'And why just the Quasi-Mind? Why not MIND?'
Yes, why so? Does someone have a response to this question?
On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 1:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> Gary R., List:
> I appreciate your positive feedback on my proposed definitions for the
> Immediate Object and Collateral Experience. I included additional ones for
> Habits of Interpretation and the Commens in my latest reply to Edwina, and
> will be elaborating on all of that eventually, probably in a new thread.
> Rediscovering Peirce's notion of a Quasi-mind was a bit of a breakthrough
> for me, and serendipitous in that it only happened because I looked up the
> bees and crystals passage when Helmut could not find it.
> I had to laugh when you referred to "flaming burners," because I was
> thinking the whole time of an electric stove. I suspect that was due to a
> childhood experience of my own, when my mother had just turned off such a
> burner, so it was no longer glowing red when I casually set my arm down on
> it to hand her a popsicle that I wanted her to unwrap for me. I still
> vividly remember the stripes of singed flesh that resulted. I guess this
> is another helpful reminder of the context-dependence of any concrete
> If the DO is the hot burner, and the IO is the girl's sensation (not
> feeling) of pain, and the DI is her scream, then what is the R? It would
> have to be something internal to the girl as a Quasi-mind, presumably some
> kind of mental Token that associates the pain with the burner as a new
> addition to her Collateral Experience. This particular DI is likely
> prompted by her established Habit of Interpretation for responding to pain
> in general--mostly instinctive, rather than learned, except perhaps that
> the specific form of the sound itself (as you originally suggested) has
> been picked up from her French-speaking environment. The FI might very
> well be produced by just this one Sign, rather than repetition--namely, the
> habit of not touching hot burners, or perhaps not touching burners at all,
> just to be safe. This addition of the new FI to her previous stock of
> Habits of Interpretation constitutes a Habit-change--i.e., an instance of
> genuine learning.
> I agree that diagrammatic analyses are not all created equal--as in
> engineering, while there is rarely only one *right *answer, there are
> certainly many *wrong *ones. I see the main benefit of insisting on
> consistent terminology as bringing greater clarity to *each *analysis,
> such that different ones can then be evaluated on a level playing field;
> apples-to-apples, so to speak. And I definitely agree that what we are
> trying to do here is an oversimplification--abstracting and idealizing a
> situation that is both complicated and complex--but nevertheless believe
> that there are valuable insights to be gained from the effort.
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> On Fri 09/02/18 1:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>> Jon, Edwina, list,
>> Jon wrote:
>> JAS: I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate
>> Object as the partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object
>> by which the Sign denotes it. It is partial because (as you said)
>> knowing the DO in its fullness is an impossibility. It does not itself
>> anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that would make it a Sign in its own
>> right, rather than a part of a Sign--but it seems to me that it must
>> somehow involve enough of the DO's attributes to ground (as you said)
>> its association with the DO. Collateral Experience would then be the
>> aggregate of previous IOs by which someone is already acquainted with
>> the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it. What do you think?
>> I think this is sound. Immediate Object: the partial combination of
>> attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the Sign denotes it. Collateral
>> Experience: the aggregate of previous IOs by which someone is already
>> acquainted with the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it.
>> JAS: As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of
>> semiosis should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of interest,
>> because that will affect how we classify everything else. For example,
>> consider the girl's scream as the Sign. It seems to me that its DO is the
>> burning of her hand, its IO is the pain that she feels, its R is the sound
>> that she makes, its II is the range of possible effects that this might
>> have, and its DI is the response of her mother.
>> As I remarked, I had been thinking of the DO as the flaming burners, a
>> sign that the child hasn't yet learned (this, again, is how Peirce employs
>> this example, i.e., re: how we learn), which is to say, she has not had
>> collateral experience of fire yet. So I don't at the moment tend to agree
>> with you that the DO is the burning of her hand (but I'm still unclear on
>> this). In any event, I agree that the IO is her feeling of pain, but not
>> the the R is the sound she makes. Rather I see the feeling of pain (IO)
>> 'determining' the R which 'determines' the DI, her crying out.
>> JAS: All of these assignments are somewhat arbitrary, though, because
>> various other things are also happening--both internal and external to the
>> girl--that would warrant a different yet equally valid analysis, even if
>> the terminological definitions are exactly the same. In that sense, I am
>> constructing a diagram that embodies what I discern to be the
>> significant relations among the parts of the (in this case) hypothetical
>> situation. Again, what do you think?
>> I would agree that our several "assignments are somewhat arbitrary. . .
>> because various other things are also happening. . . that would warrant a
>> different yet equally valid analysis, even if the terminological
>> definitions are exactly the same." But if each of our "diagrams" is
>> different, while some of them may be congruent, some may not be, may even
>> be quite wrong. So this arbitrariness brings up more questions than answers
>> to my mind. So I again wonder if the focus on exact terminological analysis
>> in such cases (hypothetical or existential) can lead to much that would be
>> helpful (that is, towards are mutual understanding of the Signs involved).
>> In a word, these various types of Signs may be occurring, but the may
>> also be as aggregate much too complex to analyze adequately except,
>> perhaps, as exemplify the various Sign types (pretty much all that Peirce
>> attempts even in the James letter) which classes, after all, are
>> abstractions from existential reality.
>> Edwina wrote:
>> ET: I think there are multiple Signs involved. I understand the Sign as:
>> DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often DI. That's the basic format.
>> Did you perhaps mean "DO-[IO-R-II]...and often DI"?
>> ET: 1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign
>> - a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot]. DO is the
>> stove. R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling.
>> I don't see the R as "the physiology of skin" but as the 'unfolding' of
>> the R from its IO, the felt pain (, through to the ejaculatory cry, which
>> as I see it is the DI.
>> ET: 2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign
>> - spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of
>> experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to heat.
>> I don't agree. Again I see the cry as the child's Dynamic Interpretant
>> which for the mother is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. The child's
>> semiosis is centered in the pain 'determining' her DI.
>> As for the rest of the signs involved in the mother's reaction, well,
>> that's all too complex for me to analyze let alone comment on your analysis
>> (except to say that, on first reading, I would tend to agree with some of
>> your analysis, disagree with other parts of it). Suffice it to say that
>> there are many, many possible signs involved in her reaction to hearing her
>> child's cry. I think a complex analysis in terms of sign categories is,
>> well, pretty much in vain.
>> ET: Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge base
>> - whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I disagree
>> with Jon that the R is the cry of the child...
>> In my view there are at least two Signs for the child, the external one
>> (I'm still not entirely clear as to exactly how to characterize it--but
>> there is a Sign), and the internal one, although I disagree with you and
>> agree with Jon that it is not "a general knowledge base," while it,
>> perhaps, operates within one.
>> Again, for me the child's cry is a Dynamic Interpretant (so part of the
>> child's Sign), but for the mother the cry is a Sign, a Rhematic Indexical
>> Sinsign. And this final point again brings up for me the interesting idea
>> of "Signs of SIgns," since the child's Interpretant Sign becomes a
>> different Sign for her mother (in my view).
>> Gary R
>> [image: Blocked image]
>> Gary Richmond
>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
>> Communication Studies
>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>
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