Jon, list You asked of your analysis of the child and mother example:
JAS: Does any of this make sense? To be honest, it all still feels highly conjectural to me, so I am expecting (hopefully constructive) criticism. I am sorry to say that your complex analysis does not make a lot of sense to me; or, perhaps it would be more correct to say that it seems so "highly conjectural" that I just can't enough sense of it to offer a helpful critique of it. It feels to me almost like a kind of literary exegesis, rich but somewhat fantastic. You propose several extraordinary interpretive claims and suggestions (for example, that the child's scream may not be sign-action at all) which seem, well, strained. So, I'm going to leave it to others to offer constructive criticism. Meanwhile, I'll stand by my previous analyses. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 10:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote: > Gary R., List: > > Thank you for your characteristically thoughtful and thought-provoking > response. Up until now, I have been considering all of this with the > mindset that the child's scream must be analyzed as *one *Sign. Upon > reflection, I realize that such an approach fails to take proper account of > the nature of a *genuine *Sign as "something that exists in replicas" (EP > 2:411; 1904). What you seem to be suggesting--please correct me if I am > misunderstanding--is that the same "thing" can be a Replica of *more than > one* Sign. > > In this case, as Gary F. observed, the girl's scream is, for her, > "primarily a natural sign," or what I have started calling a *degenerate > *Sign--an > instinctive physical reflex, rather than an intentional "utterance"--such > that all six Correlates are Existents (2ns). As such, I get the sense that > many of the steps in the *internal *chain of events, from the contact of > the child's finger with the hot burner to the propagation of sound waves > from her vocal chords--including both of those phenomena themselves--could > conceivably be analyzed as *dynamical*, rather than *semiosic*. Why > should we treat the girl's scream as the Dynamic Interpretant of a > particular neural pattern within her that represents the hot burner, rather > than as merely the last in a series of strictly dyadic causes and effects? > If she effectively *cannot help* but scream, is this really an example of > Sign-action at all? The same questions arise regarding the flight of a > bird upon hearing a loud sound. I have some vague notions of possible > answers, but I am hoping that you (or someone else) can provide a clear > explanation. > > For the mother, on the other hand, the scream does not produce any kind of > *deterministic > *response. Although it probably triggers certain "motherly instincts," > she rushes into the kitchen *deliberately*; presumably she *could *ignore > the child if she were so inclined, as a neglectful parent might be. From > her standpoint, the child is the *utterer* of the Sign that is the > scream, even if *unintentionally*; and therefore, the girl is indeed > where we must "look" to "find" the Sign's Dynamic Object, "the essential > ingredient of the utterer" (EP 2:404; 1907). However, I am still not > convinced that it is the child *herself*; typically when a Sign *has *an > utterer, the Dynamic Object is *not *that utterer, but whatever the > utterer (as the saying goes) *has in mind* upon uttering the Sign--in > this case, perhaps the *pain *that the girl is sensing. The Immediate > Object is then the combination of attributes of *this particular scream* > that the mother's Collateral Experience leads her to associate with > previous *screams of pain or distress* that she has heard, both from this > child and from others, which likely differentiates them somehow from *other > kinds* of childish screams. > > This, then, takes us back to my first paragraph above. For the mother, > the girl's scream is a *Replica*--a Token of a Type--which it obviously > *cannot > *be for the child. The Dynamic Object of the corresponding *genuine *Sign > is presumably something like *pain or distress in general*. Hence the > context-dependence of any *concrete *instance of *actual > *semiosis--necessarily > involving Replicas--is quite evident here. > > Does any of this make sense? To be honest, it all still feels highly > conjectural to me, so I am expecting (hopefully constructive) criticism. > In fact, I can already anticipate that Edwina will reject it right > away--understandably, given her very different model of semiosis--but I am > eager to see what you and others have to say. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 6:12 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Jon, Edwina, list, >> >> Jon, while I am tending to agree with you on much of your analysis, I >> still can't agree with you in the matter of the Dynamic Object for the >> mother. You wrote: >> >> JAS: In this case, I am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between "the >> child's semiosis" and "the mother's semiosis"; are they not continuous? >> >> I do not see the semioses as continuous which is not to say that there is >> no continuity. There's a continuity of communication, shall we say, but the >> dynamic object of each person's semiosis is different in my opinion. >> >> The mother's semiosis at that moment of its occurrence seems to me not >> determined by the oven at all, but by her daughter. So in my view the >> Immediate Object of the mother concerns the oven not at all. Rather it is >> grounded (in Peirce's sense of the ground of a sign, which he later terms >> the immediate object: 'selected' characters of the DO) in the child >> herself.Again, the ground of he semiosis cannot be the child in the >> entirety of all her characters (an impossibility), but exactly those which >> are predominant, her scream, perhaps the look on her face, etc. So, again, >> as I see it the Dynamic Object for the mother is the child, while those >> several characters which form the ground of her semiosis (equivalent to her >> immediate object) contribute to a wholly different IO-R-II-DI, and so a >> different Sign, than her daughter's, again, the consequence of their having >> *entirely >> different* Dynamic Objects. >> >> Edwina, while my understanding of the semioses involved here seems closer >> to yours than to Jon's, I do not agree that the child's scream in the DO. >> For just as the DO was the oven, while the heat (a character) from the >> flaming burners led to the child's pain (a character) that grounded her >> semiosis, it was the child as DO whose scream (a character for her mother) >> grounded her mother's semiosis. >> >> Jon continued: >> >> JAS: It seems to me that there must be some semiotic connection between >> the hot burner and the mother's eventual response to the child's cry, >> because the one would not have happened without the other. >> >> Well this kind of thinking would, I believe, lead to an infinite regress >> going as far back as the child's conception, and probably much further back >> than that. It seems to me a kind of post hoc, propter hoc version of that >> regress. What you point to ("the one would not have happened without the >> other") seems to me more like physical than semiotic determination. >> >> JAS: Why regard the girl's scream as having a different Dynamic Object >> for the mother than it does for the child? Is it not the very same Sign? >> >> I do not *at al*l see it as "the very same Sign." In my view there are >> two signs, not, however, unrelated, and even intimately connected by the DI >> of the child leading to the IO of the mother: but still *two distinct >> signs*(at least) Here I think Edwina and I may be in at least partial >> agreement. >> >> So, I think I already offered a reason in my earlier post as to why I >> think our views are so different GR: ". . . in my understanding the >> interpretant standing "in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as >> the Sign itself does" doesn't apply to both signs, but to the child's >> sign and* not *to the mother's (as you've been analyzing the semioses). >> >> The remainer of your analysis follows from your viewpoint which, as I see >> it, goes well beyond the example into habit-change and the like which will >> in my view necessarily involve more time, more semiosis, additional signs, >> etc. than the discrete analysis put forth here. This is not to suggest that >> the habits of the mother and the daughter will not lead to perhaps >> life-changing habit change. But you yourself have noted that these will be >> very different habits: not touching flames in the future for the child; not >> leaving the child alone in the kitchen in the future for the mother. Again, >> this stark difference in habit-change strongly suggests to me two different >> signs, not one. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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