Edwina, List:

Yes, I have; but I will try to do so again, with some additional detail.

What you call the Representamen is basically (though not exactly) what I
see Peirce calling the Quasi-mind, specifically the Quasi-interpreter (CP
4.551 ;1906).  Its acquaintance with the system of Signs is "the
prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign," and its
Collateral Experience is "previous acquaintance with what the Sign denotes"
(CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909); again, the aggregate of previous IOs that it
associates with the DO.  Its Habits of Interpretation are the aggregate of
previous FIs that influence (but do not necessitate) *which *DI the Sign
actually produces from among the possibilities of the II.
Habit-change--i.e., learning from experience--occurs when a new FI
supplements or replaces a previous Habit of Interpretation.

What you call MIND is presumably the aggregate of all Quasi-minds; i.e.,
the entire Universe, since "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293;
1891) with "inveterate" Habits of Interpretation that are practically
(though not absolutely) exceptionless.  The Commens is any subset of MIND
in which communication among multiple Quasi-minds is possible due to
sufficient overlap of their systems of Signs, Collateral Experience, and
Habits of Interpretation.  The employment of Sign-action to enhance
the *continuity
*of individual Quasi-minds, until all of them are finally (at the ideal
limit) "welded" together, is one aspect of what Peirce considered to
be the *summum
bonum*--"the development [or growth] of concrete reasonableness" (CP 5.3-4;
1902).

As for the Peirce quote, I honestly do not see how your discussion below is
consistent with your definition of the Representamen as a "knowledge
base."  The same proverb in two different languages is *one Representamen*
embodied in two different Signs (Replicas).  The people who write or speak
and read or hear it are not two individual *Representamens*, they are two
individual *Quasi-minds* who are "welded" in the Sign.  Each is acquainted
with the system of Signs to a different extent, has different Collateral
Experience for associating the IO with the DO, and has different Habits of
Intepretation; but there is enough overlap (the Commens) for this
particular Sign to serve as a medium for the communication of ideas between
them.

In my view, this use of terminology in an analysis of semiosis is much more
consistent with all of the *other *places where Peirce defined the
Representamen.

   - "something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or
   capacity" (CP 2.228; c. 1897)
   - something having the character "by virtue of which, for the production
   of a certain mental effect [its Interpretant], it may stand in place of
   another thing [its Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899)
   - "that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902)
   - "[t]he concrete subject that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903)

As you have put it before, we need to read Peirce *holistically*, taking
all of these texts into account.  Nevertheless, I will say it again, and I
mean it sincerely--"Different people have such wonderfully different ways
of thinking" (CP 6.462, EP 2:437; 1908).

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon, list -  You haven't told us where and when the Quasi-Mind enters the
> semiosic interaction. And why just the Quasi-Mind? Why not MIND?
>
>  When and how does MIND, which I understand as referring to the
> general habits/laws/rules of organization of matter - enter the semiosic
> interaction? My view is that this is the function of the Representamen.
>
> I DO refer to Peirce - and DO re-read Peirce - but I'm not going to
> constantly refer to the exact sections/paragraphs.
>
> Now, with reference to your quote: - I interpret this completely
> differently from you.
>
> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of
> repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt
> good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or
> any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same
> representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same
> with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs,
> it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A
> representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of
> repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact
> represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)
>
> My reading of the above is that the Representamen, as a common habit, as
> a generality - is most certainly capable of being transformed
> and articulated, repeatedly, within any number of INDIVIDUAL Dynamic
> Interpretants.
>
> The Representamen is not an individual proverb/diagram/picture...etc. It
> is the generality of this proverb, diagram/picture... that is capable of
> being expressed at any other time - as an individual Dynamic
> Interpretant.
>
> So- the symptoms of measles are general. They are the laws-of-measles. As
> such, when the disease is activated within the individual person, these
> general laws will be expressed, as individual articulations of measles...as
> the Dynamic Interpretants.
>
> Exactly- if a Representamen does not function as GENERAL LAWS - but is
> instead an individual 'unique embodiment'...then, it isn't a Representamen.
> It is, a unique Dynamic Object or Dynamic Interpretant.
>
> And, to me - these habits/rules/laws...which are generalities rather than
> specifics - are the domain of MIND - and expressed within the mediative
> actions of the Representamen.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Fri 09/02/18 2:19 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina:
>
> It is never helpful to toss out allegations like "reductionist."  My
> still-developing model aspires to be just as interactive and relational as
> yours, but uses the terminology differently, in a way that is much more
> consistent with my reading of Peirce.  It is telling that I am constantly
> going back to revisit Peirce's writings about this subject, and then
> offering multiple citations to support my position, while you simply assert
> yours over and over.
>
> I actually did tell you where I see Peirce "locating" the "knowledge
> base"--not the Representamen, but the Quasi-mind.  I will now add that
> each individual Quasi-mind includes acquaintance with the system of Signs,
> Collateral Experience as the aggregate of previous Immediate Objects, and
> Habits of Interpretation as the aggregate of previous Final Interpretants.
> The Commens is then the overlapping system of Signs, Collateral
> Experience, and Habits of Interpretation by which the Sign serves as a
> medium of communication between multiple individual Quasi-minds.
>
> Apparently your novel definition of the Representamen compels you to
> disagree that "proverbs, diagrams, pictures, physical signs, symptoms, and
> weathercocks are all Representamens"; and yet, here again is what I quoted
> directly from Peirce about this.
>
> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of
> repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt
> good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or
> any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same
> representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same
> with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs,
> it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A
> representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of
> repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact
> represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)
>
>
> Taking the Representamen as a "knowledge base" simply does not work here,
> nor in any of the other passages that I referenced below; and all of the
> items that I listed are indeed called Representamens in Peirce's own
> usage of that term.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 12:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list
>>
>> And of course - I disagree.  I think your understanding of the Sign
>> [DO-[IO-R-II] is reductionist. You don't seem, to me, to be involved in a
>> view of semiosis as an interactive set of relations.
>>
>> You have not shown us where the knowledge base; i.e., the laws, the
>> rules, the commonality of an interaction, comes into action.
>>
>> I disagree that, as you write, " proverbs, diagrams, pictures, physical
>> signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens". Each one of
>> these functions only within a full triad and is not and cannot be simply
>> the Representamen.
>>
>> A weathercock is a DO-[IO-R-II].  That is, it functions as that
>> weathercock within an interaction with another Sign , DO-[IO-R-II]..in this
>> case, the wind and within an observer [also operative in the full Sign
>> set]. Most certainly, the weathercock is not simply a Representamen. What
>> is the Representamen in the situation where it, as a piece of metal, moves
>> in the wind? The Representamen is the kinetic laws-of-force of the wind,
>> which will move that piece of metal as it sits on a post. What is the DO?
>> The wind.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>
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