Edwina, list, You said: 'And why just the Quasi-Mind? Why not MIND?'
Yes, why so? Does someone have a response to this question? Best, Jerry R On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 1:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > I appreciate your positive feedback on my proposed definitions for the > Immediate Object and Collateral Experience. I included additional ones for > Habits of Interpretation and the Commens in my latest reply to Edwina, and > will be elaborating on all of that eventually, probably in a new thread. > Rediscovering Peirce's notion of a Quasi-mind was a bit of a breakthrough > for me, and serendipitous in that it only happened because I looked up the > bees and crystals passage when Helmut could not find it. > > I had to laugh when you referred to "flaming burners," because I was > thinking the whole time of an electric stove. I suspect that was due to a > childhood experience of my own, when my mother had just turned off such a > burner, so it was no longer glowing red when I casually set my arm down on > it to hand her a popsicle that I wanted her to unwrap for me. I still > vividly remember the stripes of singed flesh that resulted. I guess this > is another helpful reminder of the context-dependence of any concrete > Sign-action. > > If the DO is the hot burner, and the IO is the girl's sensation (not > feeling) of pain, and the DI is her scream, then what is the R? It would > have to be something internal to the girl as a Quasi-mind, presumably some > kind of mental Token that associates the pain with the burner as a new > addition to her Collateral Experience. This particular DI is likely > prompted by her established Habit of Interpretation for responding to pain > in general--mostly instinctive, rather than learned, except perhaps that > the specific form of the sound itself (as you originally suggested) has > been picked up from her French-speaking environment. The FI might very > well be produced by just this one Sign, rather than repetition--namely, the > habit of not touching hot burners, or perhaps not touching burners at all, > just to be safe. This addition of the new FI to her previous stock of > Habits of Interpretation constitutes a Habit-change--i.e., an instance of > genuine learning. > > I agree that diagrammatic analyses are not all created equal--as in > engineering, while there is rarely only one *right *answer, there are > certainly many *wrong *ones. I see the main benefit of insisting on > consistent terminology as bringing greater clarity to *each *analysis, > such that different ones can then be evaluated on a level playing field; > apples-to-apples, so to speak. And I definitely agree that what we are > trying to do here is an oversimplification--abstracting and idealizing a > situation that is both complicated and complex--but nevertheless believe > that there are valuable insights to be gained from the effort. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri 09/02/18 1:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent: >> >> Jon, Edwina, list, >> >> Jon wrote: >> >> JAS: I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate >> Object as the partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object >> by which the Sign denotes it. It is partial because (as you said) >> knowing the DO in its fullness is an impossibility. It does not itself >> predicate >> anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that would make it a Sign in its own >> right, rather than a part of a Sign--but it seems to me that it must >> somehow involve enough of the DO's attributes to ground (as you said) >> its association with the DO. Collateral Experience would then be the >> aggregate of previous IOs by which someone is already acquainted with >> the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it. What do you think? >> >> >> I think this is sound. Immediate Object: the partial combination of >> attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the Sign denotes it. Collateral >> Experience: the aggregate of previous IOs by which someone is already >> acquainted with the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it. >> >> JAS: As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of >> semiosis should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of interest, >> because that will affect how we classify everything else. For example, >> consider the girl's scream as the Sign. It seems to me that its DO is the >> burning of her hand, its IO is the pain that she feels, its R is the sound >> that she makes, its II is the range of possible effects that this might >> have, and its DI is the response of her mother. >> >> >> As I remarked, I had been thinking of the DO as the flaming burners, a >> sign that the child hasn't yet learned (this, again, is how Peirce employs >> this example, i.e., re: how we learn), which is to say, she has not had >> collateral experience of fire yet. So I don't at the moment tend to agree >> with you that the DO is the burning of her hand (but I'm still unclear on >> this). In any event, I agree that the IO is her feeling of pain, but not >> the the R is the sound she makes. Rather I see the feeling of pain (IO) >> 'determining' the R which 'determines' the DI, her crying out. >> >> JAS: All of these assignments are somewhat arbitrary, though, because >> various other things are also happening--both internal and external to the >> girl--that would warrant a different yet equally valid analysis, even if >> the terminological definitions are exactly the same. In that sense, I am >> constructing a diagram that embodies what I discern to be the >> significant relations among the parts of the (in this case) hypothetical >> situation. Again, what do you think? >> >> >> I would agree that our several "assignments are somewhat arbitrary. . . >> because various other things are also happening. . . that would warrant a >> different yet equally valid analysis, even if the terminological >> definitions are exactly the same." But if each of our "diagrams" is >> different, while some of them may be congruent, some may not be, may even >> be quite wrong. So this arbitrariness brings up more questions than answers >> to my mind. So I again wonder if the focus on exact terminological analysis >> in such cases (hypothetical or existential) can lead to much that would be >> helpful (that is, towards are mutual understanding of the Signs involved). >> In a word, these various types of Signs may be occurring, but the may >> also be as aggregate much too complex to analyze adequately except, >> perhaps, as exemplify the various Sign types (pretty much all that Peirce >> attempts even in the James letter) which classes, after all, are >> abstractions from existential reality. >> >> Edwina wrote: >> >> >> ET: I think there are multiple Signs involved. I understand the Sign as: >> DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often DI. That's the basic format. >> >> >> Did you perhaps mean "DO-[IO-R-II]...and often DI"? >> >> ET: 1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign >> >> - a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot]. DO is the >> stove. R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling. >> >> I don't see the R as "the physiology of skin" but as the 'unfolding' of >> the R from its IO, the felt pain (, through to the ejaculatory cry, which >> as I see it is the DI. >> >> ET: 2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign >> >> - spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of >> experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to heat. >> >> I don't agree. Again I see the cry as the child's Dynamic Interpretant >> which for the mother is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. The child's >> semiosis is centered in the pain 'determining' her DI. >> >> As for the rest of the signs involved in the mother's reaction, well, >> that's all too complex for me to analyze let alone comment on your analysis >> (except to say that, on first reading, I would tend to agree with some of >> your analysis, disagree with other parts of it). Suffice it to say that >> there are many, many possible signs involved in her reaction to hearing her >> child's cry. I think a complex analysis in terms of sign categories is, >> well, pretty much in vain. >> >> ET: Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge base >> - whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I disagree >> with Jon that the R is the cry of the child... >> >> In my view there are at least two Signs for the child, the external one >> (I'm still not entirely clear as to exactly how to characterize it--but >> there is a Sign), and the internal one, although I disagree with you and >> agree with Jon that it is not "a general knowledge base," while it, >> perhaps, operates within one. >> >> Again, for me the child's cry is a Dynamic Interpretant (so part of the >> child's Sign), but for the mother the cry is a Sign, a Rhematic Indexical >> Sinsign. And this final point again brings up for me the interesting idea >> of "Signs of SIgns," since the child's Interpretant Sign becomes a >> different Sign for her mother (in my view). >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> [image: Blocked image] >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690> >> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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