Edwina, Helmut, List:

The nearly 40 different types of "form" that Peirce cataloged in CP
6.360-361 (from Baldwin's *Dictionary*, 1902) highlight the importance of
being clear about *what we mean* by "Form" when we talk about it; likewise
"Matter."  In NEM 4:292-300 (c. 1903?), Peirce stated the following.

... Form is quality, suchness,--red, for example ... The peculiar suchness
of the feeling, wherein is that? It is wholly in itself. The quality or
form is whatever it is in itself, irrespective of anything else. No
embodiment of it in this or that object or feeling in any degree modifies
the suchness. It is something positive in itself. ... The suchness does not
exist, but it is something definite. Neither does it consist in being
represented. The being represented is one thing; the being represented such
as red is represented, is another definite thing. It is general. It is an
element of existing things; but it is not and has nothing to do with the
element of existence. The suchness of *red *is such as it is in its own
suchness, and in nothing else.

*Matter*, that something which is the subject of a fact, is, in every
respect the contrary of form, except that both are elements of the world
that are independent of how they are represented to be. Form is not an
existent. Matter is precisely that which exists. (Remember, that whether
corporeal, or physical matter is, or is not, the only matter is beyond my
present scope.) Form is definite. Whatever *red *is, it is of its very
essence, and is nothing else. Matter is an element of something definite.
But it is in itself, as the subject of that determination, vague ... Form,
as we have seen, is all that it is in itself. Matter being the subject of
fact, and being nothing but the subject of a fact, is all that it is in
reference to something else than itself ... (293-294)

The next paragraph includes what I quoted previously (294-295), and then
comes the following.

This *Entelechy*, the third element which it is requisite to acknowledge
besides Matter and Form, is that which brings things together. It is the
element which is prominent in such ideas as Plan, Cause, and Law. The
philosopher who recognizes only Form, will do best to insist that Form
fulfills this uniting function by virtue of its generality. But it is not
so; since Form remains entirely within its own self. (295-296)

Hence in this *particular *manuscript, it is clear that Form is 1ns, Matter
is 2ns, and Entelechy is 3ns.  Similarly, in EP 2:304 (1904), Peirce stated
the following.

But so far as the "Truth" is merely the *object *of a sign, it is merely
the Aristotelian *Matter *of it that is so. In addition however to *denoting
*objects, every sign sufficiently complete *signifies characters*, or
qualities ... Every sign signifies the "Truth." But it is only the
Aristotelian *Form *of the universe that it signifies ... What we call a
"fact" is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to
be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to
express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly
as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect
Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this
language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of
perfection, or *entelechy*, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may
adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should
be quite perfect, and so identical,—in such identity as a sign may
have,—with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by
it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua *fact,
will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The
"Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate
interpretant of every sign.

Here it is equally clear that Aristotelian *Form *corresponds to the
*(1ns) that a Sign *signifies*, Aristotelian *Matter *corresponds to the
*object *(2ns) that a Sign *denotes*, and Aristotelian *Entelechy *corresponds
to the *unity *of these (3ns) that a Sign *expresses*.

Of course, whether or how these two texts have bearing on our
interpretation of Peirce's *other *writings is another question.


Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 3:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Helmut, list
> My view of Peirce's Form and Matter is quite different from that of JAS. I
> refer you to Vol 6, 354-364, which has an extensive outline of different
> types of form. Indeed, he associates Form with 'forma corpus' and 'morphe'
> {Note: I am transliterating from the Greek]. Whereas, he associates
> Firstness with chance, quality, vagueness - none of which have spatial
> extension or a 'body' [corpus/morphe].
> I don't see how one can assign only ONE category to matter - whether that
> one category be 1stness or 2ndness or 3rdness.. The point of anything in
> 'thisness',[haecceity]  is that it is made up of three categories.
> Therefore, something discrete and individual, would be made up of a mode
> of 'potentiality' [1stness]; as well as 'thisness' [haecceity; 2ndness] as
> well as habits and even 'esse in futuro' 2.148 of these habits continuing
> on [3rdness]
> Edwina
> On Mon 12/02/18 3:22 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
> Dear All,
> I wonder why Peirce associated the categories like that. To me it rather
> seems like matter would be 1ns, form 2ns, and entelechy 3ns. That is
> because I cannot see more than one mode in matter, but 2 in form: Reason
> for it, and aim (telos) of it. Aristotle said, that form consists of energy
> and entelechy, so two parts (modes?). 2.1. might be said like: material
> reason of the form, or the form´s sustenance by matter, potential energies
> keeping the form together, and 2.2. the form of the form, or the form´s
> formal reason, which is it´s aim.
> Also, I see "quality" rather associated with matter than with form. As the
> form of a thing is more likely to change due to circumstances than its
> matter is, I see "actuality" rather suiting with "form" than with "matter".
> Does "entelechy" contain "telos"? Does it mean quite the similar?
> Best,
> Helmut
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