Edwina,

I think what is meant by 'subset' is that your conception of things
contributes to the overall conception of things.  But there is also the
possibility that what you contribute are the good and right things and you
are supposed to let go of the things that are not good and/or right.

Another way to ask this is, if Peirce makes a distinction between
quasi-mind and Mind, and you see no reason for valuing the difference in
the two things placed next to one another, then what is the reason for
Peirce bringing attention to the distinction?
That is, why even make up a word like quasi-mind when Mind will do?  So,
what is the reason that the distinction even necessary or should we just
say, 'forget it', it's not *even* necessary.

Best,
Jerry R

On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jerry- yes, Peirce was quite specific that one cannot make individuals
> judges of truth...and that we function within a 'community'...and I
> certainly agree with that. I would prefer to somehow imply/read that
> individual mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of Mind.  I just get 'antsy'
> about the term 'subset'.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Fri 09/02/18 4:47 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, list,
>
>
> Here is a reason for difference between Mind and Quasi-Mind:
>
>
>
> When we come to the great principle of continuity and see how all is fluid
> and every point directly partakes the being of every other, it will appear
> that individualism and falsity are one and the same.
>
>
>
> Meantime, we know that man is not whole as long as he is single, that he
> is essentially a possible member of society.  Especially, one man’s
> experience is nothing if it stands alone.
>
>
>
> If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination.  It is not ‘my’
> experience but ‘our’ experience that has to be thought of; and this ‘us’
> has indefinite possibilities..
>
>
>
> Neither must we understand the practical in any low and sordid sense.
> Individual action is a means and not our end.  Individual pleasure is not
> our end; we are all putting our shoulders to the wheel for an end that none
> of us can catch more than a glimpse at- that which the generations are
> working out.  But we can see that the development of embodied ideas is what
> it will consist in.-
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry R
>
>
> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon -
>>
>> I still don't see why you call this semiosic action the 'quasi-mind'
>> rather than the 'mind'. What's the difference between the two?
>>
>> This 'mind/quasi-mind', in my understanding operates within the mediative
>> process of the Representamen.
>>
>> I therefore agree with the outline of your first paragraph - but- this
>> 'quasi-mind/mind..again..operates within the mediative process of the
>> Representamen. I note that Peirce's outline of semiosis did not include
>> this quasi-mind, but - included:
>>
>> DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI.
>>
>> No - I wouldn't call Mind the 'aggregate' nor would I call 'Quasi-Mind'
>> the subset of this seeming universal Mind.  I see Mind and quasi-mind both
>> as a process of habit formation and laws. The reason for my hesitation in
>> this - is that I am concerned about your setting up an aggregate and
>> subsets.
>>
>> The Representamen as a process of mediation, provides the laws, the
>> rules, the common habits of the system. I see that two different people
>> will each have a set of shared values/knowledge/information - and a set of
>> unshared values/knowledge/information. Therefore - their interpretation of
>> the same proverb in two different languages must reflect these differences.
>> The point of semiosis is that it provides for BOTH stability of information
>> AND deviation from this stability.
>>
>> You say that the same proverb in two different languages is one
>> Representamen embodied into different semiosic processes. Yes and No.
>> Again, if we are not talking about a mechanical iconic iteration of this
>> proverb - then,   the Representamen is up to a point,  uniquely different
>> in each individual! Just as the rule of law is ONE law and is articulated
>> in all individual instances. But - within each instance, each individual
>> articulation - the Representamen functions within that individual semiosis.
>> Again, semiosis provides for both stability and continuity of information -
>> AND - diversity and variance of information.
>>
>> Frankly - I think we agree on more than we disagree.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri 09/02/18 4:17 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Yes, I have; but I will try to do so again, with some additional detail.
>>
>> What you call the Representamen is basically (though not exactly) what I
>> see Peirce calling the Quasi-mind, specifically the Quasi-interpreter (CP
>> 4.551 ;1906).  Its acquaintance with the system of Signs is " the
>> prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign," and its
>> Collateral Experience is "previous acquaintance with what the Sign
>> denotes" (CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909); again, the aggregate of previous IOs
>> that it associates with the DO.  Its Habits of Interpretation are the
>> aggregate of previous FIs that influence (but do not necessitate) which DI
>> the Sign actually produces from among the possibilities of the II.
>> Habit-change--i.e., learning from experience--occurs when a new FI
>> supplements or replaces a previous Habit of Interpretation.
>>
>> What you call MIND is presumably the aggregate of all Quasi-minds; i.e.,
>> the entire Universe, since "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293;
>> 1891) with "inveterate" Habits of Interpretation that are practically
>> (though not absolutely) exceptionless.  The Commens is any subset of MIND
>> in which communication among multiple Quasi-minds is possible due to
>> sufficient overlap of their systems of Signs, Collateral Experience, and
>> Habits of Interpretation.  The employment of Sign-action to enhance the 
>> continuity
>> of individual Quasi-minds, until all of them are finally (at the ideal
>> limit) "welded" together, is one aspect of what Peirce considered to be the 
>> summum
>> bonum--"the development [or growth] of concrete reasonableness" (CP
>> 5.3-4; 1902).
>>
>> As for the Peirce quote, I honestly do not see how your discussion below
>> is consistent with your definition of the Representamen as a "knowledge
>> base."  The same proverb in two different languages is one Representamen
>> embodied in two different Signs (Replicas).  The people who write or speak
>> and read or hear it are not two individual Representamens, they are two
>> individual Quasi-minds who are "welded" in the Sign.  Each is acquainted
>> with the system of Signs to a different extent, has different Collateral
>> Experience for associating the IO with the DO, and has different Habits of
>> Intepretation; but there is enough overlap (the Commens) for this
>> particular Sign to serve as a medium for the communication of ideas between
>> them.
>>
>> In my view, this use of terminology in an analysis of semiosis is much
>> more consistent with all of the other places where Peirce defined the
>> Representamen.
>>
>>    - "something which stands to somebody for something in some respect
>>    or capacity" (CP 2.228; c. 1897)
>>    - something having the character "by virtue of which, for the
>>    production of a certain mental effect [its Interpretant], it may stand in
>>    place of another thing [its Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899)
>>    - "that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902)
>>    - "[t]he concrete subject that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903)
>>
>> As you have put it before, we need to read Peirce  holistically, taking
>> all of these texts into account.  Nevertheless, I will say it again, and I
>> mean it sincerely--" Different people have such wonderfully different
>> ways of thinking" (CP 6.462, EP 2:437; 1908).
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon S.
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, list -  You haven't told us where and when the Quasi-Mind enters
>>> the semiosic interaction. And why just the Quasi-Mind? Why not MIND?
>>>
>>>  When and how does MIND, which I understand as referring to the
>>> general habits/laws/rules of organization of matter - enter the semiosic
>>> interaction? My view is that this is the function of the Representamen.
>>>
>>> I DO refer to Peirce - and DO re-read Peirce - but I'm not going to
>>> constantly refer to the exact sections/paragraphs.
>>>
>>> Now, with reference to your quote: - I interpret this completely
>>> differently from you.
>>>
>>> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable
>>> of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications
>>> corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English,
>>> Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and
>>> the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is
>>> the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are
>>> different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of
>>> the air. A representamen which should have a unique embodiment,
>>> incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of
>>> the very fact represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)
>>>
>>> My reading of the above is that the Representamen, as a common habit, as
>>> a generality - is most certainly capable of being transformed
>>> and articulated, repeatedly, within any number of INDIVIDUAL Dynamic
>>> Interpretants.
>>>
>>> The Representamen is not an individual proverb/diagram/picture...etc.
>>> It is the generality of this proverb, diagram/picture... that is
>>> capable of being expressed at any other time - as an individual Dynamic
>>> Interpretant.
>>>
>>> So- the symptoms of measles are general. They are the laws-of-measles.
>>> As such, when the disease is activated within the individual person, these
>>> general laws will be expressed, as individual articulations of measles...as
>>> the Dynamic Interpretants.
>>>
>>> Exactly- if a Representamen does not function as GENERAL LAWS - but is
>>> instead an individual 'unique embodiment'...then, it isn't a Representamen.
>>> It is, a unique Dynamic Object or Dynamic Interpretant.
>>>
>>> And, to me - these habits/rules/laws...which are generalities rather
>>> than specifics - are the domain of MIND - and expressed within the
>>> mediative actions of the Representamen.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>> On Fri 09/02/18 2:19 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>>> sent:
>>>
>>> Edwina:
>>>
>>> It is never helpful to toss out allegations like "reductionist."  My
>>> still-developing model aspires to be just as interactive and relational as
>>> yours, but uses the terminology differently, in a way that is much more
>>> consistent with my reading of Peirce.  It is telling that I am
>>> constantly going back to revisit Peirce's writings about this subject,
>>> and then offering multiple citations to support my position, while you
>>> simply assert yours over and over.
>>>
>>> I actually did tell you where I see Peirce "locating" the "knowledge
>>> base"--not the Representamen, but the Quasi-mind.  I will now add that
>>> each individual Quasi-mind includes acquaintance with the system of Signs,
>>> Collateral Experience as the aggregate of previous Immediate Objects, and
>>> Habits of Interpretation as the aggregate of previous Final Interpretants.
>>> The Commens is then the overlapping system of Signs, Collateral
>>> Experience, and Habits of Interpretation by which the Sign serves as a
>>> medium of communication between multiple individual Quasi-minds.
>>>
>>> Apparently your novel definition of the Representamen compels you to
>>> disagree that "proverbs, diagrams, pictures, physical signs, symptoms, and
>>> weathercocks are all Representamens"; and yet, here again is what I quoted
>>> directly from Peirce about this.
>>>
>>> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable
>>> of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications
>>> corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English,
>>> Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and
>>> the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is
>>> the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are
>>> different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of
>>> the air. A representamen which should have a unique embodiment,
>>> incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of
>>> the very fact represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)
>>>
>>>
>>> Taking the Representamen as a "knowledge base" simply does not work
>>> here, nor in any of the other passages that I referenced below; and all
>>> of the items that I listed are indeed called Representamens in Peirce's
>>> own usage of that term.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon S.
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>
>>> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 12:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon, list
>>>>
>>>> And of course - I disagree.  I think your understanding of the Sign
>>>> [DO-[IO-R-II] is reductionist. You don't seem, to me, to be involved in a
>>>> view of semiosis as an interactive set of relations.
>>>>
>>>> You have not shown us where the knowledge base; i.e., the laws, the
>>>> rules, the commonality of an interaction, comes into action.
>>>>
>>>> I disagree that, as you write, " proverbs, diagrams, pictures, physical
>>>> signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens". Each one of
>>>> these functions only within a full triad and is not and cannot be simply
>>>> the Representamen.
>>>>
>>>> A weathercock is a DO-[IO-R-II].  That is, it functions as that
>>>> weathercock within an interaction with another Sign , DO-[IO-R-II]..in this
>>>> case, the wind and within an observer [also operative in the full Sign
>>>> set]. Most certainly, the weathercock is not simply a Representamen. What
>>>> is the Representamen in the situation where it, as a piece of metal, moves
>>>> in the wind? The Representamen is the kinetic laws-of-force of the
>>>> wind, which will move that piece of metal as it sits on a post. What is the
>>>> DO? The wind.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>
>
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