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}Jerry, list - in reply to your comments:
5.65 "All nature abounds in proofs of other influences than merely
mechanical action"
6.13 Now the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature
and for uniformity in general is to suppose the results of evolution.
this supposes them not to be absolute not to be obeyed precisely. It
makes an element of indeterminacy, spontaneity, or absolute chance in
nature.
6.14 "exact law obviously never can produce heterogeneity out of
homogeneity; and arbitrary heterogeneity is the feature of the
universe the most manifest and characteristic.
6.21 "The one primary and fundamental law of mental action consists
in s tendency to generalization. Feeling tends to spread; connections
between feelings awaken feelings; neighouring feelings become
assimilated; ideas are apt to reproduce themselves" [NOTE: I use this
to refer to 'networking of relations]
6.23 "The law of habit exhibits a striking contrast to all physical
laws in the character of its commands. A physical law is absolute.
What it requires is an exact relation....On the other hand, no exact
conformity is required by the mental law. Nay, exact conformity would
be in downright conflict with the law; since it would instantly
crystallize thought and prevent all further formation of ha bit. The
law of mind only makes a given feeling more likely to arise" {NOTE:
the point of Thirdness is its tendency to generalize, to reduce
specificity and thus enable networked commonality and enable
connections with diverse objects]
6.59 "By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of
the universe, acting always and everywhere thought restrained within
narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law
continually, and great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for
all the variety and diversity of the universe...[NOTE: FIrstness or
chance/ spontaneity is a basic component of the university, just as
the tendency to generalize or take habits is yet another basic
component]
6.64 "I point first to the phenomenon of growth and developing
complexity, which appears to be universal, and which, though it may
possibly be an affair of mechanism perhaps, certainly presents all
the appearance of increasing diversification. Then, there is variety
itself, beyond comparison the most obtrusive character of the
universe; no mechanism can account for this"
Peirce writes of how the 'necessitarian' will reject chance, will
focus instead on the 'regularity of the universe' - which Peirce
writes, is a focus that severs "only to block the road of inquiry'
[NOTE: I consider that the focus on specific and closed definitions
is an aspect of Secondness - and such a focus ignores the two other
modes, both of which enable the dynamic and adaptive nature of
Peircean semiosis].
Edwina
On Thu 01/03/18 3:56 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
Dear Edwina, list,
I support you and appreciate you for saying what you believe in
earnest,
but it seems to me that when you say
“My view of Peircean semiosis is its dynamic transformic nature;
its capacity to enable the world to operate as a complex adaptive
system”,
and you continually run up against the following of which you divest
yourself:
“focus on singular definitions of terms as a clarification of
Peircean semiosis but instead, as an obscuring of it”,
then either we’re being absurd by thinking your interpretation
somehow allows such dynamic transformation or we’re missing
something critical.
Surely, there must be a way out and Peirce has given us this
somewhere.
So, where is it and how shall we know it?
Best,
Jerry R
On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 2:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I don't see the current focus on singular definitions of terms as a
clarification of Peircean semiosis but instead, as an obscuring of
it.
My view of Peircean semiosis is its dynamic transformic nature; its
capacity to enable the world to operate as a complex adaptive system.
This capacity requires [1] a triadic semiosic relational systems and
[2] requires a modal nature of three types ; and [3] requires a
constant interactional and relational networking of Signs. I see
nothing of this in the mechanical outline of 'nodes' on a linear path
that seems to be the model now being discussed.
In addition, I see the Quasi-Mind as a LOCAL articulation of Mind
that enables all three points above - and not as a Sign in itself.
Yes, as Jerry points out - this linearity [as I call it] disconnects
the semiosic action from the relations with a larger network.
Edwina
On Thu 01/03/18 2:04 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com [2] sent:
Dear Jon, Garys, list,
I am confused by your exact treatment.
It appears to me that you have a clear and correct view but I
don’t yet see it.
Since it is determined, at least by you and Gary R, that you have a
grasp of what Quasi-mind entails, please go a little bit further and
say out loud the answer to this:
Is Quasi-mind the general standpoint of the spectator?
That is, if quasi-minds are either of the quasi-utterer and
quasi-interpreter or somehow of both, then where, in accordance with
your view, is the spectator?
I feel as though an understanding of this question and answer can
help me to be a better critical thinker; a better citizen of the
world, even.
Thanks and with best wishes,
Jerry R
On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Gary F., List:
GF: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of
Signs in a Quasi-mind?
Gary R. and I now agree that a Quasi-mind is (in my words) "an
individual Sign that is also a complex of Signs," and (in his words)
"something like the prerequisite of all semiosis and communication."
There is nothing in EP 2:304 to indicate that "the ideal or perfect
sign" is "an accretion of Signs," although EP 2:545n25 does refer to
"a perfect sign" as "the aggregate formed by a sign and all the
signs which its occurrence carries with it." I am not quite ready to
say anything further about the latter passage just yet; I would prefer
to cover a bit more semiotic and metaphysical ground first.
JAS: The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate
Object of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to
reproducing the entire effect that the Dynamic Object itself would
have on the Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906).
GF: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can
include) attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the
Immediate Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your
concept of a woman includes attributes of the woman you are talking
about right now. Do you think of an Immediate Object as a concept or
like a concept?
In the 1906 passage that I cited but did not quote, Peirce stated
that a Sign "is determined by the object, but in no other respect
than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and
the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less
effect it has upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it
as if the object itself had acted upon it." I have posited that this
"respect" is precisely the Immediate Object, and stated that
determination "must always occur with respect to a character or
quality; i.e., a Form." Hence the Dynamic Object determines the Sign
with respect to some, but not all, of its characters or qualities; and
that partial combination of attributes is the Immediate Object, the
Form that the Sign communicates. Only the Sign itself--not its
Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that unites Matter
(denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant
(determination).
GF: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in
reaction with another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is
defined only as a correlate of a triadic relation?
Indeed, it would be better to substitute "Thing" for "Dynamic
Object" when discussing dyadic reaction; I only wanted to emphasize
the direct contrast with triadic Sign-action. In fact, I am drafting
another post to discuss what I see as the key distinctions among
Things, Quasi-minds, and Persons, continuing to utilize the
Aristotelian terms for the Categories that Peirce employed in his
1904 writings--Form (1ns), Matter (2ns), and Entelechy (3ns).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSch midt [3]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]
On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 9:07 AM, wrote:
Gary, Jon S,
I’ve inserted a few questions below …
Gary f
From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 28-Feb-18 19:15
Jon, list,
Summarizing Peirce's thought at EP 2.304, Jon wrote:
EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is identical , in such
identity as a Sign may have, with the unity of the very Matter
denoted by it and the very Form signified by it, such that its
Interpretant is the Truth.
If this is so, then, since any given Sign or accretion of Signs in a
Quasi-mind (say on a sheet of assertion) can only signify specific
aspects or facets of the Object (ITS Object, mind you) as a certain,
shall we say, "selected assemblage" of characters (its Form), it
would seem to me that a perfect Sign remains an Ideal, that even the
perfect Sign can only asymptotically approach the Truth that it means
to represent.
Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of
Signs in a Quasi-mind?
So, in sum, the Object can never be completely represented even by
a perfect Sign, and even if, as Jon wrote:
The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object
of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to
reproducing the entire effect that the Dynamic Object itself would
have on the Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906).
Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can
include) attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the
Immediate Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your
concept of a woman includes attributes of the woman you are talking
about right now. Do you think of an Immediate Object as a concept or
like a concept?
It seems to me that "reproducing the entire effect that the Dynamic
Object itself would have on the Quasi-interpreter" is an
impossibility.
Yet, Jon, I'm not clear if this interpretation is consistent with
this part of your conclusion:
Therefore, a perfect Sign in this sense is one that achieves
Entelechy, the complete unity of Matter and Form in its Interpretant.
This is the final cause of all triadic semiosis, Truth as "the
conformity of a representamen to its object--its object, ITS object,
mind you" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906).
Of course I completely agree with your concluding sentence.
By contrast, dyadic action occurs when there is no mediating Sign;
just two Dynamic Objects directly and reciprocally affecting each
other (cf. EP 2:411; 1907).
Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction
with another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined
only as a correlate of a triadic relation?
But here we are speaking of Science, while I believe that Art
is--even if rarely--able to perfectly represent its Object, one which
however, it retrospectively, so to speak, creates.
Best,
Gary R
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