# Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

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}Gary R - yes, thanks for your correction. The basic semiosic set, as
I see it, is: DO-[IO-R-II] - and often DI

I think that what is at issue for many is where the laws, the rules,
i.e., the general, non-local, common information, which I refer to as
the Knowledge Base,  moves into action within the semiosic
interaction. I see this as the Representamen. So far- I haven't heard
from anyone where this Knowledge Base comes into action.

Edwina
On Fri 09/02/18  1:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
Jon, Edwina, list,
Jon wrote:
JAS: I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate
Object as  the partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object
by which the Sign denotes it.  It is partial because (as you said)
knowing the DO in its fullness is an impossibility.  It does not
itself predicate anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that would
make it a Sign in its own right, rather than a  part of a Sign--but
it seems to me that it must somehow involve enough of the DO's
attributes to ground (as you said) its association with the DO.
Collateral Experience would then be the aggregate of previous IOs by
which someone is already acquainted with the DO, and thus recognizes
the Sign as denoting it.  What do you think?
I think this is sound. Immediate Object: the partial combination of
attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the Sign denotes  it.
Collateral Experience: the aggregate of previous IOs by which someone
is already acquainted with the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as
denoting it.
JAS: As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of
semiosis should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of
interest, because that will affect how we classify everything else.
For example, consider the girl's scream as the Sign.  It seems to me
that its DO is the burning of her hand, its IO is the pain that she
feels, its R is the sound that she makes, its II is the range of
possible effects that this might have, and its DI is the response of
her mother.
As I remarked, I had been thinking of the DO as the flaming burners,
a sign that the child hasn't yet learned (this, again, is how Peirce
employs this example, i.e., re: how we learn), which is to say, she
has not had collateral experience of fire yet. So I don't at the
moment tend to agree with you that the DO is the burning of her hand
(but I'm still unclear on this). In any event, I agree that the IO is
her feeling of pain, but not the the R is the sound she makes. Rather
I see the feeling of pain (IO) 'determining' the R which 'determines'
the DI, her crying out.
JAS: All of these assignments are somewhat arbitrary, though,
because various other things are also happening--both internal and
external to the girl--that would warrant a different yet equally
valid analysis, even if the terminological definitions are exactly
the same.  In that sense, I am constructing a diagram  that embodies
what I discern to be the significant relations among the parts of the
(in this case) hypothetical situation.  Again, what do you think?
I would agree that our several "assignments are somewhat arbitrary.
. . because various other things are also happening. . . that would
warrant a different yet equally valid analysis, even if the
terminological definitions are exactly the same." But if each of our
"diagrams" is different, while some of them may be congruent, some
may not be, may even be quite wrong. So this arbitrariness brings up
more questions than answers to my mind. So I again wonder if the
focus on exact terminological analysis in such cases (hypothetical or
existential) can lead to much that would be helpful (that is, towards
are mutual understanding of the Signs involved). In a word, these
various types of Signs  may be occurring, but the may also be as
aggregate much too complex to analyze adequately except, perhaps, as
exemplify the various Sign types (pretty much all that Peirce
attempts even in the James letter) which classes, after all, are
abstractions from existential reality.
Edwina wrote: ​ET: I think there are multiple Signs involved. I
understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often DI. That's the basic
format.
Did you perhaps mean "DO-[IO-R-II]...and often DI"?
ET: 1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign

- a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot].  DO is the
stove. R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling.

I don't see the R as "the physiology of skin" but as the 'unfolding'
of the R from its IO, the felt pain (, through to the ejaculatory cry,
which as I see it is the DI.

ET: 2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign

- spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of
experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to heat.

I don't agree. Again I see the cry as the child's Dynamic
Interpretant which for the mother is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.
The child's semiosis is centered in the pain 'determining' her DI.

As for the rest of the signs involved in the mother's reaction,
well, that's all too complex for me to analyze let alone comment on
your analysis (except to say that, on first reading, I would tend to
agree with some of your analysis, disagree with other parts of it).
Suffice it to say that there are many, many possible signs involved
in her reaction to hearing her child's cry. I think a complex
analysis in terms of sign categories is, well, pretty much in vain.

ET: Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge
base - whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I
disagree with Jon that the R is the cry of the child...

In my view there are at least two Signs for the child, the external
one (I'm still not entirely clear as to  exactly how to characterize
it--but there is a Sign), and the internal one, although I disagree
with you and agree with Jon that it is not "a general knowledge
base," while it, perhaps, operates within one.

Again, for me the child's cry is a Dynamic Interpretant (so part of
the child's Sign), but for the mother the cry is a Sign, a Rhematic
Indexical Sinsign. And this final point again brings up for me the
interesting idea of "Signs of SIgns," since the child's Interpretant
Sign becomes a different Sign for her mother (in my view).

Best,

Gary R
Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718
482-5690
On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 10:06 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
Edwina, List:
I agree that there are multiple Signs involved in Gary R.'s thought
experiment; the girl's scream is only one of them.  As I said, any
analysis--even using consistent terminology--will be somewhat
arbitrary, since semiosis is  continuous.
While I have gained a much better understanding and appreciation of
your model in recent days, I still cannot agree with it; mainly
because, in my reading of Peirce, I have yet to come across a passage
where he defines or uses "Representamen" as you do, for a "knowledge
Sign, eventually generalizing this to a "Quasi-utterer" and a
"Quasi-interpreter," which are both "Quasi-minds" that become
"welded" in the Sign  (CP 4.551; 1906) when it serves as a medium for
communication of an idea or form between them (EP 2:391 and EP
2:544n2; 1906).  The process is no different when the two Quasi-minds
are "the mind of yesterday" and "the mind of tomorrow into which
yesterday's has grown" (EP 2:388; 1906).
The Representamen, on the other hand, is more like what some have
called a "sign-vehicle" (cf. CP 1.339; undated), although I am not a
fan of that particular term.  It is "something which stands to
somebody for something in some respect or capacity" (CP 2.228; c.
1897); something having the character "by virtue of which, for the
production of a certain mental effect [its Interpretant], it may
stand in place of another thing [its Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899);
"that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902); and "[t]he concrete subject
that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903).  "Indeed, representation
necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a sign, or
representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an
object and an interpreting thought" (CP 1.480; c. 1896, emphases
CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is
capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil
communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or
spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is
thought of it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a
diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If
two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they
refer to different parts of the air. A representamen which should
have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a
representamen, but a part of the very fact represented." (CP 5.138,
EP 2:203; 1903)
Not "knowledge bases," but things like proverbs, diagrams, pictures,
physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens.  In
fact, according to Peirce, each of these is the same Representamen
whenever it is embodied in a Replica, although I would say that it is
part of a different Sign when the Immediate Object or Immediate
Interpretant is different.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 8:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
As usual - I have a different outline. I think there are multiple
Signs involved. I understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often
DI. That's the basic format.

1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign

- a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot].  DO is the
stove. R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling.

2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign

- spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of
experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to heat.

3. Mother hears cry: Both a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign and a Rhematic
Indexical Legisign

- mother's FEELING on hearing the cry; mother's connecting this cry
with her child and with pain

DO is the cry; R is her knowledge base that a cry is pain; and
indexically,  that it is her child's pain

4. Mother decides what to do: Argument Symbolic Legisign

- mother thinks how to treat a burn. DO is the events in #3; R is
her knowledge base. DI is the ice and lotions.

5. Mother treats child: Dicent Symbolic Legisign

- mother treats child. DO is the burn AND the DI of #4, the ice and
lotions; R is her knowledge

That's how I see it.

Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge
base - whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I
disagree with Jon that the R is the cry of the child...

Edwina
On Thu 08/02/18  8:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[5] sent:
Gary R., List:
I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate
Object as the  partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic
Object by which the Sign  denotes it.  It is partial because (as you
said) knowing the DO in its fullness is an impossibility.  It does
not  itself  predicate anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that
would make it a Sign in its own right, rather than a  part  of a
Sign--but it seems to me that it must somehow involve enough of the
DO's attributes to  ground  (as you said) its association with the
DO.  Collateral Experience would then be  the aggregate of previous
IOs  by which someone is already acquainted  with the DO, and thus
recognizes  the Sign as denoting it.  What do you think?
As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of
semiosis should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of
interest, because that will affect how we classify everything else.
For example, consider the girl's scream as the Sign.  It seems to me
that its DO is the burning of her hand, its IO is the pain that she
feels, its R is the sound that she makes, its II is the range of
possible effects that this might have, and its DI is the response of
her mother.  All of these assignments are somewhat arbitrary, though,
because various other things are also happening--both internal and
external to the girl--that would warrant a different yet equally
valid analysis, even if the terminological definitions are exactly
the same.  In that sense, I am constructing a  diagram  that embodies
what I discern to be the significant  relations among the parts of the
(in this case) hypothetical situation.  Again, what do you think?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 5:12 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
Jeff, Jon S, Edwina, Gary f, Helmut, list,
I agree with Jon S that there is value in theoretical as well as
practical (pragmatic) analyses of the Sign and pragmaticism more
generally. While, as I noted in a post of a few days ago, it would
seem that we have been concentrating on the theoretical much more
than the practical for the last several months, while there is surely
a place for discussions of both on the list. Still, I hope Mary's
questions and Dan's comments will encourage forum members to initiate
threads on pragmatism which are less theoretical.
But first, thanks for this interesting, albeit perhaps controversial
post, Jeff. You concluded:
JD: Putting the matter in simpler terms, it might be good to ask how
inner and outer apply to signs that stand in relations of similarity
to their objects (e.g., icons), and then take up the question of how
it applies to an individual substantial object, a general
conception--and then to a thinking being like us who sees the world
in terms of what is internal to thought and what is external to
thought. The phenomena in our experience of inner (e.g., subjective)
and outer (e.g., objective) is, I take it, being explained in terms
of the way the distinction is applied in the cases of these
relatively simpler kinds of things--largely because that is how
greater clarity can be achieved.
I'm interested in this matter of outer-inner from several standpoint
including in terms of Peirce's notion of "signs of signs," an
expression he introduces tentatively late in his work on semeiotic in
a letter to Victoria Welby.
I'd also like to discuss further, but not much in this post, the
Immediate Object--which seems, along with the Representamen, to be a
continuing bone of contention for some. I would, however, note that
Gary f has already given us as a springboard for discussion by
offering a rather useful quote of Peirce's from a letter to William
James in one of the Lowell threads. I think that quotation still
needs to be further unpacked/analyzed. But, in addition, in an
off-list note Gary f commented:
Gf: Quotes from the Logic Notebook and a couple of other sources. .
. make Peirce’s definitions and actual usage of the term immediate
object very clear: it’s the “part of the sign which indicates or
represents the dynamic object” (but does not  predicate anything of
that object, such as recognizing it as a member of a general class
would do).
The IO is that “ part of the sign which indicates or represents
the dynamic object” (but does not predicate anything of that
object)." But, again, I would suggest as I did earlier that it
indicates the Ground  of the Object, not the Object in its fullness,
an impossibility. But I can imagine that some might argue that it
indeed does indicates the DO itself, known through collateral
observation.
But for now let me return to my thought-experiment based on Peirce's
example of how we learn, "A child learns a lesson."
So, again, the example (developed a little): A young child told not
to touch the hot stove nevertheless touches it to find out for
herself. She fulls back her hand as she screams in pain at which
point her mother, hearing her scream, rushes to her and quickly puts
ice and then ointment on her fingers.
I would suggest that something involved in 'hot stove burners' (the
direct object) might be seen as a sign (or signs, say of heat, etc.)
for some here. What is the putative sign here?
Then the child's mind in relation to the DO (having 'determined' her
IO, 'selecting', so to speak, some few out of all the possible
characteristics/attributes of the DO, these being most likely iconic
signs) forms a ground, or basis, of her semiosis, an internal sign,
that is, her IO-R-DI. So, what is her Immediate Object? What is her
Representamen?
Now her DI would seem to be her scream: that is another sign, an
external  sign for her mother which is (or involves) a DO which,
again, 'determines' her internal IO-R-DI, running to the child, etc.
What is the Dynamic Object for her mother.
Her mother's thoughts and actions represent other signs, etc.
I'd like to hear from folk on the list how they might characterize
the Signs and semiosis involved in this example.
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718
482-5690 [8]
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