I think, the knowledge base belongs to the dynamical object, being its firstness part, the immaterial part, while the secondness of the dynamical object is its material/energetic part. Both parts are the object denoted by and part of the sign/representamen.
09. Februar 2018 um 19:36 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
Gary R - yes, thanks for your correction. The basic semiosic set, as I see it, is: DO-[IO-R-II] - and often DI
I think that what is at issue for many is where the laws, the rules, i.e., the general, non-local, common information, which I refer to as the Knowledge Base, moves into action within the semiosic interaction. I see this as the Representamen. So far- I haven't heard from anyone where this Knowledge Base comes into action.
On Fri 09/02/18 1:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
Jon, Edwina, list,
JAS: I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate Object as the partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the Sign denotes it. It is partial because (as you said) knowing the DO in its fullness is an impossibility. It does not itself predicate anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that would make it a Sign in its own right, rather than a part of a Sign--but it seems to me that it must somehow involve enough of the DO's attributes to ground (as you said) its association with the DO. Collateral Experience would then be the aggregate of previous IOs by which someone is already acquainted with the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it. What do you think?
I think this is sound. Immediate Object: the partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the Sign denotes it. Collateral Experience: the aggregate of previous IOs by which someone is already acquainted with the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it.
JAS: As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of semiosis should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of interest, because that will affect how we classify everything else. For example, consider the girl's scream as the Sign. It seems to me that its DO is the burning of her hand, its IO is the pain that she feels, its R is the sound that she makes, its II is the range of possible effects that this might have, and its DI is the response of her mother.
As I remarked, I had been thinking of the DO as the flaming burners, a sign that the child hasn't yet learned (this, again, is how Peirce employs this example, i.e., re: how we learn), which is to say, she has not had collateral experience of fire yet. So I don't at the moment tend to agree with you that the DO is the burning of her hand (but I'm still unclear on this). In any event, I agree that the IO is her feeling of pain, but not the the R is the sound she makes. Rather I see the feeling of pain (IO) 'determining' the R which 'determines' the DI, her crying out.
JAS: All of these assignments are somewhat arbitrary, though, because various other things are also happening--both internal and external to the girl--that would warrant a different yet equally valid analysis, even if the terminological definitions are exactly the same. In that sense, I am constructing a diagram that embodies what I discern to be the significant relations among the parts of the (in this case) hypothetical situation. Again, what do you think?
I would agree that our several "assignments are somewhat arbitrary. . . because various other things are also happening. . . that would warrant a different yet equally valid analysis, even if the terminological definitions are exactly the same." But if each of our "diagrams" is different, while some of them may be congruent, some may not be, may even be quite wrong. So this arbitrariness brings up more questions than answers to my mind. So I again wonder if the focus on exact terminological analysis in such cases (hypothetical or existential) can lead to much that would be helpful (that is, towards are mutual understanding of the Signs involved). In a word, these various types of Signs may be occurring, but the may also be as aggregate much too complex to analyze adequately except, perhaps, as exemplify the various Sign types (pretty much all that Peirce attempts even in the James letter) which classes, after all, are abstractions from existential reality.
ET: I think there are multiple Signs involved. I understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often DI. That's the basic format.
Did you perhaps mean "DO-[IO-R-II
]...and often DI"?
ET: 1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign
- a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot]. DO is the stove. R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling.
I don't see the R as "the physiology of skin" but as the 'unfolding' of the R from its IO, the felt pain (, through to the ejaculatory cry, which as I see it is the DI.
ET: 2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign
- spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to heat.
I don't agree. Again I see the cry as the child's Dynamic Interpretant which for the mother is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. The child's semiosis is centered in the pain 'determining' her DI.
As for the rest of the signs involved in the mother's reaction, well, that's all too complex for me to analyze let alone comment on your analysis (except to say that, on first reading, I would tend to agree with some of your analysis, disagree with other parts of it). Suffice it to say that there are many, many possible signs involved in her reaction to hearing her child's cry. I think a complex analysis in terms of sign categories is, well, pretty much in vain.
ET: Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge base - whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I disagree with Jon that the R is the cry of the child...
In my view there are at least two Signs for the child, the external one (I'm still not entirely clear as to exactly how to characterize it--but there is a Sign), and the internal one, although I disagree with you and agree with Jon that it is not "a general knowledge base," while it, perhaps, operates within one.
Again, for me the child's cry is a Dynamic Interpretant (so part of the child's Sign), but for the mother the cry is a Sign, a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. And this final point again brings up for me the interesting idea of "Signs of SIgns," since the child's Interpretant Sign becomes a different Sign for her mother (in my view).
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