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}Jon, list - 

        1. With regard to the example - I consider the child's scream to be
a DI, which then transforms into a DO for the mother.

        2. I do not think that it is 'undeniable' that Peirce associated
Form with Firstness. Apart from that one quote - which I have, in a
separate post before I read this response from you - interpreted it
to mean 'wholeness of Type' rather than the fresh spontaneity that is
Firstness - I can't find any references in Peirce's work using Form as

        3. It isn't that I 'prefer' aligning Form with 3rdness, which
suggests a strictly individual interpretation - I read Peirce's work
as doing just that. 

        4. As for Peirce's terms for the three categories - he has provided
them throughout his work: 

        Firstness: spontaneity, chance, state, quality, freshness, feeling,

        Secondness; brute, struggle, reaction, otherness, existent,
volition, fact

        Thirdness: habit,, mind, mediation, necessity, generality,

 On Tue 13/02/18 10:30 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt
 In an effort to reduce the quantity of my individual messages, I am
going to try combining multiple replies into one post.
 Gary R.:
 1.  I agree that even persons can lose, or deliberately set aside,
their capacity for Habit-change.  Hopefully it is evident that I am
still very much open to adjusting my own views on these matters.
 2.  In particular, as you have observed and I have acknowledged
previously, I tend to be a more abstract than concrete thinker; so
these kinds of practical examples are good "stretching exercises" for
me.  In this case, I am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between
"the child's semiosis" and "the mother's semiosis"; are they not 
continuous?  It seems to me that there must be some semiotic
connection between the hot burner and the mother's eventual response
to the child's cry, because the one would not have happened without
the other.  Why regard the girl's scream as having a different
Dynamic Object for the mother than it does for the child?  Is it not
the very same Sign?  I suppose that it might have different Immediate
Objects for the two of them, because of their different Collateral
Experiences, but I am still mulling over that possibility. 
Regardless, my conjecture is that any "individual" instance of
semiosis  begins with a Dynamic Object--either selected for a purpose
in a Quasi-mind (genuine Signs), or a "thing" itself (degenerate
Signs)--and ends (if it ever does) with a Habit-change.  For the
child, that termination is (I suspect) her new habit of not touching
hot burners; but her scream, as a Dynamic Interpretant, is an
external Sign that continues the semiosic process in the
mother--perhaps resulting in a new habit of not leaving her daughter
alone in the kitchen. 
 3.  As a matter of fact, Peirce used the term "quasi-sign" at least
twice.  In "What Makes a Reasoning Sound" (1903), it refers to
"certain objects more or less analogous to signs," but nothing more
is said (EP 2:257).  In "Pragmatism" (1907), it refers to something
that would be a Sign except that it lacks "the triadic production of
the interpretant," and a Jacquard loom is given as an example (CP
5.473; cf. EP 2:404).  However, I think that there is now fairly
widespread consensus, at least among those of us who have discussed
it on the List in recent years, that as long as something is 
interpretable--i.e., has an Immediate Interpretant--it qualifies as a
Sign, even if it never actually produces a Dynamic Interpretant.
 4.  I agree that Edwina is using "Form" in way that better aligns
with 3ns than 1ns.  As I said in the other thread, while it is
undeniable that Peirce associated "Form" with 1ns, "Matter" with 2ns,
and "Entelechy" with 3ns in NEM 4:292-300 (c. 1903?) and EP 2:304
(1904), this does not entail that he  always did so.  Having reread
both "A Sketch of Dichotomic Mathematics" and "New Elements" within
the last few days, I noticed a few other uncanny similarities,
suggesting that he may have composed them at about the same time and
for much the same purpose.  I wonder if that is why the online
Commens bibliography dates R 4 as 1904, rather than "c. 1903?" per CP
and Robin.
 1.  What do you make of Peirce's statements in "Pragmatism" (1907)
that  habit-changes  as "ultimate logical interpretants" are not
Signs (CP 5.476), or that habits as "final logical interpretants" are
(at least) not Signs in the same way as the Signs that produce them
(EP 2:418)?  What warrants analyzing the dissipation of a rock as
(triadic) semiosic action, rather than (dyadic) dynamical action?  No
one is advocating the separation of Mind and Matter; the point, as
always, is that Matter is (effete) Mind whose habits have become so
inveterate as to be effectively invulnerable to  Habit-change, which
is the final cause of every semiosic process.
 2.  I agree that there is "a plethora of Signs" in the example,
which is why I said a while back that we have to agree on which Sign
to analyze before attempting to assign any of the other terms.  Right
now, we are discussing the girl's scream as a Sign; but unless you
have changed your mind, you analyze it instead as a Dynamic Object
for the mother, since you deny that there are any  external Signs.
 3.  Do you have any specific comments on my latest tentative
definition of "Quasi-mind" (see below)?
 4.  In NEM 4:292-300, obviously "Form" does not mean "formlessness."
 In fact, I find it very interesting that Peirce instead characterizes
it as "something definite," in contrast to other writings where
"definite" and "vague" are antonyms, and he associates the  latter
with 1ns (e.g., CP 5.447-450; 1905).  So again, we must pay careful
attention to the context and not necessarily impose the same
interpretation on a given word throughout Peirce's (or anyone else's)
writings, despite his explicit desire to be self-consistent in his own
terminology.  Since you prefer aligning "Form" with 3ns, what
corresponding terms do you advocate for 1ns and 2ns to highlight the
distinctions among the three Categories, while still affirming that
all three are present in any phenomenon? 
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran [1] - [2]  
  On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 7:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
         Gary R, Jon, list:

        1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because
Firstness, which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as
Thirdness/habits. Even a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think
that Mind is ever separate from Matter and vice versa. 

        2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can
regress to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the
Mother, the Sign that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign]. The hot stove is almost irrelevant to

        3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.

         4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form'
and I certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of
Firstness. Firstness is a State and has no structure.

         Edwina On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 2:56 AM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Jon, list,
 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it,
the end of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the
production of a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a
material substance is a bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it
has effectively lost the capacity for Habit-change.  
 Nicely said. And I would suggest that to the extent that a person
has "effectively lost the capacity for Habit-change," has become,
say, 'set in his ways' or 'married to his theories, that he is, in a
sense, to that extent intellectually 'hardened' or spiritually
 I'll be interested to see how you develop your idea that the
"irreducibly triadic action of semiosis" requires a
Quasi-interpreter. I agree that 'things', especially those in nature,
can serve as Quasi-utterers of degenerate Signs.  
  2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an
II--not necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the
mother's inability (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my
view) as standing for the hot burner.  She would presumably find this
out very quickly, of course, after rushing into the kitchen.  
  I disagree. Whether or not the mother interprets the DI (the cry of
her daughter) correctly or not, the cry is part of the child's
semiosis, not that of the mother. You continue:
 The Dynamic Object determines the Sign--perhaps a neural signal of
pain--of which the girl's scream is a Dynamic Interpretant;  and
every Sign determines its Interpretant to stand in the same relation
to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself does.  Hence both the
internal neural signal and the external scream are Indices of the hot
burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment.
 I would say that the Interpretant standing in the same relation to
the Sign's DO as the Sign does concerns the child's sign only. I see
the mother as grounding (in the sense of semiotic 'determination')
her Immediate Object for  her, the mother's) semiosis not in the
distant burner but in the cry of her child. So I still hold that the
child is the Dynamic Object of the mother's Sign action (semiosis).
Again, in my understanding the interpretant standing "in the same
relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself does"
applies to a different Sign, namely, that of the child.  3.  Did you
mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My current
tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral
Experience and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a reacting substance)
that retains the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., learning by
experience ), and thus can be the Quasi-utterer of a genuine Sign
(since this requires a purpose) and the Quasi-interpreter of any
 Yes, of course I meant Quasi-mind and not Quasi-sign (an
impossibility, I'd think). I'll have to reflect on your "current
tentative definition of 'Quasi-mind' " which at first blush seems
quite promising.
  4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread.
 It would be helpful for me if you'd comment on my thought that
Edwina may be using 'Form' in a different sense than Peirce such that
in her sense it would connect more to 3ns than to 1ns. And of course
I'd be especially eager to hear what Edwina thinks about that
 Gary R
 Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690 [4] 

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