see it.
>
> Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge base -
> whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I disagree with
> Jon that the R is the cry of the child...
>
> Edwina
>
> On Thu 08/02/18 8:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary R., List:
>
> I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate Object as
>  the partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the
> Sign denotes it.  It is partial because (as you said) knowing the DO in
> its fullness is an impossibility.  It does not itself predicate anything
> of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that would make it a Sign in its own right,
> rather than a  part of a Sign--but it seems to me that it must somehow
> involve enough of the DO's attributes to ground (as you said) its
> association with the DO.  Collateral Experience would then be  the
> aggregate of previous IOs  by which someone is already acquainted  with
> the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it.  What do you think?
>
> As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of semiosis
> should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of interest, because that
> will affect how we classify everything else.  For example, consider the
> girl's scream as the Sign.  It seems to me that its DO is the burning of
> her hand, its IO is the pain that she feels, its R is the sound that she
> makes, its II is the range of possible effects that this might have, and
> its DI is the response of her mother.  All of these assignments are
> somewhat arbitrary, though, because various other things are also
> happening--both internal and external to the girl--that would warrant a
> different yet equally valid analysis, even if the terminological
> definitions are exactly the same.  In that sense, I am constructing a
> diagram that embodies what I discern to be the significant relations
> among the parts of the (in this case) hypothetical situation.  Again, what
> do you think?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 5:12 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Jeff, Jon S, Edwina, Gary f, Helmut, list,
>>
>> I agree with Jon S that there is value in theoretical as well as
>> practical (pragmatic) analyses of the Sign and pragmaticism more generally.
>> While, as I noted in a post of a few days ago, it would seem that we have
>> been concentrating on the theoretical much more than the practical for the
>> last several months, while there is surely a place for discussions of both
>> on the list. Still, I hope Mary's questions and Dan's comments will
>> encourage forum members to initiate threads on pragmatism which are less
>> theoretical.
>>
>> But first, thanks for this interesting, albeit perhaps controversial
>> post, Jeff. You concluded:
>>
>> JD: Putting the matter in simpler terms, it might be good to ask how
>> inner and outer apply to signs that stand in relations of similarity to
>> their objects (e.g., icons), and then take up the question of how it
>> applies to an individual substantial object, a general conception--and then
>> to a thinking being like us who sees the world in terms of what is internal
>> to thought and what is external to thought. The phenomena in our experience
>> of inner (e.g., subjective) and outer (e.g., objective) is, I take it,
>> being explained in terms of the way the distinction is applied in the cases
>> of these relatively simpler kinds of things--largely because that is how
>> greater clarity can be achieved.
>>
>>
>> I'm interested in this matter of outer-inner from several standpoint
>> including in terms of Peirce's notion of "signs of signs," an expression he
>> introduces tentatively late in his work on semeiotic in a letter to
>> Victoria Welby.
>>
>> I'd also like to discuss further, but not much in this post, the
>> Immediate Object--which seems, along with the Representamen, to be a
>> continuing bone of contention for some. I would, however, note that Gary f
>> has already given us as a springboard for discussion by offering a rather
>> useful quote of Peirce's from a letter to William James in one of the
>> Lowell threads. I think that quotation still needs to be further
>> unpacked/analyzed. But, in addition, in an off-list note Gary f commented:
>>
>> Gf: Quotes from the Logic Notebook and a couple of other sources. . .
>> make Peirce’s definitions and actual usage of the term immediate object very
>> clear: it’s the “part of the sign which indicates or represents the
>> dynamic object” (but does not  predicate anything of that object, such
>> as recognizing it as a member of a general class would do).
>>
>>
>> The IO is that “ part of the sign which indicates or represents the
>> dynamic object” (but does not predicate anything of that object)." But,
>> again, I would suggest as I did earlier that it indicates the Ground  of
>> the Object, not the Object in its fullness, an impossibility. But I can
>> imagine that some might argue that it indeed does indicates the DO itself,
>> known through collateral observation.
>>
>> But for now let me return to my thought-experiment based on Peirce's
>> example of how we learn, "A child learns a lesson."
>>
>> So, again, the example (developed a little): A young child told not to
>> touch the hot stove nevertheless touches it to find out for herself. She
>> fulls back her hand as she screams in pain at which point her mother,
>> hearing her scream, rushes to her and quickly puts ice and then ointment on
>> her fingers.
>>
>> I would suggest that something involved in 'hot stove burners' (the
>> direct object) might be seen as a sign (or signs, say of heat, etc.) for
>> some here. What is the putative sign here?
>>
>> Then the child's mind in relation to the DO (having 'determined' her IO,
>> 'selecting', so to speak, some few out of all the possible
>> characteristics/attributes of the DO, these being most likely iconic signs)
>> forms a ground, or basis, of her semiosis, an internal sign, that is, her
>> IO-R-DI. So, what is her Immediate Object? What is her Representamen?
>>
>> Now her DI would seem to be her scream: that is another sign, an external
>> sign for her mother which is (or involves) a DO which, again,
>> 'determines' her internal IO-R-DI, running to the child, etc. What is the
>> Dynamic Object for her mother.
>>
>> Her mother's thoughts and actions represent other signs, etc.
>>
>> I'd like to hear from folk on the list how they might characterize the
>> Signs and semiosis involved in this example.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> [image: Blocked image]
>>
>> Gary Richmond
>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
>> Communication Studies
>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>
>>
>
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