Just to clarify, what is undeniable is that Peirce associated Form with 1ns *in
those two passages* (NEM 4:292-300, EP 2:304)--not as "freshness,
spontaneity," but as "quality, suchness" in one case and "characters, or
qualities" in the other. I agree that he used "form" to mean other things
in other writings, including 3ns as you have outlined. I am also familiar
with the various words that he associated with each Category on different
occasions; my specific question for you is which ones for 1ns and 2ns,
respectively, you would contrast with "form" as 3ns. Put another way,
Peirce labeled the Categories as Form, Matter, and Entelechy in those two
passages; what would you put in the blanks to label them instead as _____,
_____, and Form?
I also remain interested in getting your responses to the following, as I
continue to gain a better understanding of your views on these matters.
a. What do you make of Peirce's statements in "Pragmatism" (1907) that
habit-changes as "ultimate logical interpretants" are not Signs (CP 5.476),
or that habits as "final logical interpretants" are (at least) not Signs in
the same way as the Signs that produce them (EP 2:418)?
b. What warrants analyzing the dissipation of a rock as (triadic) semiosic
action, rather than (dyadic) dynamical action?
c. Do you have any specific comments on my latest tentative definition of
"Quasi-mind" as a bundle of Collateral Experience and Habits of
Interpretation (i.e., a *reacting substance*) that retains the capacity for
Habit-change (i.e., *learning by experience*), and thus can be the
Quasi-utterer of a *genuine *Sign (since this requires a *purpose*) and the
Quasi-interpreter of *any *Sign?
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> Jon, list -
> 1. With regard to the example - I consider the child's scream to be a DI,
> which then transforms into a DO for the mother.
> 2. I do not think that it is 'undeniable' that Peirce associated Form with
> Firstness. Apart from that one quote - which I have, in a separate post
> before I read this response from you - interpreted it to mean 'wholeness
> of Type' rather than the fresh spontaneity that is Firstness - I can't
> find any references in Peirce's work using Form as Firstness.
> 3. It isn't that I 'prefer' aligning Form with 3rdness, which suggests a
> strictly individual interpretation - I read Peirce's work as doing just
> 4. As for Peirce's terms for the three categories - he has provided them
> throughout his work:
> Firstness: spontaneity, chance, state, quality, freshness, feeling,
> Secondness; brute, struggle, reaction, otherness, existent, volition, fact
> Thirdness: habit,, mind, mediation, necessity, generality, continuity
On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> With reference to 'form', as I said, Peirce has multiple references to it.
> When I look up, in the CP index, the term 'form', besides page numbers, I
> also find 'see also Generals'...and generals are Thirdness.
> "originality is not an attribute of the matter of life, present in the
> whole only so far as it is present in the smallest parts, but is an affair
> of form, of the way in which parts none of which possess it are joined
> together" 4.611
> Peirce refers to form as 'type': "this noun is not an existent thing; it
> is a type or form, to which objects, both those that are externally
> existent and those which are imagined may conform, but which none of them
> can exactly be' 5.429.
> In 5.430, he refers to generals and forms...In 5.194 - he refers to the
> difference between matter and logical form
> In 5.550- he refers to the mathematical form..'as represents only the
> sameness and diversities involved in that state of things". This sounds,
> to me, like 3rdness not 1stness.
> Then, in 6.353 and on, there is his long outline of the history of the
> distinction between matter and form. And in 6.360- a long list of the
> 'varieties of form' - something imposible within the mode of Firstness.
> I am aware of that one quote referring to Form as quality, suchness' -
> but I take that to mean only the holistic nature of Form, which is meant to
> be understood in its whole general nature rather than by its mechanical
> So- I'll still maintain that Peirce's use of Form refers to its generality
> of Type and not to a state of 'freshness, spontaneity'- which is Firstness.
> Note- see also 1.409, with Pierce's rejection that habits will eventually
> be dominant in the world.."at any assignable date in the future there will
> be some slight aberrancy from law'.
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