Helmut, List,

I have to say I don't see all that much of consequence
riding on the “pin the tail on the category” game that
so diverts the List on so many occasions, apart perhaps
from the functional value of social cohesion it affords.
And I have come to suspect, after many many years, that
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness are almost certainly
among Peirce's worst coinages for their liability to
upstage, trample underfoot, and generally obscure the
main insights of relational over absolutist thinking.

But never mind that now ...

As far as Aristotle goes —

Inquiry Driven Systems • The Formative Tension
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_:_Part_2#The_Formative_Tension

<QUOTE>

b. We describe one class of existing things as substance (ousia),
   and this we subdivide into three: (1) matter (hyle), which
   in itself is not an individual thing, (2) shape (morphe)
   or form (eidos), in virtue of which individuality is
   directly attributed, and (3) the compound of the two.

c. Matter is potentiality (dynamis), while form is realization or
   actuality (entelecheia), and the word actuality is used in two
   senses, illustrated by the possession of knowledge (episteme)
   and the exercise of it (theorein).

</QUOTE>

Dynamis can be potentiality or power.  Entelecheia as actuality
is more like actualization or realization.  Entelechy is often
rendered to mean completion or perfection but I would gloss it
as “that which contains its end in itself”.  It brings to mind
ideas of “art for art's sake”, of a game whose goal is the play
itself, of a quest whose object is the quest itself.

Another thing that struck me about Aristotle's version is the
two senses of actualization, “illustrated by the possession
of knowledge (episteme) and the exercise of it (theorein)”.
I think this nicely prefigures the Competence/Performance
distinction emphasized in our times by Chomsky and others
in generative linguistics and allied computational models.

Regards,

Jon

On 2/13/2018 11:01 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
Thank you, Jon! But, if matter is potentiality, and form is actuality, I still
wonder why Peirce didn't assign 1ns to matter, and 2ns to form.  But everybody,
please try not to explain, at least not if it were meant for just my sake, I
would not understand it in the moment.
Best,
Helmut
>
>
   12. Februar 2018 um 22:24 Uhr
   "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net>
Helmut, List,

Here is one of my musements on
a few pertinent paragraphs from
Aristotle's treatise “On the Soul”:

Inquiry Driven Systems • The Formative Tension
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_:_Part_2#The_Formative_Tension

Consider especially:

<QUOTE>

We describe one class of existing things as substance (ousia),
and this we subdivide into three: (1) matter (hyle),
which in itself is not an individual thing, (2) shape (morphe)
or form (eidos), in virtue of which individuality is
directly attributed, and (3) the compound of the two.

Matter is potentiality (dynamis), while form is realization
or actuality (entelecheia), and the word actuality is used
in two senses, illustrated by the possession of knowledge
(episteme) and the exercise of it (theorein).

</QUOTE>

Regards,

Jon


--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to