Hi Soren... Interesting. Peirce uses the word flummery in ref. to Hegel. Who has examined Peirce in relation to logical positivism? He missed it didn't he? As to finding a basis for empirically showing the impact of ontological terms, it seems to me that the Symbol in the triad Icon(Sign) Index Symbol amounts to a sort of laboratory for the testing of such things. I would love to design such a study based on Peirce's understanding of the power and ubiquity of memorial maxims.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 7:29 PM, Søren Brier <sbr....@cbs.dk> wrote: > I think all three categories are framed in the phenomenological view of > experience as the primary reality, where he also seems to place qualitative > mathematic. But he opens for the possibility of an outer word behind > experience through Secondness and therefore opens for an empirical realism, > which is what he criticize Hegel for not doing. It seem to me that when we > get to Thirdness we already have established an inner and an outer world. I > think that is his trick to make empirical quantitative research possible > from a phenomenological and hermeneutical basis. Thereby he goes beyond > logical positivism. No one else has done this*.* But I do not have quotes > to support this. So if anybody have it I would be grateful. . More might be > found in C. Misak’s *Verificationism.* > > > > Best > > Søren > > > > *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 13. februar 2018 16:33 > *To:* Peirce List <Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning > > > > Thanks, Soren -- I think that clears it up. Does phenomenology apply as a > sort of catch-all for the various attributes of the three elements of the > triad? Does Peirce's phenomenology deal with the ontological. I assume that > while ontology deals with words that words themselves refer to what lies > behind them. I find it convenient to see the words that are key grouped > either as ontotogy (truth, beauty, freedom and so forth) or as utilities > (will, reason, etc) I guess that is a point at which people's philosophy > becomes individualized, almost necessarily. > > > amazon.com/author/stephenrose > > > > On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Søren Brier <sbr....@cbs.dk> wrote: > > Dear Stephen and Edwina > > > > I think the entropy is a natural scientific conceptualization of > evolutionary processes in natural science, further developed by Prigogine > into a non-equilibrium thermodynamics but is unable to encompass > experiential mind as it is created in a materialist-energetic ontology (not > even an informational one) where Peirce in his philosophy includes > phenomenology. > > > > Best > > Søren > > > > *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 13. februar 2018 15:18 > *To:* Peirce List <Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning > > > > Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of > what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed > Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I > would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic? > > > amazon.com/author/stephenrose > > > > On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > > Gary R, Jon, list: > > 1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because Firstness, > which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as Thirdness/habits. Even > a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think that Mind is ever separate from > Matter and vice versa. > > 2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the > mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of > Signs. I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here. > Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can regress > to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the Mother, the Sign > that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign]. > The hot stove is almost irrelevant to her. > > 3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'. > > 4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and I > certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness. Firstness > is a State and has no structure. > > Edwina > > > > > > > > *On Mon 12/02/18 10:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com > <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> sent:* > > Gary R., List: > > > > 1. I am inclined to agree with you on this. As I understand it, the end > of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of > a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a > bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the > capacity for Habit-change. As a result, it seems to me that the behavior > of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms > of *dyadic *action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly *triadic *action > of semiosis. In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a > Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even > though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic > Objects) of degenerate Signs. > > > > 2. Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not > necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability > (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for > the hot burner. She would presumably find this out very quickly, of > course, after rushing into the kitchen. The Dynamic Object determines the > Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of which the girl's scream is a > Dynamic Interpretant; and every Sign determines its Interpretant to > stand in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself > does. Hence both the internal neural signal and the external scream are > *Indices > *of the hot burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment. > > > > 3. Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"? My > current tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral > Experience and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a *reacting substance*) > that retains the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., *learning by experience*), > and thus can be the Quasi-utterer of a *genuine *Sign (since this > requires a *purpose*) and the Quasi-interpreter of *any *Sign. > > > > 4. I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread. > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 7:05 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Jon S, Edwina, list, > > > > For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet points. In > response to Edwina, Jon wrote: > > > > 1. It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with > talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy > beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within > a continuous process. That is why I find your tendency to use the term > "Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I > hoped that when we jointly recognized the * internal *triad of [IO-R-II] > some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call *this *(and > *only *this) the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign > *without *a DO. > > > > My view is that while such an individual thing as a crystal has been > created by some semiosic process, that the semiosis is (internally) more or > less complete once the crystal is formed, and this is so even as we can > analyze aspects of the three categories present in/as the crystal (these no > longer being semiotic, but rather, phenomenological categories). > > > > John Deely, who introduced the idea of physiosemiosis, did not argue for > a, shall we say, vital 'process' of physiosemiosis once rocks and the like > have been formed: "Deely . . . notably in *Basics of Semiotics*, laid > down the argument that the action of signs extends even further than life, > and that semiosis as an influence of the future played a role in the > shaping of the physical universe prior to the advent of life, a role for > which Deely coined the term *physiosemiosis."* > > *https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely>* > > > > As suggested above, I think that it was Peirce's view that what Delly > termed "physiosemiosis" not only " played a role in the shaping of the > physical universe prior to the advent of life" but has played one since and > does so today, and not only in the formation of crystals. But, again, in my > view, once the crystal is formed the (internal) semiosis ends (yes, it > continues to have a relation to its environment, and there will be atomic > and sub-atomic activity necessarily occurring, but I personally have yet to > be convinced that such activity constitutes a form of semiosis, while some > physicists have argued that it does). > > > > Living organisms present a more difficult problem. The work of Stjernfelt > (esp. in *Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of > Dicisigns)*, not to mention the whole thrust of the science of > Biosemiotics holds not only that any living organism, but the organism in > relation to its environment (its Umwelt) is fully involved in complex > semiosic activity. I would tend to strongly agree. > > > > 2. As I noted in my own reply to Gary, I instead view the DI of the child > (the utterer) as an *external Sign* for the mother (the interpreter), and > its DO is still the hot burner. > > > > While I also view the DI of the child as an external Sign for her mother, > I do not see the DO as the hot burner. The mother, say, who was out of the > room for the moment of the accident, hearing her child's scream may not > connect the scream (the Sign) with the stove at all. So then what is the > DO? I think that rather than the hot burner (as Jon holds) that it's the > child herself. > > > > 3. Your mind is indeed an individual manifestation of Mind; but again, I > suspect that Peirce used "Quasi-mind" to accommodate cases that most people > would not normally associate with "mind." > > > > As I've posted now a couple of times, in my opinion the concept > "Quasi-sign" needs much further discussion, perhaps a thread of its own. I > would for now merely suggest that while it no doubt does "accommodate cases > that most people would not normally associate with "mind," that the concept > includes more ordinary cases as well. > > > > 4. If to you "Form has [parameters] and laws and continuity," then you > are not referring to the same thing that Peirce called "Form" when he > contrasted it with Matter in NEM 4:292-300 and EP 2:303-304. > > > > At times in this discussion as to the meaning of 'Form', while there > seems to me that for Peirce 'Form' *is *1ns, Edwina's analysis of Form > seems to me more related to structure--the forms of the organization of > related elements in a material system, rather than the forms of the > elements themselves. In that physical system the organization would in many > if not all cases have "parameters, laws, and continuity." > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > >
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