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}Jon, list

        And of course - I disagree.  I think your understanding of the Sign
[DO-[IO-R-II] is reductionist. You don't seem, to me, to be involved
in a view of semiosis as an interactive set of relations. 

        You have not shown us where the knowledge base; i.e., the laws, the
rules, the commonality of an interaction, comes into action. 

        I disagree that, as you write, " proverbs, diagrams, pictures,
physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens".
Each one of these functions only within a full triad and is not and
cannot be simply the Representamen. 

        A weathercock is a DO-[IO-R-II].  That is, it functions as that
weathercock within an interaction with another Sign ,
DO-[IO-R-II] this case, the wind and within an observer [also
operative in the full Sign set]. Most certainly, the weathercock is
not simply a Representamen. What is the Representamen in the
situation where it, as a piece of metal, moves in the wind? The
Representamen is the kinetic laws-of-force of the wind, which will
move that piece of metal as it sits on a post. What is the DO? The

 On Fri 09/02/18 10:06 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt
 Edwina, List:
 I agree that there are multiple Signs involved in Gary R.'s thought
experiment; the girl's scream is only one of them.  As I said, any
analysis--even using consistent terminology--will be somewhat
arbitrary, since semiosis is continuous.
 While I have gained a much better understanding and appreciation of
your model in recent days, I still cannot agree with it; mainly
because, in my reading of Peirce, I have yet to come across a passage
where he defines or uses "Representamen" as you do, for a "knowledge
base."  Instead, he writes about the "utterer" and "interpreter" of a
Sign, eventually generalizing this to a "Quasi-utterer" and a
"Quasi-interpreter," which are both "Quasi-minds" that become
"welded" in the Sign  (CP 4.551; 1906) when it serves as a medium for
communication of an idea or form between them (EP 2:391 and EP
2:544n2; 1906).  The process is no different when the two Quasi-minds
are "the mind of yesterday" and "the mind of tomorrow into which
yesterday's has grown" (EP 2:388; 1906). 
 The Representamen, on the other hand, is more like what some have
called a "sign-vehicle" (cf. CP 1.339; undated), although I am not a
fan of that particular term.  It is "something which stands to
somebody for something in some respect or capacity" (CP 2.228; c.
1897); something having the character "by virtue of which, for the
production of a certain mental effect [its Interpretant], it may
stand in place of another thing [its Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899);
"that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902); and "[t]he concrete subject
that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903).  "Indeed, representation
necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a sign, or 
representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an
object and an interpreting thought" (CP 1.480; c. 1896, emphases
added).  Furthermore ...
 CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is
capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil
communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or
spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is
thought of it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a
diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If
two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they
refer to different parts of the air. A representamen which should
have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a
representamen, but a part of the very fact represented." (CP 5.138,
EP 2:203; 1903) 
 Not "knowledge bases," but things like proverbs, diagrams, pictures,
physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens.  In
fact, according to Peirce, each of these is the same Representamen
whenever it is embodied in a Replica, although I would say that it is
part of a different Sign when the Immediate Object or Immediate
Interpretant is different.
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran [1] - [2] 
 On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 8:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
        As usual - I have a different outline. I think there are multiple
Signs involved. I understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often
DI. That's the basic format.

        1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign

        - a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot].  DO is the
stove. R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling. 

        2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign

        - spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of
experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to heat. 

        3. Mother hears cry: Both a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign and a Rhematic
Indexical Legisign

        - mother's FEELING on hearing the cry; mother's connecting this cry
with her child and with pain 

        DO is the cry; R is her knowledge base that a cry is pain; and
indexically,  that it is her child's pain

        4. Mother decides what to do: Argument Symbolic Legisign

        - mother thinks how to treat a burn. DO is the events in #3; R is
her knowledge base. DI is the ice and lotions.  

        5. Mother treats child: Dicent Symbolic Legisign

        - mother treats child. DO is the burn AND the DI of #4, the ice and
lotions; R is her knowledge

        That's how I see it.

        Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge
base - whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I
disagree with Jon that the R is the cry of the child...

 On Thu 08/02/18  8:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt
[4] sent:
 Gary R., List:
 I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate
Object as the  partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic
Object by which the Sign  denotes it.  It is partial because (as you
said) knowing the DO in its fullness is an impossibility.  It does
not  itself  predicate anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that
would make it a Sign in its own right, rather than a  part  of a
Sign--but it seems to me that it must somehow involve enough of the
DO's attributes to  ground  (as you said) its association with the
DO.  Collateral Experience would then be  the aggregate of previous
IOs  by which someone is already acquainted  with the DO, and thus
recognizes  the Sign as denoting it.  What do you think? 
  As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of
semiosis should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of
interest, because that will affect how we classify everything else. 
For example, consider the girl's scream as the Sign.  It seems to me
that its DO is the burning of her hand, its IO is the pain that she
feels, its R is the sound that she makes, its II is the range of
possible effects that this might have, and its DI is the response of
her mother.  All of these assignments are somewhat arbitrary, though,
because various other things are also happening--both internal and
external to the girl--that would warrant a different yet equally
valid analysis, even if the terminological definitions are exactly
the same.  In that sense, I am constructing a  diagram  that embodies
what I discern to be the significant  relations among the parts of the
(in this case) hypothetical situation.  Again, what do you think? 
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran [5] - [6] 
 On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 5:12 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Jeff, Jon S, Edwina, Gary f, Helmut, list,
 I agree with Jon S that there is value in theoretical as well as
practical (pragmatic) analyses of the Sign and pragmaticism more
generally. While, as I noted in a post of a few days ago, it would
seem that we have been concentrating on the theoretical much more
than the practical for the last several months, while there is surely
a place for discussions of both on the list. Still, I hope Mary's
questions and Dan's comments will encourage forum members to initiate
threads on pragmatism which are less theoretical. 
 But first, thanks for this interesting, albeit perhaps controversial
post, Jeff. You concluded:
 JD: Putting the matter in simpler terms, it might be good to ask how
inner and outer apply to signs that stand in relations of similarity
to their objects (e.g., icons), and then take up the question of how
it applies to an individual substantial object, a general
conception--and then to a thinking being like us who sees the world
in terms of what is internal to thought and what is external to
thought. The phenomena in our experience of inner (e.g., subjective)
and outer (e.g., objective) is, I take it, being explained in terms
of the way the distinction is applied in the cases of these
relatively simpler kinds of things--largely because that is how
greater clarity can be achieved. 
 I'm interested in this matter of outer-inner from several standpoint
including in terms of Peirce's notion of "signs of signs," an
expression he introduces tentatively late in his work on semeiotic in
a letter to Victoria Welby. 
 I'd also like to discuss further, but not much in this post, the
Immediate Object--which seems, along with the Representamen, to be a
continuing bone of contention for some. I would, however, note that
Gary f has already given us as a springboard for discussion by
offering a rather useful quote of Peirce's from a letter to William
James in one of the Lowell threads. I think that quotation still
needs to be further unpacked/analyzed. But, in addition, in an
off-list note Gary f commented: 
 Gf: Quotes from the Logic Notebook and a couple of other sources. .
. make Peirce’s definitions and actual usage of the term immediate
object very clear: it’s the “part of the sign which indicates or
represents the dynamic object” (but does not  predicate anything of
that object, such as recognizing it as a member of a general class
would do).
 The IO is that “ part of the sign which indicates or represents
the dynamic object” (but does not predicate anything of that
object)." But, again, I would suggest as I did earlier that it
indicates the Ground  of the Object, not the Object in its fullness,
an impossibility. But I can imagine that some might argue that it
indeed does indicates the DO itself, known through collateral
 But for now let me return to my thought-experiment based on Peirce's
example of how we learn, "A child learns a lesson."  
 So, again, the example (developed a little): A young child told not
to touch the hot stove nevertheless touches it to find out for
herself. She fulls back her hand as she screams in pain at which
point her mother, hearing her scream, rushes to her and quickly puts
ice and then ointment on her fingers.
 I would suggest that something involved in 'hot stove burners' (the
direct object) might be seen as a sign (or signs, say of heat, etc.)
for some here. What is the putative sign here?
 Then the child's mind in relation to the DO (having 'determined' her
IO, 'selecting', so to speak, some few out of all the possible
characteristics/attributes of the DO, these being most likely iconic
signs) forms a ground, or basis, of her semiosis, an internal sign,
that is, her IO-R-DI. So, what is her Immediate Object? What is her
 Now her DI would seem to be her scream: that is another sign, an
external  sign for her mother which is (or involves) a DO which,
again, 'determines' her internal IO-R-DI, running to the child, etc.
What is the Dynamic Object for her mother.
 Her mother's thoughts and actions represent other signs, etc.
 I'd like to hear from folk on the list how they might characterize
the Signs and semiosis involved in this example.
 Gary R 
  Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718
482-5690 [7]  

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