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 Jon, list, 

        1] My problem with your terms is that you use 'sign' to refer only
to the mediate node in the semiosic triad; the Representamen. Where
and how does the triad enter into your understanding of semiosis?

        2. I understand the term of 'symbol' to refer to the Relation
between the Representamen and the Dynamic Object, such that this
Relation sets up a triadic semiosic process of conceptualization: 
i.e., "In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I
divide signs into Icons, Indices and Symbols" 8.335. .

        ..."I define a Symbol as a sign which is determined by its dynamic
objects only in the sense that it will be so interpreted. It thus
depends either upon a convention, a habit, or a natural disposition
of its interpretant or of the field of its interpretant  8.335...

        and thus - the Relation between the Representamen and the DO is in a
mode of Thirdness and the Representamen in such an interaction
functions within Thirdness - as a Legisign. That is - I see the
Symbol as a Relational function of the triad, not as an integral
component of the 'Sign/representamen'.

        3. I don't read the Interpretant section the same way as you do.
There are three Interpretants: Immediate, Dynamic and Final. IF, in
the terms you use, the  Sign is that mediate node in the O-R-I
semiosic triad, then - none of the three Interpretants can be that
mediate process. 

        Peirce says" that I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and
an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the
Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a
feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the
Interpretant" (CP 4.536; 1906).

        I read the above that the Quasi-mind is the INTERPRETER. Not the
Interpretant. And the semiosic process that is ongoing via the
interaction between the Dynamic Object-Immediate producing in 'the
Quasi-mind/Interpreter....a feeling. Or an action/exertion. Or -
Thirdness/a concept...all of which can be expressed as 'the

        4. And I read this differently from you: " For any set of Signs
which are so connected that a complex of two of them can have one
interpretant, must be Determinations of one Sign which is a
Quasi-mind" (CP 4.550; 1906).

        I read it as a network of triads - where at least two of them have
one Interpretant - i.e., their 'actual effects are in effective
interconnection' 4.550ff - 

        The result of the semiosic process among a number of
Agents/Interpreters.... , the Dynamic Interpretant - are connected. 
This relates to [a] a shared mediate Representamen such that the
Interpretants are all 'determinations of a common Representamen - 
and a shared Mind, i.e., a Quasi-mind among all networked
agents/Interpreters in this semiosic interconnection. 

 On Fri 02/03/18  3:04 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt
 Edwina, List:
 1.  Please read more carefully--I stated that all concepts are
Symbols, not that all Signs are Symbols.  Obviously Icons and Indices
are also Signs.
 2.  Peirce explicitly distinguished three kinds of Interpretants,
only one of which is a Sign.  "I have already noted that a Sign has
an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign
produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the
latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination
is the Interpretant" (CP 4.536; 1906). 
 3.  Peirce explicitly defined a Quasi-mind as a Sign that is a
complex of Signs.  "For any set of Signs which are so connected that
a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be
Determinations of one Sign which is a Quasi-mind" (CP 4.550; 1906).
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran [1] - [2] 
 On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 1:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
        JAS, Gary R, List - and here is, as I view it, a problem.

        1] Notice that JAS seems to be confining the definition [and
function?] of a 'Sign' to a 'symbol', in other words, to Thirdness.
But is this accurate? Or is this term of symbol applied only to
'concepts'; i.e.,to the  intellectual results of semiosis? [NOTE: I
would agree with this last sentence since I view the symbol as
confined to human semiosis] ]

         [and I am assuming that JAS refers only to the mediate aspect of
the triad of O-R-I, where he uses 'Sign' to refer to that mediate R].

        2] The next point is that the Interpretant can be 'a Sign'...but
need not be; it can also b a feeling or an exertion'. That is, it can
also function within the mode of Firstness or Secondness. But aren't
semiosic triads functioning in these other modes also Signs? Or does
JAS hold the view that only an interaction in Thirdness qualifies as
a 'Sign'?

        3] I simply don't see how a quasi-mind is,  "a Quasi-mind is a Sign
which is a complex of Signs". After all, one could say the same about
Mind. I see the Quasi-Mind as a local and individual articulation of
the more general non-individual and non-local Mind which underlies
all semiosis.  I don't see how it can be a Sign - understanding Sign
as DO-[IO-R-II]. Or even, as the mediate node in the triad of O-R-I. 
I could see it as this mediate node If and Only If it is expressing an
individual and local articulation of semiosic interactions -
interactions and information which are specific to that local and
individual agent. 

        4] And I agree with Gary R to be cautious of 'sharp distinctions'
which, I feel, operate only in the abstract but go against the
dynamic relational nature of Peircean semiosis - which requires, I
think, constant networking and filiations with other nodes.


        On Fri 02/03/18  2:14 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt
 Garys, List:
 Two quick clarifications.
 1.  My point about concepts is that they are Signs, specifically
Symbols, while Immediate Objects are parts or aspects of Signs. 
Hence every concept has an Immediate Object, but no Immediate Object
is (by itself) a concept.
 2.  The Interpretant can be itself a Sign, but need not be; it can
also be a feeling or an exertion. 
 Jon S. 
 On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 11:41 AM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Gary f, Jon S, list,
 I haven't much more to offer beyond but what Jon has already
written, so I'll keep this brief. Gary f asked: 
        Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of
Signs in a Quasi-mind?
        I would make no such assumption. At the moment all I'm assuming is
that the perfect Sign (the nature of which I am not yet clear on) and
a Quasi-sign are not the same, and that whatever the perfect Sign
turns out to be that it does not mean that the Object can be
completely represented. I'd suggested that it may represent some kind
of asymptotic Ideal of representation, while Jon's quoting Peirce to
the effect that a perfect Sign is  "the aggregate formed by a sign
and all the signs which its occurrence carries with it" makes me less
certain of that initial interpretation. I'd reiterate that what Jon
and I do agree on is that a Quasi-mind is a Sign which is a complex
of Signs and, as I conjectured, perhaps the prerequisite of all

         Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can
include) attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the
Immediate Object sounds like a concept— as, for example, your
concept of a woman includes attributes of the woman you are talking
about right now. Do you think of an Immediate Object as a concept or
like a concept? 
 Jon and I agree, as he wrote, that "the Dynamic Object determines
the Sign with respect to  some, but not all, of its characters or
qualities; and that partial combination of attributes is the
Immediate Object, the Form that the Sign communicates."  I am less
certain that I would distinguish the IO from the R as completely as
Jon seems to do in writing " Only the Sign  itself--not its Immediate
Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that unites Matter (denotation) and
Form (signification) in its Interpretant (determination)." This hard
distinction of the IO from the R and I seems to me to leave the
"partial combination of attributes" floating in some literally
in-significate realm. Furthermore, the Interpretant is itself a Sign,
so too sharp a distinction in that direction is also, for me,
problematic. This discussion has gotten me rethinking just how
completely we ought distinguish IO-R-I except, perhaps, for the
purposes of certain rather abstract analyses since, at the moment,
such hard distinctions seem to me to break the continuity of
semiosis. In short, the Form which the Sign communicates seems to me
not to be fully distinct from it. 
        Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction
with another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined
only as a correlate of a triadic relation?
 I agree with Jon that "it would be better to substitute 'Thing' for
'Dynamic Object' when discussing dyadic reaction." 
 I'm sure that both Jon and I would be interested in your response to
our answers to your questions, Gary. In particular I'm wondering what
your understanding of the nature of the Immediate Object is. 

        Gary RGary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York718 482-5690 [4] 

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