Jon, Edwina, list,

Jon wrote:

JAS: I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate Object
as the *partial *combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by which
the Sign *denotes *it.  It is partial because (as you said) knowing the DO
in its fullness is an impossibility.  It does not *itself *predicate
anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that would make it a Sign in its own
right, rather than a *part *of a Sign--but it seems to me that it must
somehow involve enough of the DO's attributes to *ground *(as you said) its
association with the DO.  Collateral Experience would then be the aggregate
of *previous *IOs by which someone is already *acquainted *with the DO, and
thus *recognizes *the Sign as denoting it.  What do you think?


I think this is sound. Immediate Object: the *partial *combination of
attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the Sign *denotes *it. Collateral
Experience: the aggregate of *previous *IOs by which someone is already
*acquainted *with the DO, and thus *recognizes *the Sign as denoting it.

JAS: As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of
semiosis should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of interest,
because that will affect how we classify everything else.  For example,
consider the girl's scream as the Sign.  It seems to me that its DO is the
burning of her hand, its IO is the pain that she feels, its R is the sound
that she makes, its II is the range of possible effects that this might
have, and its DI is the response of her mother.


As I remarked, I had been thinking of the DO as the flaming burners, a sign
that the child hasn't yet learned (this, again, is how Peirce employs this
example, i.e., re: how we learn), which is to say, she has not had
collateral experience of fire yet. So I don't at the moment tend to agree
with you that the DO is the burning of her hand (but I'm still unclear on
this). In any event, I agree that the IO is her feeling of pain, but not
the the R is the sound she makes. Rather I see the feeling of pain (IO)
'determining' the R which 'determines' the DI, her crying out.

JAS: All of these assignments are somewhat arbitrary, though, because
various other things are also happening--both internal and external to the
girl--that would warrant a different yet equally valid analysis, even if
the terminological definitions are exactly the same.  In that sense, I am
constructing a *diagram* that embodies what I discern to be the
*significant *relations among the parts of the (in this case) hypothetical
situation.  Again, what do you think?


I would agree that our several "assignments are somewhat arbitrary. . .
because various other things are also happening. . . that would warrant a
different yet equally valid analysis, even if the terminological
definitions are exactly the same." But if each of our "diagrams" is
different, while some of them may be congruent, some may not be, may even
be quite wrong. So this arbitrariness brings up more questions than answers
to my mind. So I again wonder if the focus on exact terminological analysis
in such cases (hypothetical or existential) can lead to much that would be
helpful (that is, towards are mutual understanding of the Signs involved).
In a word, these various types of Signs *may be* occurring, but the may
also be as aggregate much too complex to analyze adequately except,
perhaps, as exemplify the various Sign types (pretty much all that Peirce
attempts even in the James letter) which classes, after all, are
abstractions from existential reality.

Edwina wrote:

​
ET: I think there are multiple Signs involved. I understand the Sign as:
DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often DI. That's the basic format.


Did you perhaps mean "DO-[IO-R-*II*]...and often DI"?

ET: 1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign

- a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot].  DO is the stove.
R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling.

I don't see the R as "the physiology of skin" but as the 'unfolding' of the
R from its IO, the felt pain (, through to the ejaculatory cry, which as I
see it is the DI.

ET: 2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign

- spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of
experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to heat.

I don't agree. Again I see the cry as the child's Dynamic Interpretant
which *for the mother* is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. The child's
semiosis is centered in the pain 'determining' her DI.

As for the rest of the signs involved in the mother's reaction, well,
that's all too complex for me to analyze let alone comment on your analysis
(except to say that, on first reading, I would tend to agree with some of
your analysis, disagree with other parts of it). Suffice it to say that
there are many, many possible signs involved in her reaction to hearing her
child's cry. I think a complex analysis in terms of sign categories is,
well, pretty much in vain.

ET: Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge base -
whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I disagree with
Jon that the R is the cry of the child...

In my view there are at least two Signs for the child, the external one
(I'm still not entirely clear as to *exactly* how to characterize it--but
there *is* a Sign), and the internal one, although I disagree with you and
agree with Jon that it is not "a general knowledge base," while it,
perhaps, operates* within* one.

Again, for me the child's cry is a Dynamic Interpretant (so part of the
child's Sign), but for the mother the cry is a Sign, a Rhematic Indexical
Sinsign. And this final point again brings up for me the interesting idea
of "Signs of SIgns," since the child's Interpretant Sign becomes a
different Sign for her mother (in my view).

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 10:06 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> I agree that there are multiple Signs involved in Gary R.'s thought
> experiment; the girl's scream is only one of them.  As I said, any
> analysis--even using consistent terminology--will be somewhat arbitrary,
> since semiosis is *continuous*.
>
> While I have gained a much better understanding and appreciation of your
> model in recent days, I still cannot agree with it; mainly because, in my
> reading of Peirce, I have yet to come across a passage where he defines or
> uses "Representamen" as you do, for a "knowledge base."  Instead, he writes
> about the "utterer" and "interpreter" of a Sign, eventually generalizing
> this to a "Quasi-utterer" and a "Quasi-interpreter," which are both
> "Quasi-minds" that become "welded" in the Sign (CP 4.551; 1906) when
> it serves as a medium for communication of an idea or form between them (EP
> 2:391 and EP 2:544n2; 1906).  The process is no different when the two
> Quasi-minds are "the mind of yesterday" and "the mind of tomorrow into
> which yesterday's has grown" (EP 2:388; 1906).
>
> The Representamen, on the other hand, is more like what some have called a
> "sign-vehicle" (cf. CP 1.339; undated), although I am not a fan of that
> particular term.  It is "something which stands to somebody for something
> in some respect or capacity" (CP 2.228; c. 1897); something having the
> character "by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental
> effect [its Interpretant], it may stand in place of another thing [its
> Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899); "that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902); and
> "[t]he concrete subject that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903).  "Indeed,
> representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a
> sign, or *representamen*, of some kind, *outward or inward*, mediating
> between an object and an interpreting thought" (CP 1.480; c. 1896, emphases
> added).  Furthermore ...
>
> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of
> repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt
> good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or
> any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same
> representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same
> with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs,
> it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A
> representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of
> repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact
> represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903)
>
>
> Not "knowledge bases," but things like proverbs, diagrams, pictures,
> physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens.  In
> fact, according to Peirce, each of these is the *same *Representamen *whenever
> *it is embodied in a Replica, although I would say that it is part of a
> different *Sign *when the Immediate Object or Immediate Interpretant is
> different.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 8:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> As usual - I have a different outline. I think there are multiple Signs
>> involved. I understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often DI. That's the
>> basic format.
>>
>> 1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign
>>
>> - a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot].  DO is the
>> stove. R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling.
>>
>> 2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign
>>
>> - spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of
>> experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to heat.
>>
>> 3. Mother hears cry: Both a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign and a Rhematic
>> Indexical Legisign
>>
>> - mother's FEELING on hearing the cry; mother's connecting this cry with
>> her child and with pain
>>
>> DO is the cry; R is her knowledge base that a cry is pain; and
>> indexically,  that it is her child's pain
>>
>> 4. Mother decides what to do: Argument Symbolic Legisign
>>
>> - mother thinks how to treat a burn. DO is the events in #3; R is her
>> knowledge base. DI is the ice and lotions.
>>
>> 5. Mother treats child: Dicent Symbolic Legisign
>>
>> - mother treats child. DO is the burn AND the DI of #4, the ice and
>> lotions; R is her knowledge
>>
>> That's how I see it.
>>
>> Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge base -
>> whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I disagree with
>> Jon that the R is the cry of the child...
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Thu 08/02/18 8:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Gary R., List:
>>
>> I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate Object as
>>  the partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by which
>> the Sign denotes it.  It is partial because (as you said) knowing the DO
>> in its fullness is an impossibility.  It does not itself predicate
>> anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that would make it a Sign in its own
>> right, rather than a  part of a Sign--but it seems to me that it must
>> somehow involve enough of the DO's attributes to ground (as you said)
>> its association with the DO.  Collateral Experience would then be  the
>> aggregate of previous IOs  by which someone is already acquainted  with
>> the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it.  What do you think?
>>
>> As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of semiosis
>> should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of interest, because that
>> will affect how we classify everything else.  For example, consider the
>> girl's scream as the Sign.  It seems to me that its DO is the burning of
>> her hand, its IO is the pain that she feels, its R is the sound that she
>> makes, its II is the range of possible effects that this might have, and
>> its DI is the response of her mother.  All of these assignments are
>> somewhat arbitrary, though, because various other things are also
>> happening--both internal and external to the girl--that would warrant a
>> different yet equally valid analysis, even if the terminological
>> definitions are exactly the same.  In that sense, I am constructing a
>> diagram that embodies what I discern to be the significant relations
>> among the parts of the (in this case) hypothetical situation.  Again, what
>> do you think?
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 5:12 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jeff, Jon S, Edwina, Gary f, Helmut, list,
>>>
>>> I agree with Jon S that there is value in theoretical as well as
>>> practical (pragmatic) analyses of the Sign and pragmaticism more generally.
>>> While, as I noted in a post of a few days ago, it would seem that we have
>>> been concentrating on the theoretical much more than the practical for the
>>> last several months, while there is surely a place for discussions of both
>>> on the list. Still, I hope Mary's questions and Dan's comments will
>>> encourage forum members to initiate threads on pragmatism which are less
>>> theoretical.
>>>
>>> But first, thanks for this interesting, albeit perhaps controversial
>>> post, Jeff. You concluded:
>>>
>>> JD: Putting the matter in simpler terms, it might be good to ask how
>>> inner and outer apply to signs that stand in relations of similarity to
>>> their objects (e.g., icons), and then take up the question of how it
>>> applies to an individual substantial object, a general conception--and then
>>> to a thinking being like us who sees the world in terms of what is internal
>>> to thought and what is external to thought. The phenomena in our experience
>>> of inner (e.g., subjective) and outer (e.g., objective) is, I take it,
>>> being explained in terms of the way the distinction is applied in the cases
>>> of these relatively simpler kinds of things--largely because that is how
>>> greater clarity can be achieved.
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm interested in this matter of outer-inner from several standpoint
>>> including in terms of Peirce's notion of "signs of signs," an expression he
>>> introduces tentatively late in his work on semeiotic in a letter to
>>> Victoria Welby.
>>>
>>> I'd also like to discuss further, but not much in this post, the
>>> Immediate Object--which seems, along with the Representamen, to be a
>>> continuing bone of contention for some. I would, however, note that Gary f
>>> has already given us as a springboard for discussion by offering a rather
>>> useful quote of Peirce's from a letter to William James in one of the
>>> Lowell threads. I think that quotation still needs to be further
>>> unpacked/analyzed. But, in addition, in an off-list note Gary f commented:
>>>
>>> Gf: Quotes from the Logic Notebook and a couple of other sources. . .
>>> make Peirce’s definitions and actual usage of the term immediate object very
>>> clear: it’s the “part of the sign which indicates or represents the
>>> dynamic object” (but does not  predicate anything of that object, such
>>> as recognizing it as a member of a general class would do).
>>>
>>>
>>> The IO is that “ part of the sign which indicates or represents the
>>> dynamic object” (but does not predicate anything of that object)." But,
>>> again, I would suggest as I did earlier that it indicates the Ground
>>> of the Object, not the Object in its fullness, an impossibility. But I can
>>> imagine that some might argue that it indeed does indicates the DO itself,
>>> known through collateral observation.
>>>
>>> But for now let me return to my thought-experiment based on Peirce's
>>> example of how we learn, "A child learns a lesson."
>>>
>>> So, again, the example (developed a little): A young child told not to
>>> touch the hot stove nevertheless touches it to find out for herself. She
>>> fulls back her hand as she screams in pain at which point her mother,
>>> hearing her scream, rushes to her and quickly puts ice and then ointment on
>>> her fingers.
>>>
>>> I would suggest that something involved in 'hot stove burners' (the
>>> direct object) might be seen as a sign (or signs, say of heat, etc.) for
>>> some here. What is the putative sign here?
>>>
>>> Then the child's mind in relation to the DO (having 'determined' her IO,
>>> 'selecting', so to speak, some few out of all the possible
>>> characteristics/attributes of the DO, these being most likely iconic signs)
>>> forms a ground, or basis, of her semiosis, an internal sign, that is,
>>> her IO-R-DI. So, what is her Immediate Object? What is her
>>> Representamen?
>>>
>>> Now her DI would seem to be her scream: that is another sign, an
>>> external sign for her mother which is (or involves) a DO which, again,
>>> 'determines' her internal IO-R-DI, running to the child, etc. What is the
>>> Dynamic Object for her mother.
>>>
>>> Her mother's thoughts and actions represent other signs, etc.
>>>
>>> I'd like to hear from folk on the list how they might characterize the
>>> Signs and semiosis involved in this example.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Gary R
>>>
>>> [image: Blocked image]
>>>
>>> Gary Richmond
>>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
>>> Communication Studies
>>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>>> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>
>>>
>>
>
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