BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - 

        I still don't see why you call this semiosic action the 'quasi-mind'
rather than the 'mind'. What's the difference between the two?

        This 'mind/quasi-mind', in my understanding operates within the
mediative process of the Representamen.

        I therefore agree with the outline of your first paragraph - but-
this 'quasi-mind/mind..again..operates within the mediative process
of the Representamen. I note that Peirce's outline of semiosis did
not include this quasi-mind, but - included:

        DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI.

        No - I wouldn't call Mind the 'aggregate' nor would I call
'Quasi-Mind' the subset of this seeming universal Mind.  I see Mind
and quasi-mind both as a process of habit formation and laws. The
reason for my hesitation in this - is that I am concerned about your
setting up an aggregate and subsets. 

        The Representamen as a process of mediation, provides the laws, the
rules, the common habits of the system. I see that two different
people will each have a set of shared values/knowledge/information -
and a set of unshared values/knowledge/information. Therefore - their
interpretation of the same proverb in two different languages must
reflect these differences. The point of semiosis is that it provides
for BOTH stability of information AND deviation from this stability. 

        You say that the same proverb in two different languages is one
Representamen embodied into different semiosic processes. Yes and No.
Again, if we are not talking about a mechanical iconic iteration of
this proverb - then,   the Representamen is up to a point,  uniquely
different in each individual! Just as the rule of law is ONE law and
is articulated in all individual instances. But - within each
instance, each individual articulation - the Representamen functions
within that individual semiosis. Again, semiosis provides for both
stability and continuity of information - AND - diversity and
variance of information.

        Frankly - I think we agree on more than we disagree.

        Edwina
 On Fri 09/02/18  4:17 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Yes, I have; but I will try to do so again, with some additional
detail.
 What you call the Representamen is basically (though not exactly)
what I see Peirce calling the Quasi-mind, specifically the
Quasi-interpreter (CP 4.551 ;1906).  Its acquaintance with the system
of Signs is " the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the
Sign," and its Collateral Experience is "previous acquaintance with
what the Sign denotes" (CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909); again, the
aggregate of previous IOs that it associates with the DO.  Its Habits
of Interpretation are the aggregate of previous FIs that influence
(but do not necessitate) which DI the Sign actually produces from
among the possibilities of the II.  Habit-change--i.e., learning from
experience--occurs when a new FI supplements or replaces a previous
Habit of Interpretation. 
 What you call MIND is presumably the aggregate of all Quasi-minds;
i.e., the entire Universe, since "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25, EP
1:293; 1891) with "inveterate" Habits of Interpretation that are
practically (though not absolutely) exceptionless.  The Commens is
any subset of MIND in which communication among multiple Quasi-minds
is possible due to sufficient overlap of their systems of Signs,
Collateral Experience, and Habits of Interpretation.  The employment
of Sign-action to enhance the  continuity of individual Quasi-minds,
until all of them are finally (at the ideal limit) "welded" together,
is one aspect of what Peirce considered to be the summum bonum--"the
development [or growth] of concrete reasonableness" (CP 5.3-4; 1902).
  As for the Peirce quote, I honestly do not see how your discussion
below is consistent with your definition of the Representamen as a
"knowledge base."  The same proverb in two different languages is 
one Representamen embodied in two different Signs (Replicas).  The
people who write or speak and read or hear it are not two individual
Representamens, they are two individual Quasi-minds who are "welded"
in the Sign.  Each is acquainted with the system of Signs to a
different extent, has different Collateral Experience for associating
the IO with the DO, and has different Habits of Intepretation; but
there is enough overlap (the Commens) for this particular Sign to
serve as a medium for the communication of ideas between them. 
  In my view, this use of terminology in an analysis of semiosis is
much more consistent with all of the other places where Peirce
defined the Representamen. 
    *"something which stands to somebody for something in some
respect or capacity" (CP 2.228; c. 1897)
    *something having the character "by virtue of which, for the
production of a certain mental effect [its Interpretant], it may
stand in place of another thing [its Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899)
    *"that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902)
    *"[t]he concrete subject that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903)
 As you have put it before, we need to read Peirce  holistically,
taking all of these texts into account.  Nevertheless, I will say it
again, and I mean it sincerely--" Different people have such
wonderfully different ways of thinking" (CP 6.462, EP 2:437; 1908).
  Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
        Jon, list -  You haven't told us where and when the Quasi-Mind
enters the semiosic interaction. And why just the Quasi-Mind? Why not
MIND?

         When and how does MIND, which I understand as referring to the
general habits/laws/rules of organization of matter - enter the
semiosic interaction? My view is that this is the function of the
Representamen.

        I DO refer to Peirce - and DO re-read Peirce - but I'm not going to
constantly refer to the exact sections/paragraphs.

         Now, with reference to your quote: - I interpret this completely
differently from you.

        CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is
capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil
communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or
spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is
thought of it is one and the same  representamen. It is the same with
a diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom.
If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they
refer to different parts of the air. A  representamen which should
have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a 
representamen, but a part of the very fact represented." (CP 5.138,
EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)

        My reading of the above is that the Representamen, as a common
habit, as a generality - is most certainly capable of being
transformed and articulated, repeatedly, within any number of
INDIVIDUAL Dynamic Interpretants.

        The Representamen is not an individual
proverb/diagram/picture...etc. It is the  generality of this proverb,
diagram/picture... that is capable of being expressed at any other
time - as an individual Dynamic Interpretant. 

        So- the symptoms of measles are general. They are the
laws-of-measles. As such, when the disease is activated within the
individual person, these general laws will be expressed, as
individual articulations of measles...as the Dynamic Interpretants.

        Exactly- if a Representamen does not function as GENERAL LAWS - but
is instead an individual 'unique embodiment'...then, it isn't a
Representamen. It is, a unique Dynamic Object or Dynamic
Interpretant.  

        And, to me - these habits/rules/laws...which are generalities rather
than specifics - are the domain of MIND - and expressed within the
mediative actions of the Representamen. 

        Edwina

        On Fri 09/02/18  2:19 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
  Edwina:
 It is never helpful to toss out allegations like "reductionist."  My
still-developing model aspires to be just as interactive and
relational as yours, but uses the terminology differently, in a way
that is much more consistent with my reading of Peirce.  It is
telling that I am constantly going back to revisit Peirce's writings
about this subject, and then offering  multiple citations to support
my position, while you simply  assert yours over and over.
 I actually did tell you where I see Peirce "locating" the "knowledge
base"--not the Representamen, but the Quasi-mind.  I will now add that
each individual Quasi-mind includes acquaintance with the system of
Signs, Collateral Experience as the aggregate of previous Immediate
Objects, and Habits of Interpretation as the aggregate of previous
Final Interpretants.  The Commens is then the  overlapping  system of
Signs, Collateral Experience, and Habits of Interpretation by which
the Sign serves as a medium of communication between multiple
individual Quasi-minds.
 Apparently your novel definition of the Representamen compels you to
disagree that "proverbs, diagrams, pictures, physical signs, symptoms,
and weathercocks are all Representamens"; and yet, here again is what
I quoted directly from Peirce about this.
  CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is
capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil
communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or
spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is
thought of it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a
diagram  or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom.
If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they
refer to different parts of the air. A  representamen which should
have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a
representamen, but a part of the very fact represented." (CP 5.138,
EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)
  Taking the Representamen as a "knowledge base" simply does not work
here, nor in any of the  other passages that I referenced below; and
all of the items that I listed are indeed called Representamens in
Peirce's own usage of that term. 
 Regards,
 Jon S.
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] -
 twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] 
 On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 12:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
        Jon, list

        And of course - I disagree.  I think your understanding of the Sign
[DO-[IO-R-II] is reductionist. You don't seem, to me, to be involved
in a view of semiosis as an interactive set of relations. 

        You have not shown us where the knowledge base; i.e., the laws, the
rules, the commonality of an interaction, comes into action. 

        I disagree that, as you write, " proverbs, diagrams, pictures,
physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens".
Each one of these functions only within a full triad and is not and
cannot be simply the Representamen.  

        A weathercock is a DO-[IO-R-II].  That is, it functions as that
weathercock within an interaction with another Sign ,
DO-[IO-R-II]..in this case, the wind and within an observer [also
operative in the full Sign set]. Most certainly, the weathercock is
not simply a Representamen. What is the Representamen in the
situation where it, as a piece of metal, moves in the wind? The
Representamen is the kinetic laws-of-force of the wind, which will
move that piece of metal as it sits on a post. What is the DO? The
wind. 

        Edwina 


Links:
------
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[3] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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