BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, Gary R, List - and here is, as I view it, a problem.

        1] Notice that JAS seems to be confining the definition [and
function?] of a 'Sign' to a 'symbol', in other words, to Thirdness.
But is this accurate? Or is this term of symbol applied only to
'concepts'; i.e.,to the  intellectual results of semiosis? [NOTE: I
would agree with this last sentence since I view the symbol as
confined to human semiosis] ]

         [and I am assuming that JAS refers only to the mediate aspect of
the triad of O-R-I, where he uses 'Sign' to refer to that mediate R].


        2] The next point is that the Interpretant can be 'a Sign'...but
need not be; it can also b a feeling or an exertion'. That is, it can
also function within the mode of Firstness or Secondness. But aren't
semiosic triads functioning in these other modes also Signs? Or does
JAS hold the view that only an interaction in Thirdness qualifies as
a 'Sign'?

        3] I simply don't see how a quasi-mind is,  "a Quasi-mind is a Sign
which is a complex of Signs". After all, one could say the same about
Mind. I see the Quasi-Mind as a local and individual articulation of
the more general non-individual and non-local Mind which underlies
all semiosis.  I don't see how it can be a Sign - understanding Sign
as DO-[IO-R-II]. Or even, as the mediate node in the triad of O-R-I. 
I could see it as this mediate node If and Only If it is expressing an
individual and local articulation of semiosic interactions -
interactions and information which are specific to that local and
individual agent.

        4] And I agree with Gary R to be cautious of 'sharp distinctions'
which, I feel, operate only in the abstract but go against the
dynamic relational nature of Peircean semiosis - which requires, I
think, constant networking and filiations with other nodes.

        Edwina
 On Fri 02/03/18  2:14 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Garys, List:
 Two quick clarifications.
 1.  My point about concepts is that they are Signs, specifically
Symbols, while Immediate Objects are parts or aspects of Signs. 
Hence every concept has an Immediate Object, but no Immediate Object
is (by itself) a concept.
 2.  The Interpretant can be itself a Sign, but need not be; it can
also be a feeling or an exertion. 
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 11:41 AM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Gary f, Jon S, list,
 I haven't much more to offer beyond but what Jon has already
written, so I'll keep this brief. Gary f asked: 
        Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of
Signs in a Quasi-mind?
        I would make no such assumption. At the moment all I'm assuming is
that the perfect Sign (the nature of which I am not yet clear on) and
a Quasi-sign are not the same, and that whatever the perfect Sign
turns out to be that it does not mean that the Object can be
completely represented. I'd suggested that it may represent some kind
of asymptotic Ideal of representation, while Jon's quoting Peirce to
the effect that a perfect Sign is  "the aggregate formed by a sign
and all the signs which its occurrence carries with it" makes me less
certain of that initial interpretation. I'd reiterate that what Jon
and I do agree on is that a Quasi-mind is a Sign which is a complex
of Signs and, as I conjectured, perhaps the prerequisite of all
semiosis. 

         Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can
include) attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the
Immediate Object sounds like a concept— as, for example, your
concept of a woman includes attributes of the woman you are talking
about right now. Do you think of an Immediate Object as a concept or
like a concept? 
 Jon and I agree, as he wrote, that "the Dynamic Object determines
the Sign with respect to  some, but not all, of its characters or
qualities; and that partial combination of attributes is the
Immediate Object, the Form that the Sign communicates."  I am less
certain that I would distinguish the IO from the R as completely as
Jon seems to do in writing "Only the Sign  itself--not its Immediate
Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that unites Matter (denotation) and
Form (signification) in its Interpretant (determination)." This hard
distinction of the IO from the R and I seems to me to leave the
"partial combination of attributes" floating in some literally
in-significate realm. Furthermore, the Interpretant is itself a Sign,
so too sharp a distinction in that direction is also, for me,
problematic. This discussion has gotten me rethinking just how
completely we ought distinguish IO-R-I except, perhaps, for the
purposes of certain rather abstract analyses since, at the moment,
such hard distinctions seem to me to break the continuity of
semiosis. In short, the Form which the Sign communicates seems to me
not to be fully distinct from it. 
        Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction
with another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined
only as a correlate of a triadic relation?
 I agree with Jon that "it would be better to substitute 'Thing' for
'Dynamic Object' when discussing dyadic reaction." 
 I'm sure that both Jon and I would be interested in your response to
our answers to your questions, Gary. In particular I'm wondering what
your understanding of the nature of the Immediate Object is. 
        Best,

        Gary RGary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York718 482-5690 [2]
 On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 11:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 Gary F., List:
  GF:  Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of
Signs in a Quasi-mind?
 Gary R. and I now agree that a Quasi-mind is (in my words) "an
individual Sign that is also a complex of Signs," and (in his words)
"something like the prerequisite of all semiosis and communication." 
There is nothing in EP 2:304 to indicate that "the ideal or perfect
sign" is "an accretion of Signs," although EP 2:545n25 does refer to
"a  perfect sign" as "the aggregate formed by a sign and all the
signs which its occurrence carries with it."  I am not quite ready to
say anything further about the latter passage just yet; I would prefer
to cover a bit more semiotic and metaphysical ground first.
 JAS:  The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate
Object of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to
reproducing the  entire effect that the Dynamic Object itself would
have on the Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906). 
 GF:  Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can
include) attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the
Immediate Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your
concept of a woman includes attributes of the woman you are talking
about right now. Do you think of an Immediate Object as a concept or
like a concept? 
 In the 1906 passage that I cited but did not quote, Peirce stated
that a Sign "is determined by the object, but in no other respect
than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and
the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less
effect it has upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it
as if the object itself had acted upon it."  I have posited that this
"respect" is precisely the Immediate Object, and stated that
determination "must always occur  with respect to a character or
quality; i.e., a Form."  Hence the Dynamic Object determines the Sign
with respect to some, but not all, of its characters or qualities; and
that partial combination of attributes is the Immediate Object, the
Form that the Sign communicates.  Only the Sign itself--not its
Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that unites Matter
(denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant
(determination).
  GF:  By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in
reaction with another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is
defined only as a correlate of a triadic relation?
 Indeed, it would be better to substitute "Thing" for "Dynamic
Object" when discussing dyadic reaction; I only wanted to emphasize
the direct contrast with triadic Sign-action.  In fact, I am drafting
another post to discuss what I see as the key distinctions among
Things, Quasi-minds, and Persons, continuing to utilize the
Aristotelian terms for the Categories that Peirce employed in his
1904 writings--Form (1ns), Matter (2ns), and Entelechy (3ns). 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [4] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [5] 
 On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 9:07 AM,   wrote:
        Gary, Jon S,

        I’ve inserted a few questions below …

         Gary f

        From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com [7]] 
        Sent: 28-Feb-18 19:15
        Jon, list,

        Summarizing Peirce's thought at EP 2.304, Jon wrote:

        EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is identical , in such
identity as a Sign may have, with the unity of the very Matter
denoted by it and the very Form signified by it, such that its
Interpretant is the Truth.

        If this is so, then, since any given Sign or accretion of Signs in a
Quasi-mind (say on a sheet of assertion) can only signify specific
aspects or facets of the Object (ITS Object, mind you) as a certain,
shall we say, "selected assemblage" of characters (its Form), it
would seem to me that a perfect Sign remains an Ideal, that even the
perfect Sign can only asymptotically approach the Truth that it means
to represent.  

        Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of
Signs in a Quasi-mind? 

        So, in sum, the Object can never be completely represented even by a
perfect Sign, and even if, as Jon wrote: 

        The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object
of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to
reproducing the entire  effect that the Dynamic Object itself would
have on the Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906). 

        Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can
include) attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the
Immediate Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your
concept of a woman includes attributes of the woman you are talking
about right now. Do you think of an Immediate Object as a concept or
like a concept? 

        It seems to me that "reproducing the entire effect that the Dynamic
Object itself would have on the Quasi-interpreter" is an
impossibility. 

        Yet, Jon, I'm not clear if this interpretation is consistent with
this part of your conclusion:

        Therefore, a perfect Sign in this sense is one that achieves
Entelechy, the complete unity of Matter and Form in its Interpretant.
 This is the final cause  of all triadic semiosis, Truth as "the
conformity of a representamen to its object--its object, ITS object,
mind you" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906).  

        Of course I completely agree with your concluding sentence.

         By contrast, dyadic action occurs when there is no mediating Sign;
just two Dynamic Objects directly and reciprocally affecting each
other (cf. EP 2:411; 1907).

        Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction
with another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined
only as a correlate of a  triadic relation? 

        But here we are speaking of Science, while I believe that Art
is--even if rarely--able to perfectly represent its Object, one which
however, it retrospectively, so to speak, creates. 

        Best,

        Gary R 


Links:
------
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'gary.richm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2] http://webmail.primus.ca/tel:(718)%20482-5690
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[5] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[6]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'g...@gnusystems.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[7]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'gary.richm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to