Edwina, List,
you have introduced two things: The interpreter, and a network. Interpreter: I had thought, that Peirce´s theory does not require identifying an interpreter. Network: I aways had taken this term for a mechanistic metaphor Silicon Valley nerds use to replace with algorhithms things they do not understand. But sorry! I admit allergy against certain terms: My problem only, don´t take offence! Best, Helmut
Freitag, 02. März 2018 um 21:49 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
 


Jon, list,

1] My problem with your terms is that you use 'sign' to refer only to the mediate node in the semiosic triad; the Representamen. Where and how does the triad enter into your understanding of semiosis?

2. I understand the term of 'symbol' to refer to the Relation between the Representamen and the Dynamic Object, such that this Relation sets up a triadic semiosic process of conceptualization:  i.e., "In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I divide signs into Icons, Indices and Symbols" 8.335. .

..."I define a Symbol as a sign which is determined by its dynamic objects only in the sense that it will be so interpreted. It thus depends either upon a convention, a habit, or a natural disposition of its interpretant or of the field of its interpretant  8.335...

and thus - the Relation between the Representamen and the DO is in a mode of Thirdness and the Representamen in such an interaction functions within Thirdness - as a Legisign. That is - I see the Symbol as a Relational function of the triad, not as an integral component of the 'Sign/representamen'.

3. I don't read the Interpretant section the same way as you do. There are three Interpretants: Immediate, Dynamic and Final. IF, in the terms you use, the  Sign is that mediate node in the O-R-I semiosic triad, then - none of the three Interpretants can be that mediate process.

Peirce says" that I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant" (CP 4.536; 1906).

I read the above that the Quasi-mind is the INTERPRETER. Not the Interpretant. And the semiosic process that is ongoing via the interaction between the Dynamic Object-Immediate Object-Representamen...is producing in 'the Quasi-mind/Interpreter....a feeling. Or an action/exertion. Or - Thirdness/a concept...all of which can be expressed as 'the Interpretant'.

4. And I read this differently from you: " For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be Determinations of one Sign which is a Quasi-mind" (CP 4.550; 1906).

I read it as a network of triads - where at least two of them have one Interpretant - i.e., their 'actual effects are in effective interconnection' 4.550ff - 

The result of the semiosic process among a number of Agents/Interpreters.... , the Dynamic Interpretant - are connected.  This relates to [a] a shared mediate Representamen such that the Interpretants are all 'determinations of a common Representamen -  and a shared Mind, i.e., a Quasi-mind among all networked agents/Interpreters in this semiosic interconnection.

Edwina


 

On Fri 02/03/18 3:04 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:

Edwina, List:
 
1.  Please read more carefully--I stated that all concepts are Symbols, not that all Signs are Symbols.  Obviously Icons and Indices are also Signs.
 
2.  Peirce explicitly distinguished three kinds of Interpretants, only one of which is a Sign.  "I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant" (CP 4.536; 1906).
 
3.  Peirce explicitly defined a Quasi-mind as a Sign that is a complex of Signs.  "For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be Determinations of one Sign which is a Quasi-mind" (CP 4.550; 1906).
 
Regards,
 
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
 
On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 1:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

JAS, Gary R, List - and here is, as I view it, a problem.

1] Notice that JAS seems to be confining the definition [and function?] of a 'Sign' to a 'symbol', in other words, to Thirdness. But is this accurate? Or is this term of symbol applied only to 'concepts'; i.e.,to the  intellectual results of semiosis? [NOTE: I would agree with this last sentence since I view the symbol as confined to human semiosis] ]

 [and I am assuming that JAS refers only to the mediate aspect of the triad of O-R-I, where he uses 'Sign' to refer to that mediate R].

2] The next point is that the Interpretant can be 'a Sign'...but need not be; it can also b a feeling or an exertion'. That is, it can also function within the mode of Firstness or Secondness. But aren't semiosic triads functioning in these other modes also Signs? Or does JAS hold the view that only an interaction in Thirdness qualifies as a 'Sign'?

3] I simply don't see how a quasi-mind is,  "a Quasi-mind is a Sign which is a complex of Signs". After all, one could say the same about Mind. I see the Quasi-Mind as a local and individual articulation of the more general non-individual and non-local Mind which underlies all semiosis.  I don't see how it can be a Sign - understanding Sign as DO-[IO-R-II]. Or even, as the mediate node in the triad of O-R-I.  I could see it as this mediate node If and Only If it is expressing an individual and local articulation of semiosic interactions - interactions and information which are specific to that local and individual agent.

4] And I agree with Gary R to be cautious of 'sharp distinctions' which, I feel, operate only in the abstract but go against the dynamic relational nature of Peircean semiosis - which requires, I think, constant networking and filiations with other nodes.

Edwina

On Fri 02/03/18 2:14 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:

Garys, List:
 
Two quick clarifications.
 
1.  My point about concepts is that they are Signs, specifically Symbols, while Immediate Objects are parts or aspects of Signs.  Hence every concept has an Immediate Object, but no Immediate Object is (by itself) a concept.
 
2.  The Interpretant can be itself a Sign, but need not be; it can also be a feeling or an exertion.
 
Regards,
 
Jon S.
 
 
On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 11:41 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote:
Gary f, Jon S, list,
 
I haven't much more to offer beyond but what Jon has already written, so I'll keep this brief. Gary f asked:
 

Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs in a Quasi-mind?

I would make no such assumption. At the moment all I'm assuming is that the perfect Sign (the nature of which I am not yet clear on) and a Quasi-sign are not the same, and that whatever the perfect Sign turns out to be that it does not mean that the Object can be completely represented. I'd suggested that it may represent some kind of asymptotic Ideal of representation, while Jon's quoting Peirce to the effect that a perfect Sign is  "the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries with it" makes me less certain of that initial interpretation. I'd reiterate that what Jon and I do agree on is that a Quasi-mind is a Sign which is a complex of Signs and, as I conjectured, perhaps the prerequisite of all semiosis. 

 

Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include) attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate Object sounds like a concept— as, for example, your concept of a woman includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept?
 
Jon and I agree, as he wrote, that "the Dynamic Object determines the Sign with respect to  some, but not all, of its characters or qualities; and that partial combination of attributes is the Immediate Object, the Form that the Sign communicates."  I am less certain that I would distinguish the IO from the R as completely as Jon seems to do in writing " Only the Sign  itself--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that unites Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant (determination)." This hard distinction of the IO from the R and I seems to me to leave the "partial combination of attributes" floating in some literally in-significate realm. Furthermore, the Interpretant is itself a Sign, so too sharp a distinction in that direction is also, for me, problematic. This discussion has gotten me rethinking just how completely we ought distinguish IO-R-I except, perhaps, for the purposes of certain rather abstract analyses since, at the moment, such hard distinctions seem to me to break the continuity of semiosis. In short, the Form which the Sign communicates seems to me not to be fully distinct from it.
 

Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a correlate of a triadic relation?

I agree with Jon that "it would be better to substitute 'Thing' for 'Dynamic Object' when discussing dyadic reaction." 
 
I'm sure that both Jon and I would be interested in your response to our answers to your questions, Gary. In particular I'm wondering what your understanding of the nature of the Immediate Object is.
 

Best,

Gary R

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

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