Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of
what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed
Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I
would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic?

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Gary R, Jon, list:
>
> 1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because Firstness,
> which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as Thirdness/habits. Even
> a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think that Mind is ever separate from
> Matter and vice versa.
>
> 2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
> mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
> Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
> Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can regress
> to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the Mother, the Sign
> that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign].
> The hot stove is almost irrelevant to her.
>
> 3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.
>
> 4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and I
> certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness. Firstness
> is a State and has no structure.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon 12/02/18 10:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary R., List:
>
> 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
> of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
> a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
> bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
> capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior
> of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms
> of dyadic action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly triadic action of
> semiosis.  In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a
> Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even
> though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
> Objects) of degenerate Signs.
>
> 2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
> necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
> (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
> the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
> course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The Dynamic Object determines the
> Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of which the girl's scream is a
> Dynamic Interpretant;  and every Sign determines its Interpretant to
> stand in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself
> does.  Hence both the internal neural signal and the external scream are 
> Indices
> of the hot burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment.
>
> 3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My
> current tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral
> Experience and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a reacting substance) that
> retains the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., learning by experience), and
> thus can be the Quasi-utterer of a genuine Sign (since this requires a
> purpose) and the Quasi-interpreter of any Sign.
>
> 4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 7:05 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon S, Edwina, list,
>>
>> For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet points.
>> In response to Edwina, Jon wrote:
>>
>> 1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
>> talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
>> beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
>> a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
>> "Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I
>> hoped that when we jointly recognized the  internal triad of [IO-R-II]
>> some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call this (and only 
>> this)
>> the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign without a DO.
>>
>>
>> My view is that while such an individual thing as a crystal has been
>> created by some semiosic process, that the semiosis is (internally) more or
>> less complete once the crystal is formed, and this is so even as we can
>> analyze aspects of the three categories present in/as the crystal (these no
>> longer being semiotic, but rather, phenomenological categories).
>>
>> John Deely, who introduced the idea of physiosemiosis, did not argue for
>> a, shall we say, vital 'process' of physiosemiosis once rocks and the like
>> have been formed: "Deely . . . notably in Basics of Semiotics, laid down
>> the argument that the action of signs extends even further than life, and
>> that semiosis as an influence of the future played a role in the shaping of
>> the physical universe prior to the advent of life, a role for which Deely
>> coined the term  physiosemiosis."
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely
>>
>> As suggested above, I think that it was Peirce's view that what Delly
>> termed "physiosemiosis" not only " played a role in the shaping of the
>> physical universe prior to the advent of life" but has played one since and
>> does so today, and not only in the formation of crystals. But, again, in my
>> view, once the crystal is formed the (internal) semiosis ends (yes, it
>> continues to have a relation to its environment, and there will be atomic
>> and sub-atomic activity necessarily occurring, but I personally have yet to
>> be convinced that such activity constitutes a form of semiosis, while some
>> physicists have argued that it does).
>>
>> Living organisms present a more difficult problem. The work of Stjernfelt
>> (esp. in Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of
>> Dicisigns), not to mention the whole thrust of the science of
>> Biosemiotics holds not only that any living organism, but the organism in
>> relation to its environment (its Umwelt) is fully involved in complex
>> semiosic activity. I would tend to strongly agree.
>>
>>
>> 2.  As I noted in my own reply to Gary, I instead view the DI of the
>> child (the utterer) as an external Sign for the mother (the
>> interpreter), and its DO is still the hot burner.
>>
>>
>> While I also view the DI of the child as an external Sign for her mother,
>> I do not see the DO as the hot burner. The mother, say, who was out of the
>> room for the moment of the accident, hearing her child's scream may not
>> connect the scream (the Sign) with the stove at all. So then what is the
>> DO? I think that rather than the hot burner (as Jon holds) that it's the
>> child herself.
>>
>> 3.  Your mind is indeed an individual manifestation of Mind; but again, I
>> suspect that Peirce used "Quasi-mind" to accommodate cases that most people
>> would not normally associate with "mind."
>>
>>
>> As I've posted now a couple of times, in my opinion the concept
>> "Quasi-sign" needs much further discussion, perhaps a thread of its own. I
>> would for now merely suggest that while it no doubt does "accommodate cases
>> that most people would not normally associate with "mind," that the concept
>> includes more ordinary cases as well.
>>
>> 4.  If to you "Form has [parameters] and laws and continuity," then you
>> are not referring to the same thing that Peirce called "Form" when he
>> contrasted it with Matter in NEM 4:292-300 and EP 2:303-304.
>>
>>
>> ‚ÄčAt times in this discussion as to the meaning of 'Form', while there
>> seems to me that for Peirce 'Form' is 1ns, Edwina's analysis of Form
>> seems to me more related to structure--the forms of the organization of
>> related elements in a material system, rather than the forms of the
>> elements themselves. In that physical system the organization would in many
>> if not all cases have "parameters, laws, and continuity."
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> [image: Blocked image]
>>
>> Gary Richmond
>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
>> Communication Studies
>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>
>>
>
>
>
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