The transformation goes on all the time. Sometimes many times a day.That's
why Peirce is right about so many things. Too bad he is no better known. He
needs some help in the interpretation dept. Understand by interpreting!
amazon.com/author/stephenrose
On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:16 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Dear Edwina, Stephen, list,
>
> Thank you for this conversation. I do not feel transformed but I find it
> valuable in at least exposing to the reader, who I imagine to be my friend,
> the incompetence of and behind our actions.
>
> With best wishes,
> Jerry R
>
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 4:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry - genuine science is open.
>>
>> 6.86." It is a truth well worthy of rumination that all the intellectual
>> development of man rests upon the circumstance that all our action is
>> subject to error...Inanimate things do not err at all; and the lower
>> animals very little. Instinct is all but unerring; but reason in all
>> vitally important matters is a treacherous guide. this tendency to error,
>> when you put it under the microscope of reflection, is seen to consist of
>> fortuitous variations of our actions in time. but it is apt to escape our
>> attention that on such fortuitous variations our intellect is nourished and
>> grows. Fopr without such fortuitous variation, habit-taking would be
>> impossible; and intellect consists in a plasticity of habit".
>>
>> 1.615..."the essence of Reason is such that its being never can have been
>> completel yperfected. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of
>> growth"
>>
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>> On Thu 01/03/18 4:53 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Stephen, Edwina, list:
>>
>>
>>
>> You said:
>>
>> .. .
>>
>>
>>
>> Perhaps you are right. This all seems to be stating the obvious, which
>> serves simply as a lot of unpublished fodder for endless speculation.
>>
>> For isn’t it enough that we see ourselves as good human beings and act
>> accordingly? But then, why do we go on with the skepticism and dogmatism?
>>
>>
>>
>> So then, why can we not agree where there is genuine doubt, and that
>> thing that is so chilling as a scientific explanation?
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry R
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry, list - in reply to your comments:
>>>
>>>
>>> 5.65 "All nature abounds in proofs of other influences than merely
>>> mechanical action"
>>>
>>> 6.13 Now the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature and
>>> for uniformity in general is to suppose the results of evolution. this
>>> supposes them not to be absolute not to be obeyed precisely. It makes an
>>> element of indeterminacy, spontaneity, or absolute chance in nature.
>>>
>>> 6.14 "exact law obviously never can produce heterogeneity out of
>>> homogeneity; and arbitrary heterogeneity is the feature of the universe the
>>> most manifest and characteristic.
>>>
>>> 6.21 "The one primary and fundamental law of mental action consists in s
>>> tendency to generalization. Feeling tends to spread; connections between
>>> feelings awaken feelings; neighouring feelings become assimilated; ideas
>>> are apt to reproduce themselves" [NOTE: I use this to refer to 'networking
>>> of relations]
>>>
>>> 6.23 "The law of habit exhibits a striking contrast to all physical laws
>>> in the character of its commands. A physical law is absolute. What it
>>> requires is an exact relation....On the other hand, no exact conformity is
>>> required by the mental law. Nay, exact conformity would be in downright
>>> conflict with the law; since it would instantly crystallize thought and
>>> prevent all further formation of ha bit. The law of mind only makes a given
>>> feeling more likely to arise" {NOTE: the point of Thirdness is its
>>> tendency to generalize, to reduce specificity and thus enable networked
>>> commonality and enable connections with diverse objects]
>>>
>>> 6.59 "By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the
>>> universe, acting always and everywhere thought restrained within narrow
>>> bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law continually, and
>>> great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety and
>>> diversity of the universe...[NOTE: FIrstness or chance/ spontaneity is a
>>> basic component of the university, just as the tendency to generalize or
>>> take habits is yet another basic component]
>>>
>>> 6.64 "I point first to the phenomenon of growth and developing
>>> complexity, which appears to be universal, and which, though it may
>>> possibly be an affair of mechanism perhaps, certainly presents all the
>>> appearance of increasing diversification. Then, there is variety itself,
>>> beyond comparison the most obtrusive character of the universe; no
>>> mechanism can account for this"
>>>
>>> Peirce writes of how the 'necessitarian' will reject chance, will focus
>>> instead on the 'regularity of the universe' - which Peirce writes, is a
>>> focus that severs "only to block the road of inquiry'
>>>
>>> [NOTE: I consider that the focus on specific and closed definitions is
>>> an aspect of Secondness - and such a focus ignores the two other modes,
>>> both of which enable the dynamic and adaptive nature of Peircean semiosis].
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu 01/03/18 3:56 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>>
>>> Dear Edwina, list,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I support you and appreciate you for saying what you believe in earnest,
>>>
>>> but it seems to me that when you say
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> “My view of Peircean semiosis is its dynamic transformic nature; its
>>> capacity to enable the world to operate as a complex adaptive system”,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> and you continually run up against the following of which you divest
>>> yourself:
>>>
>>> “focus on singular definitions of terms as a clarification of Peircean
>>> semiosis but instead, as an obscuring of it”,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> then either we’re being absurd by thinking your interpretation somehow
>>> allows such dynamic transformation or we’re missing something critical.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Surely, there must be a way out and Peirce has given us this somewhere.
>>>
>>> So, where is it and how shall we know it?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 2:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I don't see the current focus on singular definitions of terms as a
>>>> clarification of Peircean semiosis but instead, as an obscuring of it.
>>>>
>>>> My view of Peircean semiosis is its dynamic transformic nature; its
>>>> capacity to enable the world to operate as a complex adaptive system. This
>>>> capacity requires [1] a triadic semiosic relational systems and [2]
>>>> requires a modal nature of three types ; and [3] requires a constant
>>>> interactional and relational networking of Signs. I see nothing of this in
>>>> the mechanical outline of 'nodes' on a linear path that seems to be the
>>>> model now being discussed.
>>>>
>>>> In addition, I see the Quasi-Mind as a LOCAL articulation of Mind that
>>>> enables all three points above - and not as a Sign in itself.
>>>>
>>>> Yes, as Jerry points out - this linearity [as I call it] disconnects
>>>> the semiosic action from the relations with a larger network.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu 01/03/18 2:04 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>>>
>>>> Dear Jon, Garys, list,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am confused by your exact treatment.
>>>>
>>>> It appears to me that you have a clear and correct view but I don’t yet
>>>> see it.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Since it is determined, at least by you and Gary R, that you have a
>>>> grasp of what Quasi-mind entails, please go a little bit further and say
>>>> out loud the answer to this:
>>>>
>>>> Is Quasi-mind the general standpoint of the spectator?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That is, if quasi-minds are either of the quasi-utterer and
>>>> quasi-interpreter or somehow of both, then where, in accordance with your
>>>> view, is the spectator?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I feel as though an understanding of this question and answer can help
>>>> me to be a better critical thinker; a better citizen of the world, even.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Thanks and with best wishes,
>>>> Jerry R
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Gary F., List:
>>>>>
>>>>> GF: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of
>>>>> Signs in a Quasi-mind?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Gary R. and I now agree that a Quasi-mind is (in my words) "an individual
>>>>> Sign that is also a complex of Signs," and (in his words) "something
>>>>> like the prerequisite of all semiosis and communication." There is
>>>>> nothing
>>>>> in EP 2:304 to indicate that "the ideal or perfect sign" is "an accretion
>>>>> of Signs," although EP 2:545n25 does refer to "a perfect sign" as
>>>>> "the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence
>>>>> carries with it." I am not quite ready to say anything further about the
>>>>> latter passage just yet; I would prefer to cover a bit more semiotic and
>>>>> metaphysical ground first.
>>>>>
>>>>> JAS: The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate
>>>>> Object of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to
>>>>> reproducing the entire effect that the Dynamic Object itself would
>>>>> have on the Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> GF: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can
>>>>> include) attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the
>>>>> Immediate Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your concept of
>>>>> a
>>>>> woman includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do
>>>>> you think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In the 1906 passage that I cited but did not quote, Peirce stated that
>>>>> a Sign "is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to
>>>>> enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly
>>>>> it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that
>>>>> quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had
>>>>> acted upon it." I have posited that this "respect" is precisely the
>>>>> Immediate Object, and stated that determination "must always occur with
>>>>> respect to a character or quality; i.e., a Form." Hence the Dynamic
>>>>> Object determines the Sign with respect to some, but not all, of its
>>>>> characters or qualities; and that partial combination of attributes
>>>>> is the Immediate Object, the Form that the Sign communicates. Only the
>>>>> Sign itself--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that
>>>>> unites Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant
>>>>> (determination).
>>>>>
>>>>> GF: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction
>>>>> with another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as
>>>>> a correlate of a triadic relation?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Indeed, it would be better to substitute "Thing" for "Dynamic Object"
>>>>> when discussing dyadic reaction; I only wanted to emphasize the
>>>>> direct contrast with triadic Sign-action. In fact, I am drafting
>>>>> another post to discuss what I see as the key distinctions among Things,
>>>>> Quasi-minds, and Persons, continuing to utilize the Aristotelian terms for
>>>>> the Categories that Peirce employed in his 1904 writings--Form (1ns),
>>>>> Matter (2ns), and Entelechy (3ns).
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSch midt
>>>>> <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
>>>>> twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 9:07 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Gary, Jon S,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I’ve inserted a few questions below …
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Gary f
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sent: 28-Feb-18 19:15
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jon, list,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Summarizing Peirce's thought at EP 2.304, Jon wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is identical , in such
>>>>>> identity as a Sign may have, with the unity of the very Matter
>>>>>> denoted by it and the very Form signified by it, such that its
>>>>>> Interpretant
>>>>>> is the Truth.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If this is so, then, since any given Sign or accretion of Signs in a
>>>>>> Quasi-mind (say on a sheet of assertion) can only signify specific
>>>>>> aspects
>>>>>> or facets of the Object (ITS Object, mind you) as a certain, shall we
>>>>>> say,
>>>>>> "selected assemblage" of characters (its Form), it would seem to me that
>>>>>> a
>>>>>> perfect Sign remains an Ideal, that even the perfect Sign can only
>>>>>> asymptotically approach the Truth that it means to represent.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of
>>>>>> Signs in a Quasi-mind?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, in sum, the Object can never be completely represented even by a
>>>>>> perfect Sign, and even if, as Jon wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object
>>>>>> of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> entire effect that the Dynamic Object itself would have on the
>>>>>> Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can
>>>>>> include) attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the
>>>>>> Immediate Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your
>>>>>> concept of a woman includes attributes of the woman you are talking about
>>>>>> right now. Do you think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a
>>>>>> concept?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It seems to me that "reproducing the entire effect that the Dynamic
>>>>>> Object itself would have on the Quasi-interpreter" is an impossibility.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yet, Jon, I'm not clear if this interpretation is consistent with
>>>>>> this part of your conclusion:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Therefore, a perfect Sign in this sense is one that achieves
>>>>>> Entelechy, the complete unity of Matter and Form in its Interpretant.
>>>>>> This
>>>>>> is the final cause of all triadic semiosis, Truth as "the
>>>>>> conformity of a representamen to its object--its object, ITS object, mind
>>>>>> you" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Of course I completely agree with your concluding sentence.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> By contrast, dyadic action occurs when there is no mediating Sign;
>>>>>> just two Dynamic Objects directly and reciprocally affecting each other
>>>>>> (cf. EP 2:411; 1907).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with
>>>>>> another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a
>>>>>> correlate of a triadic relation?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But here we are speaking of Science, while I believe that Art
>>>>>> is--even if rarely--able to perfectly represent its Object, one which
>>>>>> however, it retrospectively, so to speak, creates.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Gary R
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
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