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}Jon - in reply

        1 My reading of EP 2.304 is different from yours. Peirce writes:

        'sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted,
passing from this to its matter, to successive interpretants
embodying more and more fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a
direct perception of the entelechy.....setting out from a sign
signifying a character of which it has an idea, passes from this, as
its form, to successive interpretants realizing more and more
precisely its matter hoping ultimately to be able to make a direct
effort, producing the entelchy'.

        [Note: My underlinings are italics in the original].

         I don't see 'form' as Firstness in this selection from Peirce.

         Instead, I read the first part as a semiosic process, moving from a
direct indexical experience of an object, to a concept of its
Form/Type/ reach a Final Interpretant ]Entelechy]

        I read the second example as a semiosic process, moving from a
symbolic experience [idea], to a concept of its Form/Type/
figuring out its matter [2ndness] reach the final Interpretant

        a] I read 5.476 and EP 2.418 as a change in the nature of the
habits; i.e., a change in the nature of 3rdness.

        b] The breakdown of the chemical composition of a rock is triadic,
where the habits holding together the molecules of the rock , in
interaction with external molecules [eg, oxygen of the air, water,
heat from the sun], become weaker and as such these molecules are
free of the habits. This is not dyadic or mechanical, for the rock
doesn't break into 'bits' - the habits lose their power to organize
the molecules into a rock.

        c] No - I find your use of quasi-mind problematic. You seem to be
defining a 'thing-in-itself'; i.e., any form of matter with the
capacity for self-organization and interaction with other 'things'. 

 Edwina, List:
 Just to clarify, what is undeniable is that Peirce associated Form
with 1ns in those two passages (NEM 4:292-300, EP 2:304)--not as
"freshness, spontaneity," but as "quality, suchness" in one case and
"characters, or qualities" in the other.  I agree that he used "form"
to mean other things in other writings, including 3ns as you have
outlined.  I am also familiar with the various words that he
associated with each Category on different occasions; my specific
question for you is which ones for 1ns and 2ns, respectively, you
would contrast with "form" as 3ns.  Put another way, Peirce labeled
the Categories as Form, Matter, and Entelechy in those two passages;
what would you put in the blanks to label them instead as _____,
_____, and Form? 
 I also remain interested in getting your responses to the following,
as I continue to gain a better understanding of your views on these
 a.  What do you make of Peirce's statements in "Pragmatism" (1907)
that habit-changes as "ultimate logical interpretants" are not Signs
(CP 5.476), or that habits as "final logical interpretants" are (at
least) not Signs in the same way as the Signs that produce them (EP
 b.  What warrants analyzing the dissipation of a rock as (triadic)
semiosic action, rather than (dyadic) dynamical action?
 c.  Do you have any specific comments on my latest tentative
definition of "Quasi-mind" as a bundle of Collateral Experience and
Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a reacting substance) that retains
the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., learning by experience), and
thus can be the Quasi-utterer of a genuine Sign (since this requires
a  purpose) and the Quasi-interpreter of any Sign?
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran [1] - [2] 
  On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky    wrote:
        Jon, list -

        1. With regard to the example - I consider the child's scream to be
a DI, which then transforms into a DO for the mother.

        2. I do not think that it is 'undeniable' that Peirce associated
Form with Firstness. Apart from that one quote - which I have, in a
separate post before I read this response from you - interpreted it
to mean 'wholeness of Type' rather than the fresh spontaneity that is
Firstness - I can't find any references in Peirce's work using Form as

        3. It isn't that I 'prefer' aligning Form with 3rdness, which
suggests a strictly individual interpretation - I read Peirce's work
as doing just that.

        4. As for Peirce's terms for the three categories - he has provided
them throughout his work:

        Firstness: spontaneity, chance, state, quality, freshness, feeling,

        Secondness; brute, struggle, reaction, otherness, existent,
volition, fact

        Thirdness: habit,, mind, mediation, necessity, generality,

        Edwina On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

        With reference to 'form', as I said, Peirce has multiple references
to it. When I look up, in the CP index, the term 'form', besides page
numbers, I also find 'see also Generals'...and generals are Thirdness.

        "originality is not an attribute of the matter of life, present in
the whole only so far as it is present in the smallest parts, but is
an affair of form, of the way in which parts none of which possess it
are joined together" 4.611

         Peirce refers to form as 'type': "this noun is not an existent
thing; it is a type or form, to which objects, both those that are
externally existent and those which are imagined may conform, but
which none of them can exactly be' 5.429.

        In 5.430, he refers to generals and forms...In 5.194 - he refers to
the difference between matter and logical form

        In 5.550- he refers to the mathematical form..'as represents only
the sameness and diversities involved in that state of things".  This
sounds, to me, like 3rdness not 1stness.  

        Then, in 6.353 and on, there is his long outline of the history of
the distinction between matter and form. And in 6.360- a long list of
the 'varieties of form' - something imposible within the mode of

        I  am aware of that one quote referring to Form as  quality,
suchness' - but I take that to mean only the holistic nature of Form,
which is meant to be understood in its whole general nature rather
than by its mechanical parts.  

        So- I'll still maintain that Peirce's use of Form refers to its
generality of Type and not to a state of 'freshness, spontaneity'-
which is Firstness.

        Note- see also 1.409, with Pierce's rejection that habits will
eventually be dominant in the world.."at any assignable date in the
future there will be some slight aberrancy from law'.


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