Jon, list,
Gary R is the one to thank for noticing the timeliness of the example — on my
blog it started out as just the two translations of the Dogen text, and the
semiotic commentary was an afterthought.
I recall that years ago, when we were discussing Peirce’s “New Elements” on the
list, there was some consternation caused by his statement that “a sign is not
a real thing.” On the one hand, this seemed to cast doubt on the reality of
signs, which Peirce often affirms elsewhere. On the other, it would seem to
assert that an existing thing (a sinsign) is not really a sign at all. The
clarification that “It is of such a nature as to exist in replicas” was
insufficient for many of us.
But now I think the same idea could be stated this way: The sign proper is a
Type, its replicas are Tokens, and it is only the tokens that exist as
“things.” You’ll recall that in “New Elements” (EP2:300-324) Peirce focusses on
the Symbol as the “genuine” sign and refers to the Icon and Index as
“degenerate.” If we apply those terms to the qualisign/sinsign/legisign
trichotomy which Peirce introduced in the 1903 “Syllabus” (but does not mention
in “New Elements”), we could quite reasonably say that the legisign is genuine
while the sinsign is degenerate (and the qualisign even more so). Then we could
reasonably translate “a sign is not a real thing” as follows: a sinsign is not
a genuine sign.
On the other hand, in his classification of sign types in the Syllabus Peirce
does not use the terminology of “genuine” vs. “degenerate.” The icon, index,
qualisign, sinsign etc. are all referred to as “signs.” But the whole
classification of signs in the Syllabus is arrived at by analysis of the most
genuine, or paradigmatic Sign type, which is legisign, symbol or argument
depending on the trichotomy in question. Peirce presents his classification as
if these genuine signs are ‘built up’ from simpler types, and in a sense they
are, because (for instance) the symbol can only convey information by involving
an index involving an icon. But in another sense these ‘simpler’ types are not
genuine signs; they are defined by analysis of more genuine signs into their
functional parts. In 1906 Peirce wrote that “an Argument is no more built up of
Propositions than a motion is built up of positions. So to regard it is to
neglect the very essence of it” (MS 295). Likewise the essence of the most
genuinely triadic sign relations is not to be ‘built up’ of simpler ones, but
analyzed into those simpler relations; and the most genuinely triadic relations
are those by which arguments, legisigns and symbols are related to their
respective objects and interpretants.
This ‘top-down’ view of the classification of signs is not incompatible with,
but is easily overlooked in, the presentation on “Nomenclature and Divisions of
Triadic Relations.” Take for example the Legisign (CP 2.264, EP2:291):
[[ A Legisign is a law that is a Sign. ... It is not a single object, but a
general type which, it has been agreed, shall be significant. Every legisign
signifies through an instance of its application, which may be termed a Replica
of it. Thus, the word “the” will usually occur from fifteen to twenty-five
times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one and the same word, the same
legisign. Each single instance of it is a Replica. The Replica is a Sinsign.
Thus, every Legisign requires Sinsigns. But these are not ordinary Sinsigns,
such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded as significant. Nor would
the Replica be significant if it were not for the law which renders it so.]]
What I’m suggesting is that, in the language of “New Elements,” a legisign is a
more “genuine” sign than a sinsign or replica; and when Peirce said in “New
Elements” that “a sign is not a real thing,” he meant the same thing that he
meant in saying that “It is not a single object, but a general type.” And we
must notice here that Peirce defines two kinds of sinsigns: “ordinary Sinsigns,
such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded as significant”; and the
sinsigns that are the replicas required by legisigns. The difference is that
the ordinary sinsign is regarded, but not intended, as significant. So in
Gary’s R’s example, the burnt child’s scream is an ordinary sinsign for the
mother, because she reads it as an index of the child’s distress, not because
it is a replica of any legisign. There is a psychological sense in which that
scream is more real than a replica of a legisign would be, because it elicits a
more dynamic reaction from the mother. But that reaction, being more dyadic and
less intentional, is the interpretant in a relation to the sign which is less
genuuinely triadic (from a logical point of view) than the relation would be if
the sign were a replica of a legisign.
We’ve all seen children who seem to crave such reactions from adults and
therefore pretend to be in greater distress than they really are. When they
scream intending to get that reaction, the scream is a replica of a legisign,
which may be verbalized as the law “scream gets mother’s attention.” The
element of intention makes that sinsign, as a replica of a legisign, a more
genuine sign from the logical point of view, precisely because it is a fake, a
pretense, from a psychological point of view. So which sign is more real, the
“ordinary sinsign” (like the burnt child’s scream) or the sinsign which is a
replica of a legisign (like the scream of a child who just wants attention)? It
depends on whether you are doing a top-down analysis of semiosis as Peirce (the
logician) generally did, or trying to build up a concept of semiosis from its
simplest examples.
I think this line of thought is closely related to the fact that it takes a
symbol to say anything true about a real object, but symbol use also makes it
possible to lie. This explains why symbols are ‘particularly remote from the
Truth itself’ (EP2:307), even though they are more “genuine” signs than icons
or indices, as Peirce also says in “New Elements”.
Gary f.
} To enjoy freedom we have to control ourselves. [Virginia Woolf] {
<http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 10-Feb-18 21:44
To: Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] one and the same representamen
Gary F., List:
Thank you for posting such a timely example.
GF: In Peircean texts like this one, ‘representamen’ and ‘sign’ are two words
for the same thing – which is obviously not an existing physical “thing,” since
it can be embodied many times in many ways.
This is why I confessed last night that my own usage of "Representamen" to date
is not strictly consistent with Peirce's--he basically treated it as synonymous
with "Sign," although at least a couple of times he defined a Sign as a
Representamen with a mental Interpretant. It is also a good reminder that
whether we call it a Replica or a Token or a Sign-vehicle, the physical
embodiment of a Sign is not the Sign itself.
CSP: In the first place, a sign is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as
to exist in replicas. Look down a printed page, and every the you see is the
same word, every e the same letter. A real thing does not so exist in replica.
The being of a sign is merely being represented. Now really being and being
represented are very different. (EP 2:303; 1904)
CSP: Logic is the study of the essential nature of signs. A sign is something
that exists in replicas. Whether the sign "it is raining," or "all pairs of
particles of matter have component accelerations toward one another inversely
proportional to the square of the distance," happens to have a replica in
writing, in oral speech, or in silent thought, is a distinction of the very
minutest interest in logic, which is a study, not of replicas, but of signs.
(EP 2:311; 1904)
CSP: It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for if
we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human mind,
that mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only after that
consider it in its significance; and the like must happen if the sign addresses
itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a determination of that
quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding that determination as the
sign. (EP 2:391; 1906)
That last quote expresses why, in Gary R.'s thought experiment, although
certainly a Dynamic Interpretant for the child, I analyze the girl's scream as
a Sign for the mother--or rather, correcting myself now, a Replica of a Sign.
I acknowledge that, as a physical sound, it can be analyzed instead as a
Dynamic Object for the mother; but this seems to treat it "as an object in
itself," thus breaking the continuity with its own Dynamic Object, which is the
hot burner. More to ponder ...
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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