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 Jon, list

        This is simply too convoluted for me. I consider that the child's
cry is a semiosic action, a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, an
unconscious physical reaction to an external stimuli. This is NOT
dyadic, since my understanding of a dyadic interaction is that it
takes place between two  existential Subjects. This is not the case
in this situation. The mediative process here is the neurological
nature of the child's skin which 'understands' normal vs abnormal
stimuli [heat].

        And for the mother, the Dynamic Object, in my view, is the child's
scream.

        I also think that your moving into 'genuine' vs 'degenerate' sign
classification is equally too convoluted for me.

        Edwina
 On Tue 13/02/18 10:49 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary R., List:
 Thank you for your characteristically thoughtful and
thought-provoking response.  Up until now, I have been considering
all of this with the mindset that the child's scream must be analyzed
as one Sign.  Upon reflection, I realize that such an approach fails
to take proper account of the nature of a genuine Sign as "something
that exists in replicas" (EP 2:411; 1904).  What you seem to be
suggesting--please correct me if I am misunderstanding--is that the
same "thing" can be a Replica of  more than one Sign.
 In this case, as Gary F. observed, the girl's scream is, for her,
"primarily a natural sign," or what I have started calling a
degenerate Sign--an instinctive physical reflex, rather than an
intentional "utterance"--such that all six Correlates are Existents
(2ns).  As such, I get the sense that many of the steps in the
internal chain of events, from the contact of the child's finger with
the hot burner to the propagation of sound waves from her vocal
chords--including both of those phenomena themselves--could
conceivably be analyzed as  dynamical, rather than semiosic.  Why
should we treat the girl's scream as the Dynamic Interpretant of a
particular neural pattern within her that represents the hot burner,
rather than as merely the last in a series of strictly dyadic causes
and effects?  If she effectively cannot help but scream, is this
really an example of Sign-action at all?  The same questions arise
regarding the flight of a bird upon hearing a loud sound.  I have
some vague notions of possible answers, but I am hoping that you (or
someone else) can provide a clear explanation. 
 For the mother, on the other hand, the scream does not produce any
kind of deterministic response.  Although it probably triggers
certain "motherly instincts," she rushes into the kitchen
deliberately; presumably she could ignore the child if she were so
inclined, as a neglectful parent might be.  From her standpoint, the
child is the utterer of the Sign that is the scream, even if
unintentionally; and therefore, the girl is indeed where we must
"look" to "find" the Sign's Dynamic Object, "the essential ingredient
of the utterer" (EP 2:404; 1907).  However, I am still not convinced
that it is the child  herself; typically when a Sign has an utterer,
the Dynamic Object is not that utterer, but whatever the utterer (as
the saying goes) has in mind upon uttering the Sign--in this case,
perhaps the pain that the girl is sensing.  The Immediate Object is
then the combination of attributes of  this particular scream that
the mother's Collateral Experience leads her to associate with
previous screams of pain or distress that she has heard, both from
this child and from others, which likely differentiates them somehow
from other kinds of childish screams.
 This, then, takes us back to my first paragraph above.  For the
mother, the girl's scream is a Replica--a Token of a Type--which it
obviously cannot be for the child.  The Dynamic Object of the
corresponding  genuine Sign is presumably something like pain or
distress in general.  Hence the context-dependence of any concrete
instance of actual semiosis--necessarily involving Replicas--is quite
evident here.
 Does any of this make sense?  To be honest, it all still feels
highly conjectural to me, so I am expecting (hopefully constructive)
criticism.  In fact, I can already anticipate that Edwina will reject
it right away--understandably, given her very different model of
semiosis--but I am eager to see what you and others have to say. 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]  
 On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 6:12 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Jon, Edwina, list,
 Jon, while I am tending to agree with you on much of your analysis,
I still can't agree with you in the matter of the Dynamic Object for
the mother. You wrote: 
 JAS: In this case, I am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between
"the child's semiosis" and "the mother's semiosis"; are they not
continuous?
 I do not see the semioses as continuous which is not to say that
there is no continuity. There's a continuity of communication, shall
we say, but the dynamic object of each person's semiosis is different
in my opinion. 
  The mother's semiosis at that moment of its occurrence seems to me
not determined by the oven at all, but by her daughter. So in my view
the Immediate Object of the mother concerns the oven not at all.
Rather it is grounded (in Peirce's sense of the ground of a sign,
which he later terms the immediate object: 'selected' characters of
the DO) in the child herself.Again, the ground of he semiosis cannot
be the child in the entirety of all her characters (an
impossibility), but exactly those which are predominant, her scream,
perhaps the look on her face, etc. So, again, as I see it the Dynamic
Object for the mother is the child, while those several characters
which form the ground of her semiosis (equivalent to her immediate
object) contribute to a wholly different IO-R-II-DI, and so a
different Sign, than her daughter's, again, the consequence of their
having  entirely different Dynamic Objects.
 Edwina, while my understanding of the semioses involved here seems
closer to yours than to Jon's, I do not agree that the child's scream
in the DO. For just as the DO was the oven, while the heat (a
character) from the flaming burners led to the child's pain (a
character) that grounded her semiosis, it was the child as DO whose
scream (a character for her mother) grounded her mother's semiosis. 
  Jon continued:
 JAS: It seems to me that there must be some semiotic connection
between the hot burner and the mother's eventual response to the
child's cry, because the one would not have happened without the
other. 
 Well this kind of thinking would, I believe, lead to an infinite
regress going as far back as the child's conception, and probably
much further back than that. It seems to me a kind of post hoc,
propter hoc version of that regress. What you point to (" the one
would not have happened without the other") seems to me more like
physical than semiotic determination.
 JAS: Why regard the girl's scream as having a different Dynamic
Object for the mother than it does for the child?  Is it not the very
same Sign? 
 I do not at all see it as "the very same Sign." In my view there are
two signs, not, however, unrelated, and even intimately connected by
the DI of the child leading to the IO of the mother: but still  two
distinct signs(at least) Here I think Edwina and I may be in at least
partial agreement.
 So, I think I already offered a reason in my earlier post as to why
I think our views are so different GR: ". . . in my understanding the
interpretant standing "in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic
Object as the Sign itself does"  doesn't apply to both signs, but to
the child's sign and not to the mother's (as you've been analyzing
the semioses). 
 The remainer of your analysis follows from your viewpoint which, as
I see it, goes well beyond the example into habit-change and the like
which will in my view necessarily involve more time, more semiosis,
additional signs, etc. than the discrete analysis put forth here.
This is not to suggest that the habits of the mother and the daughter
will not lead to perhaps life-changing habit change. But you yourself
have noted that these will be very different habits: not touching
flames in the future for the child; not leaving the child alone in
the kitchen in the future for the mother. Again, this stark
difference in habit-change strongly suggests to me two different
signs, not one. 
 Best,
 Gary R
 Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718
482-5690 [4] 


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[4] http://webmail.primus.ca/tel:(718)%20482-5690
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