BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list -  You haven't told us where and when the Quasi-Mind
enters the semiosic interaction. And why just the Quasi-Mind? Why not
MIND?

         When and how does MIND, which I understand as referring to the
general habits/laws/rules of organization of matter - enter the
semiosic interaction? My view is that this is the function of the
Representamen.

        I DO refer to Peirce - and DO re-read Peirce - but I'm not going to
constantly refer to the exact sections/paragraphs.

        Now, with reference to your quote: - I interpret this completely
differently from you.

        CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is
capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil
communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or
spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is
thought of it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a
diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If
two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they
refer to different parts of the air. A  representamen which should
have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a
representamen, but a part of the very fact represented." (CP 5.138,
EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)

        My reading of the above is that the Representamen, as a common
habit, as a generality - is most certainly capable of being
transformed and articulated, repeatedly, within any number of
INDIVIDUAL Dynamic Interpretants.

        The Representamen is not an individual
proverb/diagram/picture...etc. It is the generality of this proverb,
diagram/picture... that is capable of being expressed at any other
time - as an individual Dynamic Interpretant. 

        So- the symptoms of measles are general. They are the
laws-of-measles. As such, when the disease is activated within the
individual person, these general laws will be expressed, as
individual articulations of measles...as the Dynamic Interpretants.

        Exactly- if a Representamen does not function as GENERAL LAWS - but
is instead an individual 'unique embodiment'...then, it isn't a
Representamen. It is, a unique Dynamic Object or Dynamic
Interpretant. 

        And, to me - these habits/rules/laws...which are generalities rather
than specifics - are the domain of MIND - and expressed within the
mediative actions of the Representamen. 

        Edwina
 On Fri 09/02/18  2:19 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina:
 It is never helpful to toss out allegations like "reductionist."  My
still-developing model aspires to be just as interactive and
relational as yours, but uses the terminology differently, in a way
that is much more consistent with my reading of Peirce.  It is
telling that I am constantly going back to revisit Peirce's writings
about this subject, and then offering multiple citations to support
my position, while you simply  assert yours over and over.
 I actually did tell you where I see Peirce "locating" the "knowledge
base"--not the Representamen, but the Quasi-mind.  I will now add that
each individual Quasi-mind includes acquaintance with the system of
Signs, Collateral Experience as the aggregate of previous Immediate
Objects, and Habits of Interpretation as the aggregate of previous
Final Interpretants.  The Commens is then the overlapping  system of
Signs, Collateral Experience, and Habits of Interpretation by which
the Sign serves as a medium of communication between multiple
individual Quasi-minds.
 Apparently your novel definition of the Representamen compels you to
disagree that "proverbs, diagrams, pictures, physical signs, symptoms,
and weathercocks are all Representamens"; and yet, here again is what
I quoted directly from Peirce about this.
  CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is
capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil
communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or
spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is
thought of it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a
diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If
two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they
refer to different parts of the air. A  representamen which should
have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a
representamen, but a part of the very fact represented." (CP 5.138,
EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)
  Taking the Representamen as a "knowledge base" simply does not work
here, nor in any of the  other passages that I referenced below; and
all of the items that I listed are indeed called Representamens in
Peirce's own usage of that term. 
 Regards,
 Jon S.
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 12:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
        Jon, list

        And of course - I disagree.  I think your understanding of the Sign
[DO-[IO-R-II] is reductionist. You don't seem, to me, to be involved
in a view of semiosis as an interactive set of relations. 

        You have not shown us where the knowledge base; i.e., the laws, the
rules, the commonality of an interaction, comes into action. 

        I disagree that, as you write, " proverbs, diagrams, pictures,
physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens".
Each one of these functions only within a full triad and is not and
cannot be simply the Representamen.  

        A weathercock is a DO-[IO-R-II].  That is, it functions as that
weathercock within an interaction with another Sign ,
DO-[IO-R-II]..in this case, the wind and within an observer [also
operative in the full Sign set]. Most certainly, the weathercock is
not simply a Representamen. What is the Representamen in the
situation where it, as a piece of metal, moves in the wind? The
Representamen is the kinetic laws-of-force of the wind, which will
move that piece of metal as it sits on a post. What is the DO? The
wind. 

        Edwina

        On Fri 09/02/18 10:06 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[4] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I agree that there are multiple Signs involved in Gary R.'s thought
experiment; the girl's scream is only one of them.  As I said, any
analysis--even using consistent terminology--will be somewhat
arbitrary, since semiosis is continuous.
 While I have gained a much better understanding and appreciation of
your model in recent days, I still cannot agree with it; mainly
because, in my reading of Peirce, I have yet to come across a passage
where he defines or uses "Representamen" as you do, for a "knowledge
base."  Instead, he writes about the "utterer" and "interpreter" of a
Sign, eventually generalizing this to a "Quasi-utterer" and a
"Quasi-interpreter," which are both "Quasi-minds" that become
"welded" in the Sign  (CP 4.551; 1906) when it serves as a medium for
communication of an idea or form between them (EP 2:391 and EP
2:544n2; 1906).  The process is no different when the two Quasi-minds
are "the mind of yesterday" and "the mind of tomorrow into which
yesterday's has grown" (EP 2:388; 1906). 
 The Representamen, on the other hand, is more like what some have
called a "sign-vehicle" (cf. CP 1.339; undated), although I am not a
fan of that particular term.  It is "something which stands to
somebody for something in some respect or capacity" (CP 2.228; c.
1897); something having the character "by virtue of which, for the
production of a certain mental effect [its Interpretant], it may
stand in place of another thing [its Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899);
"that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902); and "[t]he concrete subject
that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903).  "Indeed, representation
necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a sign, or 
representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an
object and an interpreting thought" (CP 1.480; c. 1896, emphases
added).  Furthermore ...
 CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is
capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil
communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or
spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is
thought of it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a
diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If
two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they
refer to different parts of the air. A representamen which should
have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a
representamen, but a part of the very fact represented." (CP 5.138,
EP 2:203; 1903) 
 Not "knowledge bases," but things like proverbs, diagrams, pictures,
physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens.  In
fact, according to Peirce, each of these is the same Representamen
whenever it is embodied in a Replica, although I would say that it is
part of a different Sign when the Immediate Object or Immediate
Interpretant is different. 
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [5] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [6] 
 On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 8:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
        As usual - I have a different outline. I think there are multiple
Signs involved. I understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often
DI. That's the basic format.

        1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign

        - a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot].  DO is the
stove. R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling. 

        2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign

        - spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of
experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to heat. 

        3. Mother hears cry: Both a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign and a Rhematic
Indexical Legisign

        - mother's FEELING on hearing the cry; mother's connecting this cry
with her child and with pain 

        DO is the cry; R is her knowledge base that a cry is pain; and
indexically,  that it is her child's pain

        4. Mother decides what to do: Argument Symbolic Legisign

        - mother thinks how to treat a burn. DO is the events in #3; R is
her knowledge base. DI is the ice and lotions.  

        5. Mother treats child: Dicent Symbolic Legisign

        - mother treats child. DO is the burn AND the DI of #4, the ice and
lotions; R is her knowledge

        That's how I see it.

        Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge
base - whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I
disagree with Jon that the R is the cry of the child...

        Edwina


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