Dear Edwina, list,


What I see you doing in your last post is giving reasons for valuing
quiddity for Mind in triadic relation.



What I also see you doing is giving reasons to avoid valuing hecceity in
Quasi-mind contra Mind.



So long as you do the former (valuation for quiddity) and divest yourself
of paying attention to the latter (valuation for hecceity), I find it
unsurprising that you find it *‘not a fast-rule’ that the individual mind
is described as a ‘quasi-mind’*.



For "I persuade myself" is a phrase that suggests a state which is immune
to outside tampering.



All the best,
Jerry R


On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 7:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

>
> Jerry - I don't see that the individual mind is necessarily referenced as
> 'quasi-mind.
>
> "A sign is in s conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind'.
> 3.360
>
> "But if the triple relation between the sign, its object and the
> mind'...3.361
>
> and he refers to "the mind using the sign' 3.361.
>
> [NOTE: by 'sign' I understand the mediate term in the triad, the
> representamen].
>
> And in 8.315, he references "No event that occurs to any mind, no action
> of any mind'...etc.
>
> My point is that it is not a 'fast rule' that the individual mind is
> described as a 'quasi-mind'. Peirce uses the term 'mind' to refer to
> individual's and their mental interactions with the world. He rarely uses
> the term 'quasi-mind'...and more often then, to refer to non-human actions
> of 'mind'
>
> Edwina
>
>
> On Fri 09/02/18 5:06 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina list,
>
>
>
> As per your objection,
>
> “I would prefer to somehow imply/read that individual mind/quasi-mind is
> an aspect of Mind.  I just get 'antsy' about the term 'subset'.”
>
>
>
> Here are a few quotes from Peirce that address why individual
> mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of Mind (but this concept is not Peirce's
> alone.  It belongs to the river of pragmaticism.):
>
>
>
> Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to be
> proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But I observe that this
> satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and does not extend to
> that of other men.
>
>
>
> ..and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the Cominterpretant, which
> is a determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer and
> interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take
> place. This mind may be called the commens. It consists of all that is,
> and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the
> outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function.
>
>
>
> I take “have to be fused” as “must be fused” in order than any
> communication should take place.
>
>
>
> Hth,
>
> Jerry R
>
>
> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:59 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Edwina,
>>
>> I think what is meant by 'subset' is that your conception of things
>> contributes to the overall conception of things.  But there is also the
>> possibility that what you contribute are the good and right things and you
>> are supposed to let go of the things that are not good and/or right.
>>
>> Another way to ask this is, if Peirce makes a distinction between
>> quasi-mind and Mind, and you see no reason for valuing the difference in
>> the two things placed next to one another, then what is the reason for
>> Peirce bringing attention to the distinction?
>> That is, why even make up a word like quasi-mind when Mind will do?  So,
>> what is the reason that the distinction even necessary or should we just
>> say, 'forget it', it's not even necessary.
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry- yes, Peirce was quite specific that one cannot make individuals
>>> judges of truth...and that we function within a 'community'...and I
>>> certainly agree with that. I would prefer to somehow imply/read that
>>> individual mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of Mind.  I just get 'antsy'
>>> about the term 'subset'.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri 09/02/18 4:47 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>>
>>> Edwina, list,
>>>
>>>
>>> Here is a reason for difference between Mind and Quasi-Mind:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> When we come to the great principle of continuity and see how all is
>>> fluid and every point directly partakes the being of every other, it will
>>> appear that individualism and falsity are one and the same.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Meantime, we know that man is not whole as long as he is single, that
>>> he is essentially a possible member of society.  Especially, one man’s
>>> experience is nothing if it stands alone.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination.  It is not ‘my’
>>> experience but ‘our’ experience that has to be thought of; and this ‘us’
>>> has indefinite possibilities..
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Neither must we understand the practical in any low and sordid sense.
>>> Individual action is a means and not our end.  Individual pleasure is not
>>> our end; we are all putting our shoulders to the wheel for an end that none
>>> of us can catch more than a glimpse at- that which the generations are
>>> working out.  But we can see that the development of embodied ideas is what
>>> it will consist in.-
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon -
>>>>
>>>> I still don't see why you call this semiosic action the 'quasi-mind'
>>>> rather than the 'mind'. What's the difference between the two?
>>>>
>>>> This 'mind/quasi-mind', in my understanding operates within the
>>>> mediative process of the Representamen.
>>>>
>>>> I therefore agree with the outline of your first paragraph - but- this
>>>> 'quasi-mind/mind..again..operates within the mediative process of the
>>>> Representamen. I note that Peirce's outline of semiosis did not include
>>>> this quasi-mind, but - included:
>>>>
>>>> DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI.
>>>>
>>>> No - I wouldn't call Mind the 'aggregate' nor would I call 'Quasi-Mind'
>>>> the subset of this seeming universal Mind.  I see Mind and quasi-mind both
>>>> as a process of habit formation and laws. The reason for my hesitation in
>>>> this - is that I am concerned about your setting up an aggregate and
>>>> subsets.
>>>>
>>>> The Representamen as a process of mediation, provides the laws, the
>>>> rules, the common habits of the system. I see that two different people
>>>> will each have a set of shared values/knowledge/information - and a set of
>>>> unshared values/knowledge/information. Therefore - their interpretation of
>>>> the same proverb in two different languages must reflect these differences.
>>>> The point of semiosis is that it provides for BOTH stability of information
>>>> AND deviation from this stability.
>>>>
>>>> You say that the same proverb in two different languages is one
>>>> Representamen embodied into different semiosic processes. Yes and No.
>>>> Again, if we are not talking about a mechanical iconic iteration of this
>>>> proverb - then,   the Representamen is up to a point,  uniquely different
>>>> in each individual! Just as the rule of law is ONE law and is articulated
>>>> in all individual instances. But - within each instance, each individual
>>>> articulation - the Representamen functions within that individual semiosis.
>>>> Again, semiosis provides for both stability and continuity of information -
>>>> AND - diversity and variance of information.
>>>>
>>>> Frankly - I think we agree on more than we disagree.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri 09/02/18 4:17 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>>>> sent:
>>>>
>>>> Edwina, List:
>>>>
>>>> Yes, I have; but I will try to do so again, with some additional detail.
>>>>
>>>> What you call the Representamen is basically (though not exactly) what
>>>> I see Peirce calling the Quasi-mind, specifically the Quasi-interpreter (CP
>>>> 4.551 ;1906).  Its acquaintance with the system of Signs is " the
>>>> prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign," and its
>>>> Collateral Experience is "previous acquaintance with what the Sign
>>>> denotes" (CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909); again, the aggregate of previous IOs
>>>> that it associates with the DO.  Its Habits of Interpretation are the
>>>> aggregate of previous FIs that influence (but do not necessitate) which
>>>> DI the Sign actually produces from among the possibilities of the II.
>>>> Habit-change--i.e., learning from experience--occurs when a new FI
>>>> supplements or replaces a previous Habit of Interpretation.
>>>>
>>>> What you call MIND is presumably the aggregate of all Quasi-minds;
>>>> i.e., the entire Universe, since "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25, EP
>>>> 1:293; 1891) with "inveterate" Habits of Interpretation that are
>>>> practically (though not absolutely) exceptionless.  The Commens is any
>>>> subset of MIND in which communication among multiple Quasi-minds is
>>>> possible due to sufficient overlap of their systems of Signs, Collateral
>>>> Experience, and Habits of Interpretation.  The employment of Sign-action to
>>>> enhance the continuity of individual Quasi-minds, until all of them
>>>> are finally (at the ideal limit) "welded" together, is one aspect of what
>>>> Peirce considered to be the summum bonum--"the development [or growth]
>>>> of concrete reasonableness" (CP 5.3-4; 1902).
>>>>
>>>> As for the Peirce quote, I honestly do not see how your discussion
>>>> below is consistent with your definition of the Representamen as a
>>>> "knowledge base."  The same proverb in two different languages is one
>>>> Representamen embodied in two different Signs (Replicas).  The people
>>>> who write or speak and read or hear it are not two individual
>>>> Representamens, they are two individual Quasi-minds who are "welded"
>>>> in the Sign.  Each is acquainted with the system of Signs to a different
>>>> extent, has different Collateral Experience for associating the IO with the
>>>> DO, and has different Habits of Intepretation; but there is enough overlap
>>>> (the Commens) for this particular Sign to serve as a medium for the
>>>> communication of ideas between them.
>>>>
>>>> In my view, this use of terminology in an analysis of semiosis is much
>>>> more consistent with all of the other places where Peirce defined the
>>>> Representamen.
>>>>
>>>>    - "something which stands to somebody for something in some respect
>>>>    or capacity" (CP 2.228; c. 1897)
>>>>    - something having the character "by virtue of which, for the
>>>>    production of a certain mental effect [its Interpretant], it may stand 
>>>> in
>>>>    place of another thing [its Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899)
>>>>    - "that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902)
>>>>    - "[t]he concrete subject that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903)
>>>>
>>>> As you have put it before, we need to read Peirce  holistically,
>>>> taking all of these texts into account.  Nevertheless, I will say it again,
>>>> and I mean it sincerely--" Different people have such wonderfully
>>>> different ways of thinking" (CP 6.462, EP 2:437; 1908).
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon S.
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Jon, list -  You haven't told us where and when the Quasi-Mind enters
>>>>> the semiosic interaction. And why just the Quasi-Mind? Why not MIND?
>>>>>
>>>>>  When and how does MIND, which I understand as referring to the
>>>>> general habits/laws/rules of organization of matter - enter the semiosic
>>>>> interaction? My view is that this is the function of the Representamen.
>>>>>
>>>>> I DO refer to Peirce - and DO re-read Peirce - but I'm not going to
>>>>> constantly refer to the exact sections/paragraphs.
>>>>>
>>>>> Now, with reference to your quote: - I interpret this completely
>>>>> differently from you.
>>>>>
>>>>> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable
>>>>> of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications
>>>>> corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English,
>>>>> Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one 
>>>>> and
>>>>> the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It
>>>>> is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are
>>>>> different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of
>>>>> the air. A representamen which should have a unique embodiment,
>>>>> incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of
>>>>> the very fact represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)
>>>>>
>>>>> My reading of the above is that the Representamen, as a common habit,
>>>>> as a generality - is most certainly capable of being transformed
>>>>> and articulated, repeatedly, within any number of INDIVIDUAL Dynamic
>>>>> Interpretants.
>>>>>
>>>>> The Representamen is not an individual proverb/diagram/picture...etc.
>>>>> It is the generality of this proverb, diagram/picture... that is
>>>>> capable of being expressed at any other time - as an individual
>>>>> Dynamic Interpretant.
>>>>>
>>>>> So- the symptoms of measles are general. They are the laws-of-measles.
>>>>> As such, when the disease is activated within the individual person, these
>>>>> general laws will be expressed, as individual articulations of 
>>>>> measles...as
>>>>> the Dynamic Interpretants.
>>>>>
>>>>> Exactly- if a Representamen does not function as GENERAL LAWS - but is
>>>>> instead an individual 'unique embodiment'...then, it isn't a 
>>>>> Representamen.
>>>>> It is, a unique Dynamic Object or Dynamic Interpretant.
>>>>>
>>>>> And, to me - these habits/rules/laws...which are generalities rather
>>>>> than specifics - are the domain of MIND - and expressed within the
>>>>> mediative actions of the Representamen.
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri 09/02/18 2:19 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>>>>> sent:
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina:
>>>>>
>>>>> It is never helpful to toss out allegations like "reductionist."  My
>>>>> still-developing model aspires to be just as interactive and relational as
>>>>> yours, but uses the terminology differently, in a way that is much
>>>>> more consistent with my reading of Peirce.  It is telling that I am
>>>>> constantly going back to revisit Peirce's writings about this
>>>>> subject, and then offering multiple citations to support my position,
>>>>> while you simply assert yours over and over.
>>>>>
>>>>> I actually did tell you where I see Peirce "locating" the "knowledge
>>>>> base"--not the Representamen, but the Quasi-mind.  I will now add
>>>>> that each individual Quasi-mind includes acquaintance with the system of
>>>>> Signs, Collateral Experience as the aggregate of previous Immediate
>>>>> Objects, and Habits of Interpretation as the aggregate of previous Final
>>>>> Interpretants.  The Commens is then the overlapping system of Signs,
>>>>> Collateral Experience, and Habits of Interpretation by which the Sign
>>>>> serves as a medium of communication between multiple individual
>>>>> Quasi-minds.
>>>>>
>>>>> Apparently your novel definition of the Representamen compels you to
>>>>> disagree that "proverbs, diagrams, pictures, physical signs, symptoms, and
>>>>> weathercocks are all Representamens"; and yet, here again is what I quoted
>>>>> directly from Peirce about this.
>>>>>
>>>>> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable
>>>>> of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications
>>>>> corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English,
>>>>> Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one 
>>>>> and
>>>>> the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It
>>>>> is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are
>>>>> different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of
>>>>> the air. A representamen which should have a unique embodiment,
>>>>> incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of
>>>>> the very fact represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Taking the Representamen as a "knowledge base" simply does not work
>>>>> here, nor in any of the other passages that I referenced below; and
>>>>> all of the items that I listed are indeed called Representamens in
>>>>> Peirce's own usage of that term.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Jon S.
>>>>>
>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 12:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Jon, list
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And of course - I disagree.  I think your understanding of the Sign
>>>>>> [DO-[IO-R-II] is reductionist. You don't seem, to me, to be involved in a
>>>>>> view of semiosis as an interactive set of relations.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You have not shown us where the knowledge base; i.e., the laws, the
>>>>>> rules, the commonality of an interaction, comes into action.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I disagree that, as you write, " proverbs, diagrams, pictures,
>>>>>> physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens". Each
>>>>>> one of these functions only within a full triad and is not and cannot be
>>>>>> simply the Representamen.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A weathercock is a DO-[IO-R-II].  That is, it functions as that
>>>>>> weathercock within an interaction with another Sign , DO-[IO-R-II]..in 
>>>>>> this
>>>>>> case, the wind and within an observer [also operative in the full Sign
>>>>>> set]. Most certainly, the weathercock is not simply a Representamen. What
>>>>>> is the Representamen in the situation where it, as a piece of metal, 
>>>>>> moves
>>>>>> in the wind? The Representamen is the kinetic laws-of-force of the
>>>>>> wind, which will move that piece of metal as it sits on a post. What is 
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> DO? The wind.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
>
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