Gary R., List:

1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior
of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms
of *dyadic *action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly *triadic *action
of semiosis.  In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a
Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even
though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
Objects) of degenerate Signs.

2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
(at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The Dynamic Object determines the
Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of which the girl's scream is a
Dynamic Interpretant; and every Sign determines its Interpretant to stand
in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself does.
Hence both the internal neural signal and the external scream are *Indices *of
the hot burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment.

3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My current
tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral Experience
and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a *reacting substance*) that retains
the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., *learning by experience*), and thus
can be the Quasi-utterer of a *genuine *Sign (since this requires a
*purpose*) and the Quasi-interpreter of *any *Sign.

4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 7:05 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Jon S, Edwina, list,
>
> For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet points. In
> response to Edwina, Jon wrote:
>
> 1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
> talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
> beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
> a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
> "Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I
> hoped that when we jointly recognized the *internal *triad of [IO-R-II]
> some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call *this *(and
> *only *this) the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign
> *without *a DO.
>
>
> My view is that while such an individual thing as a crystal has been
> created by some semiosic process, that the semiosis is (internally) more or
> less complete once the crystal is formed, and this is so even as we can
> analyze aspects of the three categories present in/as the crystal (these no
> longer being semiotic, but rather, phenomenological categories).
>
> John Deely, who introduced the idea of physiosemiosis, did not argue for
> a, shall we say, vital 'process' of physiosemiosis once rocks and the like
> have been formed: "Deely . . . notably in *Basics of Semiotics*, laid
> down the argument that the action of signs extends even further than life,
> and that semiosis as an influence of the future played a role in the
> shaping of the physical universe prior to the advent of life, a role for
> which Deely coined the term *physiosemiosis."*
> *https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely>*
>
> As suggested above, I think that it was Peirce's view that what Delly
> termed "physiosemiosis" not only "played a role in the shaping of the
> physical universe prior to the advent of life" but has played one since and
> does so today, and not only in the formation of crystals. But, again, in my
> view, once the crystal is formed the (internal) semiosis ends (yes, it
> continues to have a relation to its environment, and there will be atomic
> and sub-atomic activity necessarily occurring, but I personally have yet to
> be convinced that such activity constitutes a form of semiosis, while some
> physicists have argued that it does).
>
> Living organisms present a more difficult problem. The work of Stjernfelt
> (esp. in *Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of
> Dicisigns)*, not to mention the whole thrust of the science of
> Biosemiotics holds not only that any living organism, but the organism in
> relation to its environment (its Umwelt) is fully involved in complex
> semiosic activity. I would tend to strongly agree.
>
>
> 2.  As I noted in my own reply to Gary, I instead view the DI of the child
> (the utterer) as an *external Sign* for the mother (the interpreter), and
> its DO is still the hot burner.
>
>
> While I also view the DI of the child as an external Sign for her mother,
> I do not see the DO as the hot burner. The mother, say, who was out of the
> room for the moment of the accident, hearing her child's scream may not
> connect the scream (the Sign) with the stove at all. So then what is the
> DO? I think that rather than the hot burner (as Jon holds) that it's the
> child herself.
>
> 3.  Your mind is indeed an individual manifestation of Mind; but again, I
> suspect that Peirce used "Quasi-mind" to accommodate cases that most people
> would not normally associate with "mind."
>
>
> As I've posted now a couple of times, in my opinion the concept
> "Quasi-sign" needs much further discussion, perhaps a thread of its own. I
> would for now merely suggest that while it no doubt does "accommodate cases
> that most people would not normally associate with "mind," that the concept
> includes more ordinary cases as well.
>
> 4.  If to you "Form has [parameters] and laws and continuity," then you
> are not referring to the same thing that Peirce called "Form" when he
> contrasted it with Matter in NEM 4:292-300 and EP 2:303-304.
>
>
> ‚ÄčAt times in this discussion as to the meaning of 'Form', while there
> seems to me that for Peirce 'Form' *is *1ns, Edwina's analysis of Form
> seems to me more related to structure--the forms of the organization of
> related elements in a material system, rather than the forms of the
> elements themselves. In that physical system the organization would in many
> if not all cases have "parameters, laws, and continuity."
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
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