Edwina, List:

I think that we continue to make real progress in understanding each
other.  As I see it, our remaining differences mostly boil down to
Representamen vs. Quasi-mind, and the related issue of whether a Sign can
be external as well as internal.

Peirce frequently appended the prefix "quasi-" to a term when he wanted to
use it in a way that was close to, but not identical with, its usual
meaning.  Hence a Dicisign is a "quasi-proposition" (CP 2.250 and 2.309), a
photograph has the print as its "quasi-predicate" and the section of rays
projected from what appears in it as its "quasi-object" (CP 2.320), a
Jacquard loom is a "quasi-sign" (CP 5.473), searching out a state of things
to evaluate a hypothesis rather than intentionally bringing about those
conditions is "quasi-experimentation" (CP 7.115n27), the final cause of an
animal's instinctive behavior is a "quasi-purpose" (CP 7.381n19), and seeing
something beyond the ken of sense is "quasi-vision" (CP 7.615).

Most people think of an individual *human *mind when they read the word
"mind," so my guess is that Peirce used "Quasi-mind" in CP 4.536,
4.550-551, and 4.553 to emphasize what you often remind us from the very
same passage--"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It
appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely
physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that
the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there."  I also think
that Jerry R. is right to highlight (as I previously did) the continuity
aspect of "welding" individual Quasi-minds together, such that they are "at
one (*i.e.*, are one mind) in the sign itself."

Peirce never defined "Representamen" as a "mediative process," any more
than he defined it as a "knowledge base."  In his usage, it was always
either a generalization of "Sign" that can have a non-mental Interpretant,
like a sunflower that turns toward the sun (CP 2.274), or essentially a
synonym for "Sign."  He apparently abandoned it altogether by 1905--"I use
'sign' in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful case of an
almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the
scientific definition ... I formerly preferred the word representamen. But
there was no need of this horrid long word" (SS 193).

>From that standpoint, I confess that my own usage is not quite consistent
with his, either.  Basically, I have latched onto the fact that the IO and
II are *internal to* the Sign--i.e., *parts of* the Sign--and proposed
assigning the term "Representamen" to whatever *else *constitutes the
Sign.  Again, in light of the four bulleted definitions that I quoted
below, it seems to be something along the lines of what others call the
"sign-vehicle," and maybe I will end up reluctantly embracing that label
after all.

DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI is the series of six Correlates that are involved in
Sign-action.  Quasi-minds are bundles of Collateral Experience and Habits
of Interpretation--i.e., reacting substances with "scientific
intelligence," including but not limited to human beings, that are thus
"capable of learning by experience" (CP 2.227).  They serve as the
Quasi-utterer and Quasi-interpreter(s) of the Sign.

The only reason why *I* "say that the same proverb in two different
languages is one Representamen embodied into different semiosic processes"
is because *Peirce *said it himself, quite clearly.  "Every time this is
written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time
it is thought of it is one and the same representamen" (CP 5.138).  Hence
whatever you identify as "uniquely different in each individual" *cannot *be
the Representamen.  Unless and until we agree on this, we have probably
come about as far as we possibly can toward reconciling our views.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon -
>
> I still don't see why you call this semiosic action the 'quasi-mind'
> rather than the 'mind'. What's the difference between the two?
>
> This 'mind/quasi-mind', in my understanding operates within the mediative
> process of the Representamen.
>
> I therefore agree with the outline of your first paragraph - but- this
> 'quasi-mind/mind..again..operates within the mediative process of the
> Representamen. I note that Peirce's outline of semiosis did not include
> this quasi-mind, but - included:
>
> DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI.
>
> No - I wouldn't call Mind the 'aggregate' nor would I call 'Quasi-Mind'
> the subset of this seeming universal Mind.  I see Mind and quasi-mind both
> as a process of habit formation and laws. The reason for my hesitation in
> this - is that I am concerned about your setting up an aggregate and
> subsets.
>
> The Representamen as a process of mediation, provides the laws, the rules,
> the common habits of the system. I see that two different people will each
> have a set of shared values/knowledge/information - and a set of unshared
> values/knowledge/information. Therefore - their interpretation of the same
> proverb in two different languages must reflect these differences. The
> point of semiosis is that it provides for BOTH stability of information AND
> deviation from this stability.
>
> You say that the same proverb in two different languages is one
> Representamen embodied into different semiosic processes. Yes and No.
> Again, if we are not talking about a mechanical iconic iteration of this
> proverb - then,   the Representamen is up to a point,  uniquely different
> in each individual! Just as the rule of law is ONE law and is articulated
> in all individual instances. But - within each instance, each individual
> articulation - the Representamen functions within that individual semiosis.
> Again, semiosis provides for both stability and continuity of information -
> AND - diversity and variance of information.
>
> Frankly - I think we agree on more than we disagree.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Fri 09/02/18 4:17 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Yes, I have; but I will try to do so again, with some additional detail.
>
> What you call the Representamen is basically (though not exactly) what I
> see Peirce calling the Quasi-mind, specifically the Quasi-interpreter (CP
> 4.551 ;1906).  Its acquaintance with the system of Signs is " the
> prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign," and its
> Collateral Experience is "previous acquaintance with what the Sign
> denotes" (CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909); again, the aggregate of previous IOs
> that it associates with the DO.  Its Habits of Interpretation are the
> aggregate of previous FIs that influence (but do not necessitate) which DI
> the Sign actually produces from among the possibilities of the II.
> Habit-change--i.e., learning from experience--occurs when a new FI
> supplements or replaces a previous Habit of Interpretation.
>
> What you call MIND is presumably the aggregate of all Quasi-minds; i.e.,
> the entire Universe, since "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293;
> 1891) with "inveterate" Habits of Interpretation that are practically
> (though not absolutely) exceptionless.  The Commens is any subset of MIND
> in which communication among multiple Quasi-minds is possible due to
> sufficient overlap of their systems of Signs, Collateral Experience, and
> Habits of Interpretation.  The employment of Sign-action to enhance the 
> continuity
> of individual Quasi-minds, until all of them are finally (at the ideal
> limit) "welded" together, is one aspect of what Peirce considered to be the 
> summum
> bonum--"the development [or growth] of concrete reasonableness" (CP
> 5.3-4; 1902).
>
> As for the Peirce quote, I honestly do not see how your discussion below
> is consistent with your definition of the Representamen as a "knowledge
> base."  The same proverb in two different languages is one Representamen
> embodied in two different Signs (Replicas).  The people who write or speak
> and read or hear it are not two individual Representamens, they are two
> individual Quasi-minds who are "welded" in the Sign.  Each is acquainted
> with the system of Signs to a different extent, has different Collateral
> Experience for associating the IO with the DO, and has different Habits of
> Intepretation; but there is enough overlap (the Commens) for this
> particular Sign to serve as a medium for the communication of ideas between
> them.
>
> In my view, this use of terminology in an analysis of semiosis is much
> more consistent with all of the other places where Peirce defined the
> Representamen.
>
>    - "something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or
>    capacity" (CP 2.228; c. 1897)
>    - something having the character "by virtue of which, for the
>    production of a certain mental effect [its Interpretant], it may stand in
>    place of another thing [its Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899)
>    - "that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902)
>    - "[t]he concrete subject that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903)
>
> As you have put it before, we need to read Peirce  holistically, taking
> all of these texts into account.  Nevertheless, I will say it again, and I
> mean it sincerely--" Different people have such wonderfully different
> ways of thinking" (CP 6.462, EP 2:437; 1908).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list -  You haven't told us where and when the Quasi-Mind enters the
>> semiosic interaction. And why just the Quasi-Mind? Why not MIND?
>>
>>  When and how does MIND, which I understand as referring to the
>> general habits/laws/rules of organization of matter - enter the semiosic
>> interaction? My view is that this is the function of the Representamen.
>>
>> I DO refer to Peirce - and DO re-read Peirce - but I'm not going to
>> constantly refer to the exact sections/paragraphs.
>>
>> Now, with reference to your quote: - I interpret this completely
>> differently from you.
>>
>> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of
>> repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt
>> good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or
>> any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same
>> representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same
>> with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different
>> signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A
>> representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of
>> repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact
>> represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)
>>
>> My reading of the above is that the Representamen, as a common habit, as
>> a generality - is most certainly capable of being transformed
>> and articulated, repeatedly, within any number of INDIVIDUAL Dynamic
>> Interpretants.
>>
>> The Representamen is not an individual proverb/diagram/picture...etc. It
>> is the generality of this proverb, diagram/picture... that is capable of
>> being expressed at any other time - as an individual Dynamic
>> Interpretant.
>>
>> So- the symptoms of measles are general. They are the laws-of-measles. As
>> such, when the disease is activated within the individual person, these
>> general laws will be expressed, as individual articulations of measles...as
>> the Dynamic Interpretants.
>>
>> Exactly- if a Representamen does not function as GENERAL LAWS - but is
>> instead an individual 'unique embodiment'...then, it isn't a Representamen.
>> It is, a unique Dynamic Object or Dynamic Interpretant.
>>
>> And, to me - these habits/rules/laws...which are generalities rather than
>> specifics - are the domain of MIND - and expressed within the mediative
>> actions of the Representamen.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Fri 09/02/18 2:19 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina:
>>
>> It is never helpful to toss out allegations like "reductionist."  My
>> still-developing model aspires to be just as interactive and relational as
>> yours, but uses the terminology differently, in a way that is much more
>> consistent with my reading of Peirce.  It is telling that I am constantly
>> going back to revisit Peirce's writings about this subject, and then
>> offering multiple citations to support my position, while you simply assert
>> yours over and over.
>>
>> I actually did tell you where I see Peirce "locating" the "knowledge
>> base"--not the Representamen, but the Quasi-mind.  I will now add that
>> each individual Quasi-mind includes acquaintance with the system of Signs,
>> Collateral Experience as the aggregate of previous Immediate Objects, and
>> Habits of Interpretation as the aggregate of previous Final Interpretants.
>> The Commens is then the overlapping system of Signs, Collateral
>> Experience, and Habits of Interpretation by which the Sign serves as a
>> medium of communication between multiple individual Quasi-minds.
>>
>> Apparently your novel definition of the Representamen compels you to
>> disagree that "proverbs, diagrams, pictures, physical signs, symptoms, and
>> weathercocks are all Representamens"; and yet, here again is what I quoted
>> directly from Peirce about this.
>>
>> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of
>> repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt
>> good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or
>> any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same
>> representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same
>> with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different
>> signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A
>> representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of
>> repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact
>> represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903, emphases added)
>>
>>
>> Taking the Representamen as a "knowledge base" simply does not work
>> here, nor in any of the other passages that I referenced below; and all
>> of the items that I listed are indeed called Representamens in Peirce's
>> own usage of that term.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon S.
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 12:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, list
>>>
>>> And of course - I disagree.  I think your understanding of the Sign
>>> [DO-[IO-R-II] is reductionist. You don't seem, to me, to be involved in a
>>> view of semiosis as an interactive set of relations.
>>>
>>> You have not shown us where the knowledge base; i.e., the laws, the
>>> rules, the commonality of an interaction, comes into action.
>>>
>>> I disagree that, as you write, " proverbs, diagrams, pictures, physical
>>> signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens". Each one of
>>> these functions only within a full triad and is not and cannot be simply
>>> the Representamen.
>>>
>>> A weathercock is a DO-[IO-R-II].  That is, it functions as that
>>> weathercock within an interaction with another Sign , DO-[IO-R-II]..in this
>>> case, the wind and within an observer [also operative in the full Sign
>>> set]. Most certainly, the weathercock is not simply a Representamen. What
>>> is the Representamen in the situation where it, as a piece of metal, moves
>>> in the wind? The Representamen is the kinetic laws-of-force of the
>>> wind, which will move that piece of metal as it sits on a post. What is the
>>> DO? The wind.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>
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