Edwina:

It is never helpful to toss out allegations like "reductionist."  My
still-developing model aspires to be just as interactive and relational as
yours, but uses the *terminology *differently, in a way that is much more
consistent with my reading of Peirce.  It is telling that I am *constantly*
going back to revisit Peirce's writings about this subject, and then
offering *multiple* citations to support my position, while you simply *assert
*yours over and over.

I actually *did *tell you where I see Peirce "locating" the "knowledge
base"--not the *Representamen*, but the *Quasi-mind*.  I will now add that
each individual Quasi-mind includes acquaintance with the system of Signs,
Collateral Experience as the aggregate of previous Immediate Objects, and
Habits of Interpretation as the aggregate of previous Final Interpretants.
The Commens is then the *overlapping *system of Signs, Collateral
Experience, and Habits of Interpretation by which the Sign serves as a
medium of communication *between *multiple individual Quasi-minds.

Apparently your novel definition of the Representamen compels you to
disagree that "proverbs, diagrams, pictures, physical signs, symptoms, and
weathercocks are all Representamens"; and yet, here again is what I quoted
directly from Peirce about this.

CSP:  The mode of being of a *representamen *is such that it is capable of
repetition. Take, for example, any *proverb*. "Evil communications corrupt
good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or
any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same
*representamen*. It is the same with a *diagram *or *picture*. It is the
same with a *physical sign* or *symptom*. If two *weathercocks *are
different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of
the air. A *representamen* which should have a unique embodiment, incapable
of repetition, would not be a *representamen*, but a part of the very fact
represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)


Taking the Representamen as a "knowledge base" simply *does not work* here,
nor in any of the *other *passages that I referenced below; and all of the
items that I listed are indeed called *Representamens *in Peirce's own
usage of that term.

Regards,

Jon S.

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 12:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon, list
>
> And of course - I disagree.  I think your understanding of the Sign
> [DO-[IO-R-II] is reductionist. You don't seem, to me, to be involved in a
> view of semiosis as an interactive set of relations.
>
> You have not shown us where the knowledge base; i.e., the laws, the rules,
> the commonality of an interaction, comes into action.
>
> I disagree that, as you write, " proverbs, diagrams, pictures, physical
> signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens". Each one of
> these functions only within a full triad and is not and cannot be simply
> the Representamen.
>
> A weathercock is a DO-[IO-R-II].  That is, it functions as that
> weathercock within an interaction with another Sign , DO-[IO-R-II]..in this
> case, the wind and within an observer [also operative in the full Sign
> set]. Most certainly, the weathercock is not simply a Representamen. What
> is the Representamen in the situation where it, as a piece of metal, moves
> in the wind? The Representamen is the kinetic laws-of-force of the wind,
> which will move that piece of metal as it sits on a post. What is the DO?
> The wind.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Fri 09/02/18 10:06 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> I agree that there are multiple Signs involved in Gary R.'s thought
> experiment; the girl's scream is only one of them.  As I said, any
> analysis--even using consistent terminology--will be somewhat arbitrary,
> since semiosis is continuous.
>
> While I have gained a much better understanding and appreciation of your
> model in recent days, I still cannot agree with it; mainly because, in my
> reading of Peirce, I have yet to come across a passage where he defines or
> uses "Representamen" as you do, for a "knowledge base."  Instead, he writes
> about the "utterer" and "interpreter" of a Sign, eventually generalizing
> this to a "Quasi-utterer" and a "Quasi-interpreter," which are both
> "Quasi-minds" that become "welded" in the Sign (CP 4.551; 1906) when
> it serves as a medium for communication of an idea or form between them (EP
> 2:391 and EP 2:544n2; 1906).  The process is no different when the two
> Quasi-minds are "the mind of yesterday" and "the mind of tomorrow into
> which yesterday's has grown" (EP 2:388; 1906).
>
> The Representamen, on the other hand, is more like what some have called a
> "sign-vehicle" (cf. CP 1.339; undated), although I am not a fan of that
> particular term.  It is "something which stands to somebody for something
> in some respect or capacity" (CP 2.228; c. 1897); something having the
> character "by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental
> effect [its Interpretant], it may stand in place of another thing [its
> Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899); "that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902); and
> "[t]he concrete subject that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903).  "Indeed,
> representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a
> sign, or  representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating
> between an object and an interpreting thought" (CP 1.480; c. 1896, emphases
> added).  Furthermore ...
>
> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of
> repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt
> good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or
> any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same
> representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same
> with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs,
> it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A
> representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of
> repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact
> represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903)
>
>
> Not "knowledge bases," but things like proverbs, diagrams, pictures,
> physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens.  In
> fact, according to Peirce, each of these is the same Representamen whenever
> it is embodied in a Replica, although I would say that it is part of a
> different Sign when the Immediate Object or Immediate Interpretant is
> different.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 8:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> As usual - I have a different outline. I think there are multiple Signs
>> involved. I understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often DI. That's the
>> basic format.
>>
>> 1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign
>>
>> - a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot].  DO is the
>> stove. R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling.
>>
>> 2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign
>>
>> - spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of
>> experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to heat.
>>
>> 3. Mother hears cry: Both a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign and a Rhematic
>> Indexical Legisign
>>
>> - mother's FEELING on hearing the cry; mother's connecting this cry with
>> her child and with pain
>>
>> DO is the cry; R is her knowledge base that a cry is pain; and
>> indexically,  that it is her child's pain
>>
>> 4. Mother decides what to do: Argument Symbolic Legisign
>>
>> - mother thinks how to treat a burn. DO is the events in #3; R is her
>> knowledge base. DI is the ice and lotions.
>>
>> 5. Mother treats child: Dicent Symbolic Legisign
>>
>> - mother treats child. DO is the burn AND the DI of #4, the ice and
>> lotions; R is her knowledge
>>
>> That's how I see it.
>>
>> Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge base -
>> whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I disagree with
>> Jon that the R is the cry of the child...
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
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