Edwina list,


As per your objection,

“I would prefer to somehow imply/read that individual mind/quasi-mind is an
aspect of Mind.  I just get 'antsy' about the term 'subset'.”



Here are a few quotes from Peirce that address why individual
mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of Mind (but this concept is not Peirce's
alone.  It belongs to the river of pragmaticism.):



Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to be
proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But I observe that this
satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and does not extend to
that of other men.



..and the *Communicational* Interpretant, or say the *Cominterpretant*,
which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer and
interpreter *have to be fused* *in order that any communication should take
place*. This mind may be called the *commens*. It consists of all that is,
and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the
outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function.



I take “have to be fused” as “must be fused” in order than *any*
communication should take place.



Hth,

Jerry R


On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:59 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Edwina,
>
> I think what is meant by 'subset' is that your conception of things
> contributes to the overall conception of things.  But there is also the
> possibility that what you contribute are the good and right things and you
> are supposed to let go of the things that are not good and/or right.
>
> Another way to ask this is, if Peirce makes a distinction between
> quasi-mind and Mind, and you see no reason for valuing the difference in
> the two things placed next to one another, then what is the reason for
> Peirce bringing attention to the distinction?
> That is, why even make up a word like quasi-mind when Mind will do?  So,
> what is the reason that the distinction even necessary or should we just
> say, 'forget it', it's not *even* necessary.
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry- yes, Peirce was quite specific that one cannot make individuals
>> judges of truth...and that we function within a 'community'...and I
>> certainly agree with that. I would prefer to somehow imply/read that
>> individual mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of Mind.  I just get 'antsy'
>> about the term 'subset'.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri 09/02/18 4:47 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, list,
>>
>>
>> Here is a reason for difference between Mind and Quasi-Mind:
>>
>>
>>
>> When we come to the great principle of continuity and see how all is
>> fluid and every point directly partakes the being of every other, it will
>> appear that individualism and falsity are one and the same.
>>
>>
>>
>> Meantime, we know that man is not whole as long as he is single, that he
>> is essentially a possible member of society.  Especially, one man’s
>> experience is nothing if it stands alone.
>>
>>
>>
>> If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination.  It is not ‘my’
>> experience but ‘our’ experience that has to be thought of; and this ‘us’
>> has indefinite possibilities..
>>
>>
>>
>> Neither must we understand the practical in any low and sordid sense.
>> Individual action is a means and not our end.  Individual pleasure is not
>> our end; we are all putting our shoulders to the wheel for an end that none
>> of us can catch more than a glimpse at- that which the generations are
>> working out.  But we can see that the development of embodied ideas is what
>> it will consist in.-
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Jerry R
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon -
>>>
>>> I still don't see why you call this semiosic action the 'quasi-mind'
>>> rather than the 'mind'. What's the difference between the two?
>>>
>>> This 'mind/quasi-mind', in my understanding operates within the
>>> mediative process of the Representamen.
>>>
>>> I therefore agree with the outline of your first paragraph - but- this
>>> 'quasi-mind/mind..again..operates within the mediative process of the
>>> Representamen. I note that Peirce's outline of semiosis did not include
>>> this quasi-mind, but - included:
>>>
>>> DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI.
>>>
>>> No - I wouldn't call Mind the 'aggregate' nor would I call 'Quasi-Mind'
>>> the subset of this seeming universal Mind.  I see Mind and quasi-mind both
>>> as a process of habit formation and laws. The reason for my hesitation in
>>> this - is that I am concerned about your setting up an aggregate and
>>> subsets.
>>>
>>> The Representamen as a process of mediation, provides the laws, the
>>> rules, the common habits of the system. I see that two different people
>>> will each have a set of shared values/knowledge/information - and a set of
>>> unshared values/knowledge/information. Therefore - their interpretation of
>>> the same proverb in two different languages must reflect these differences.
>>> The point of semiosis is that it provides for BOTH stability of information
>>> AND deviation from this stability.
>>>
>>> You say that the same proverb in two different languages is one
>>> Representamen embodied into different semiosic processes. Yes and No.
>>> Again, if we are not talking about a mechanical iconic iteration of this
>>> proverb - then,   the Representamen is up to a point,  uniquely different
>>> in each individual! Just as the rule of law is ONE law and is articulated
>>> in all individual instances. But - within each instance, each individual
>>> articulation - the Representamen functions within that individual semiosis.
>>> Again, semiosis provides for both stability and continuity of information -
>>> AND - diversity and variance of information.
>>>
>>> Frankly - I think we agree on more than we disagree.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri 09/02/18 4:17 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>>> sent:
>>>
>>> Edwina, List:
>>>
>>> Yes, I have; but I will try to do so again, with some additional detail.
>>>
>>> What you call the Representamen is basically (though not exactly) what I
>>> see Peirce calling the Quasi-mind, specifically the Quasi-interpreter (CP
>>> 4.551 ;1906).  Its acquaintance with the system of Signs is " the
>>> prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign," and its
>>> Collateral Experience is "previous acquaintance with what the Sign
>>> denotes" (CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909); again, the aggregate of previous IOs
>>> that it associates with the DO.  Its Habits of Interpretation are the
>>> aggregate of previous FIs that influence (but do not necessitate) which DI
>>> the Sign actually produces from among the possibilities of the II.
>>> Habit-change--i.e., learning from experience--occurs when a new FI
>>> supplements or replaces a previous Habit of Interpretation.
>>>
>>> What you call MIND is presumably the aggregate of all Quasi-minds;
>>> i.e., the entire Universe, since "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25, EP
>>> 1:293; 1891) with "inveterate" Habits of Interpretation that are
>>> practically (though not absolutely) exceptionless.  The Commens is any
>>> subset of MIND in which communication among multiple Quasi-minds is
>>> possible due to sufficient overlap of their systems of Signs, Collateral
>>> Experience, and Habits of Interpretation.  The employment of Sign-action to
>>> enhance the continuity of individual Quasi-minds, until all of them are
>>> finally (at the ideal limit) "welded" together, is one aspect of what
>>> Peirce considered to be the summum bonum--"the development [or growth]
>>> of concrete reasonableness" (CP 5.3-4; 1902).
>>>
>>> As for the Peirce quote, I honestly do not see how your discussion below
>>> is consistent with your definition of the Representamen as a "knowledge
>>> base."  The same proverb in two different languages is one Representamen
>>> embodied in two different Signs (Replicas).  The people who write or speak
>>> and read or hear it are not two individual Representamens, they are two
>>> individual Quasi-minds who are "welded" in the Sign.  Each is
>>> acquainted with the system of Signs to a different extent, has different
>>> Collateral Experience for associating the IO with the DO, and has different
>>> Habits of Intepretation; but there is enough overlap (the Commens) for this
>>> particular Sign to serve as a medium for the communication of ideas between
>>> them.
>>>
>>> In my view, this use of terminology in an analysis of semiosis is much
>>> more consistent with all of the other places where Peirce defined the
>>> Representamen.
>>>
>>>    - "something which stands to somebody for something in some respect
>>>    or capacity" (CP 2.228; c. 1897)
>>>    - something having the character "by virtue of which, for the
>>>    production of a certain mental effect [its Interpretant], it may stand in
>>>    place of another thing [its Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899)
>>>    - "that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902)
>>>    - "[t]he concrete subject that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903)
>>>
>>> As you have put it before, we need to read Peirce  holistically, taking
>>> all of these texts into account.  Nevertheless, I will say it again, and I
>>> mean it sincerely--" Different people have such wonderfully different
>>> ways of thinking" (CP 6.462, EP 2:437; 1908).
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon S.
>>>
>>> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon, list -  You haven't told us where and when the Quasi-Mind enters
>>>> the semiosic interaction. And why just the Quasi-Mind? Why not MIND?
>>>>
>>>>  When and how does MIND, which I understand as referring to the
>>>> general habits/laws/rules of organization of matter - enter the semiosic
>>>> interaction? My view is that this is the function of the Representamen.
>>>>
>>>> I DO refer to Peirce - and DO re-read Peirce - but I'm not going to
>>>> constantly refer to the exact sections/paragraphs.
>>>>
>>>> Now, with reference to your quote: - I interpret this completely
>>>> differently from you.
>>>>
>>>> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable
>>>> of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications
>>>> corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English,
>>>> Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and
>>>> the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It
>>>> is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are
>>>> different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of
>>>> the air. A representamen which should have a unique embodiment,
>>>> incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of
>>>> the very fact represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)
>>>>
>>>> My reading of the above is that the Representamen, as a common habit,
>>>> as a generality - is most certainly capable of being transformed
>>>> and articulated, repeatedly, within any number of INDIVIDUAL Dynamic
>>>> Interpretants.
>>>>
>>>> The Representamen is not an individual proverb/diagram/picture...etc.
>>>> It is the generality of this proverb, diagram/picture... that is
>>>> capable of being expressed at any other time - as an individual
>>>> Dynamic Interpretant.
>>>>
>>>> So- the symptoms of measles are general. They are the laws-of-measles.
>>>> As such, when the disease is activated within the individual person, these
>>>> general laws will be expressed, as individual articulations of measles...as
>>>> the Dynamic Interpretants.
>>>>
>>>> Exactly- if a Representamen does not function as GENERAL LAWS - but is
>>>> instead an individual 'unique embodiment'...then, it isn't a Representamen.
>>>> It is, a unique Dynamic Object or Dynamic Interpretant.
>>>>
>>>> And, to me - these habits/rules/laws...which are generalities rather
>>>> than specifics - are the domain of MIND - and expressed within the
>>>> mediative actions of the Representamen.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>> On Fri 09/02/18 2:19 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>>>> sent:
>>>>
>>>> Edwina:
>>>>
>>>> It is never helpful to toss out allegations like "reductionist."  My
>>>> still-developing model aspires to be just as interactive and relational as
>>>> yours, but uses the terminology differently, in a way that is much
>>>> more consistent with my reading of Peirce.  It is telling that I am
>>>> constantly going back to revisit Peirce's writings about this subject,
>>>> and then offering multiple citations to support my position, while you
>>>> simply assert yours over and over.
>>>>
>>>> I actually did tell you where I see Peirce "locating" the "knowledge
>>>> base"--not the Representamen, but the Quasi-mind.  I will now add that
>>>> each individual Quasi-mind includes acquaintance with the system of Signs,
>>>> Collateral Experience as the aggregate of previous Immediate Objects, and
>>>> Habits of Interpretation as the aggregate of previous Final Interpretants.
>>>> The Commens is then the overlapping system of Signs, Collateral
>>>> Experience, and Habits of Interpretation by which the Sign serves as a
>>>> medium of communication between multiple individual Quasi-minds.
>>>>
>>>> Apparently your novel definition of the Representamen compels you to
>>>> disagree that "proverbs, diagrams, pictures, physical signs, symptoms, and
>>>> weathercocks are all Representamens"; and yet, here again is what I quoted
>>>> directly from Peirce about this.
>>>>
>>>> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable
>>>> of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications
>>>> corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English,
>>>> Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and
>>>> the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It
>>>> is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are
>>>> different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of
>>>> the air. A representamen which should have a unique embodiment,
>>>> incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of
>>>> the very fact represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Taking the Representamen as a "knowledge base" simply does not work
>>>> here, nor in any of the other passages that I referenced below; and
>>>> all of the items that I listed are indeed called Representamens in
>>>> Peirce's own usage of that term.
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon S.
>>>>
>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 12:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Jon, list
>>>>>
>>>>> And of course - I disagree.  I think your understanding of the Sign
>>>>> [DO-[IO-R-II] is reductionist. You don't seem, to me, to be involved in a
>>>>> view of semiosis as an interactive set of relations.
>>>>>
>>>>> You have not shown us where the knowledge base; i.e., the laws, the
>>>>> rules, the commonality of an interaction, comes into action.
>>>>>
>>>>> I disagree that, as you write, " proverbs, diagrams, pictures,
>>>>> physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens". Each
>>>>> one of these functions only within a full triad and is not and cannot be
>>>>> simply the Representamen.
>>>>>
>>>>> A weathercock is a DO-[IO-R-II].  That is, it functions as that
>>>>> weathercock within an interaction with another Sign , DO-[IO-R-II]..in 
>>>>> this
>>>>> case, the wind and within an observer [also operative in the full Sign
>>>>> set]. Most certainly, the weathercock is not simply a Representamen. What
>>>>> is the Representamen in the situation where it, as a piece of metal, moves
>>>>> in the wind? The Representamen is the kinetic laws-of-force of the
>>>>> wind, which will move that piece of metal as it sits on a post. What is 
>>>>> the
>>>>> DO? The wind.
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>
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