Edwina,
I would say, the knowledge brought with the representamen is the immediate object, the common knowledge (which not necessarily includes all existing relevant rules/laws) is part of the dynamical object, and the complete knowledge (including all relevant rules/laws) is the final interpretant. Though the representamen has been an interpretant before! So you are right, I think: Because the interpretant consists of the final interpretant too, the representamen does so too, and contains the knowledge base. Am I getting close?
Best, Helmut
 
09. Februar 2018 um 21:01 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
 

Helmut - no, I'll disagree. Knowledge, as a commonality, as general rules/laws, is Thirdness. It can be compared to Arisotle and Plato's 'Form'. In Aristotle it is an integral part of matter; it is 'how' matter is organized. Peirce was an Aristotelian.

Edwina

 

On Fri 09/02/18 2:28 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina, List,
I think, the knowledge base belongs to the dynamical object, being its firstness part, the immaterial part, while the secondness of the dynamical object is its material/energetic part. Both parts are the object denoted by and part of the sign/representamen.
Best, Helmut
 
 09. Februar 2018 um 19:36 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Gary R - yes, thanks for your correction. The basic semiosic set, as I see it, is: DO-[IO-R-II] - and often DI

I think that what is at issue for many is where the laws, the rules, i.e., the general, non-local, common information, which I refer to as the Knowledge Base,  moves into action within the semiosic interaction. I see this as the Representamen. So far- I haven't heard from anyone where this Knowledge Base comes into action.

Edwina

 

On Fri 09/02/18 1:26 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:

Jon, Edwina, list,
 
Jon wrote:
 
JAS: I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate Object as  the partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the Sign denotes it.  It is partial because (as you said) knowing the DO in its fullness is an impossibility.  It does not  itself predicate anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that would make it a Sign in its own right, rather than a  part of a Sign--but it seems to me that it must somehow involve enough of the DO's attributes to  ground (as you said) its association with the DO.  Collateral Experience would then be the aggregate of previous IOs by which someone is already acquainted with the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it.  What do you think?
 
I think this is sound. Immediate Object: the partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the Sign denotes  it. Collateral Experience: the aggregate of  previous IOs by which someone is already acquainted with the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it.
 
JAS: As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of semiosis should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of interest, because that will affect how we classify everything else.  For example, consider the girl's scream as the Sign.  It seems to me that its DO is the burning of her hand, its IO is the pain that she feels, its R is the sound that she makes, its II is the range of possible effects that this might have, and its DI is the response of her mother. 
 
As I remarked, I had been thinking of the DO as the flaming burners, a sign that the child hasn't yet learned (this, again, is how Peirce employs this example, i.e., re: how we learn), which is to say, she has not had collateral experience of fire yet. So I don't at the moment tend to agree with you that the DO is the burning of her hand (but I'm still unclear on this). In any event, I agree that the IO is her feeling of pain, but not the the R is the sound she makes. Rather I see the feeling of pain (IO) 'determining' the R which 'determines' the DI, her crying out.
 
JAS: All of these assignments are somewhat arbitrary, though, because various other things are also happening--both internal and external to the girl--that would warrant a different yet equally valid analysis, even if the terminological definitions are exactly the same.  In that sense, I am constructing a diagram  that embodies what I discern to be the  significant relations among the parts of the (in this case) hypothetical situation.  Again, what do you think?
 
I would agree that our several "assignments are somewhat arbitrary. . . because various other things are also happening. . . that would warrant a different yet equally valid analysis, even if the terminological definitions are exactly the same." But if each of our "diagrams" is different, while some of them may be congruent, some may not be, may even be quite wrong. So this arbitrariness brings up more questions than answers to my mind. So I again wonder if the focus on exact terminological analysis in such cases (hypothetical or existential) can lead to much that would be helpful (that is, towards are mutual understanding of the Signs involved). In a word, these various types of Signs may be occurring, but the may also be as aggregate much too complex to analyze adequately except, perhaps, as exemplify the various Sign types (pretty much all that Peirce attempts even in the James letter) which classes, after all, are abstractions from existential reality.
 
Edwina wrote:
ET: I think there are multiple Signs involved. I understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often DI. That's the basic format.

 

 
Did you perhaps mean "DO-[IO-R-II]...and often DI"?

 

ET: 1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign

- a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot].  DO is the stove. R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling.

I don't see the R as "the physiology of skin" but as the 'unfolding' of the R from its IO, the felt pain (, through to the ejaculatory cry, which as I see it is the DI.

ET: 2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign

- spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to heat.

I don't agree. Again I see the cry as the child's Dynamic Interpretant which for the mother is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. The child's semiosis is centered in the pain 'determining' her DI.

As for the rest of the signs involved in the mother's reaction, well, that's all too complex for me to analyze let alone comment on your analysis (except to say that, on first reading, I would tend to agree with some of your analysis, disagree with other parts of it). Suffice it to say that there are many, many possible signs involved in her reaction to hearing her child's cry. I think a complex analysis in terms of sign categories is, well, pretty much in vain.

ET: Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge base - whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I disagree with Jon that the R is the cry of the child...

In my view there are at least two Signs for the child, the external one (I'm still not entirely clear as to exactly how to characterize it--but there is a Sign), and the internal one, although I disagree with you and agree with Jon that it is not "a general knowledge base," while it, perhaps, operates within one. 

Again, for me the child's cry is a Dynamic Interpretant (so part of the child's Sign), but for the mother the cry is a Sign, a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. And this final point again brings up for me the interesting idea of "Signs of SIgns," since the child's Interpretant Sign becomes a different Sign for her mother (in my view).

Best,

Gary R

 
 
Blocked image
 
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
718 482-5690
 
On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 10:06 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
Edwina, List:
 
I agree that there are multiple Signs involved in Gary R.'s thought experiment; the girl's scream is only one of them.  As I said, any analysis--even using consistent terminology--will be somewhat arbitrary, since semiosis is continuous.
 
While I have gained a much better understanding and appreciation of your model in recent days, I still cannot agree with it; mainly because, in my reading of Peirce, I have yet to come across a passage where he defines or uses "Representamen" as you do, for a "knowledge base."  Instead, he writes about the "utterer" and "interpreter" of a Sign, eventually generalizing this to a "Quasi-utterer" and a "Quasi-interpreter," which are both "Quasi-minds" that become "welded" in the Sign (CP 4.551; 1906) when it serves as a medium for communication of an idea or form between them (EP 2:391 and EP 2:544n2; 1906).  The process is no different when the two Quasi-minds are "the mind of yesterday" and "the mind of tomorrow into which yesterday's has grown" (EP 2:388; 1906).
 
The Representamen, on the other hand, is more like what some have called a "sign-vehicle" (cf. CP 1.339; undated), although I am not a fan of that particular term.  It is "something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity" (CP 2.228; c. 1897); something having the character "by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental effect [its Interpretant], it may stand in place of another thing [its Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899); "that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902); and "[t]he concrete subject that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903).  "Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a sign, or  representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought" (CP 1.480; c. 1896, emphases added).  Furthermore ...
 
CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903)
 
Not "knowledge bases," but things like proverbs, diagrams, pictures, physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens.  In fact, according to Peirce, each of these is the same Representamen whenever it is embodied in a Replica, although I would say that it is part of a different Sign when the Immediate Object or Immediate Interpretant is different.
 
Regards,
 
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
 
On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 8:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

As usual - I have a different outline. I think there are multiple Signs involved. I understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often DI. That's the basic format.

1. Child touches hot stove: Rhematic Iconic Qualisign

- a feeling of hot [without consciousness of it as hot].  DO is the stove. R is the physiology of skin. II is the feeling.

2. Child cries out: Rhematic Indexical Sinsign

- spontaneous cry. DO is THE FEELING OF HEAT; i.e., the feeling of experience the above Sign. R is the physiology's reaction to heat.

3. Mother hears cry: Both a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign and a Rhematic Indexical Legisign

- mother's FEELING on hearing the cry; mother's connecting this cry with her child and with pain

DO is the cry; R is her knowledge base that a cry is pain; and indexically,  that it is her child's pain

4. Mother decides what to do: Argument Symbolic Legisign

- mother thinks how to treat a burn. DO is the events in #3; R is her knowledge base. DI is the ice and lotions.

5. Mother treats child: Dicent Symbolic Legisign

- mother treats child. DO is the burn AND the DI of #4, the ice and lotions; R is her knowledge

That's how I see it.

Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge base - whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I disagree with Jon that the R is the cry of the child...

Edwina

On Thu 08/02/18 8:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:

Gary R., List:
 
I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate Object as the  partial  combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the Sign  denotes it.  It is partial because (as you said) knowing the DO in its fullness is an impossibility.  It does not itself predicate anything of the DO (as Gary F. said)--that would make it a Sign in its own right, rather than a  part of a Sign--but it seems to me that it must somehow involve enough of the DO's attributes to ground (as you said) its association with the DO.  Collateral Experience would then be  the aggregate of previous IOs  by which someone is already acquainted  with the DO, and thus recognizes the Sign as denoting it.  What do you think?
 
As for your thought experiment, I believe that any analysis of semiosis should begin by identifying the specific Sign(s) of interest, because that will affect how we classify everything else.  For example, consider the girl's scream as the Sign.  It seems to me that its DO is the burning of her hand, its IO is the pain that she feels, its R is the sound that she makes, its II is the range of possible effects that this might have, and its DI is the response of her mother.  All of these assignments are somewhat arbitrary, though, because various other things are also happening--both internal and external to the girl--that would warrant a different yet equally valid analysis, even if the terminological definitions are exactly the same.  In that sense, I am constructing a diagram that embodies what I discern to be the significant relations among the parts of the (in this case) hypothetical situation.  Again, what do you think?
 
Regards,
 
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 5:12 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote:
Jeff, Jon S, Edwina, Gary f, Helmut, list,
 
I agree with Jon S that there is value in theoretical as well as practical (pragmatic) analyses of the Sign and pragmaticism more generally. While, as I noted in a post of a few days ago, it would seem that we have been concentrating on the theoretical much more than the practical for the last several months, while there is surely a place for discussions of both on the list. Still, I hope Mary's questions and Dan's comments will encourage forum members to initiate threads on pragmatism which are less theoretical.
 
But first, thanks for this interesting, albeit perhaps controversial post, Jeff. You concluded:
 
JD: Putting the matter in simpler terms, it might be good to ask how inner and outer apply to signs that stand in relations of similarity to their objects (e.g., icons), and then take up the question of how it applies to an individual substantial object, a general conception--and then to a thinking being like us who sees the world in terms of what is internal to thought and what is external to thought. The phenomena in our experience of inner (e.g., subjective) and outer (e.g., objective) is, I take it, being explained in terms of the way the distinction is applied in the cases of these relatively simpler kinds of things--largely because that is how greater clarity can be achieved.
 
I'm interested in this matter of outer-inner from several standpoint including in terms of Peirce's notion of "signs of signs," an _expression_ he introduces tentatively late in his work on semeiotic in a letter to Victoria Welby. 
 
I'd also like to discuss further, but not much in this post, the Immediate Object--which seems, along with the Representamen, to be a continuing bone of contention for some. I would, however, note that Gary f has already given us as a springboard for discussion by offering a rather useful quote of Peirce's from a letter to William James in one of the Lowell threads. I think that quotation still needs to be further unpacked/analyzed. But, in addition, in an off-list note Gary f commented:
 
Gf: Quotes from the Logic Notebook and a couple of other sources. . . make Peirce’s definitions and actual usage of the term immediate object very clear: it’s the “part of the sign which indicates or represents the dynamic object” (but does not  predicate anything of that object, such as recognizing it as a member of a general class would do).
 
The IO is that “ part of the sign which indicates or represents the dynamic object” (but does not predicate anything of that object)." But, again, I would suggest as I did earlier that it indicates the Ground  of the Object, not the Object in its fullness, an impossibility. But I can imagine that some might argue that it indeed does indicates the DO itself, known through collateral observation.
 
But for now let me return to my thought-experiment based on Peirce's example of how we learn, "A child learns a lesson." 
 
So, again, the example (developed a little): A young child told not to touch the hot stove nevertheless touches it to find out for herself. She fulls back her hand as she screams in pain at which point her mother, hearing her scream, rushes to her and quickly puts ice and then ointment on her fingers.
 
I would suggest that something involved in 'hot stove burners' (the direct object) might be seen as a sign (or signs, say of heat, etc.) for some here. What is the putative sign here?
 
Then the child's mind in relation to the DO (having 'determined' her IO, 'selecting', so to speak, some few out of all the possible characteristics/attributes of the DO, these being most likely iconic signs) forms a ground, or basis, of her semiosis, an internal sign, that is, her IO-R-DI. So, what is her Immediate Object? What is her Representamen?
 
Now her DI would seem to be her scream: that is another sign, an external sign for her mother which is (or involves) a DO which, again, 'determines' her internal IO-R-DI, running to the child, etc. What is the Dynamic Object for her mother.
 
Her mother's thoughts and actions represent other signs, etc.
 
I'd like to hear from folk on the list how they might characterize the Signs and semiosis involved in this example.
 
Best,
 
Gary R
 
Blocked image
 
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York


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