List: This post is adapted from a very stimulating off-List discussion that I have been having with someone who sought clarification of the following comments that I offered on Friday.
JAS: Consequently, there can be no *act* of determining a Matter to a Form, because an act is individual and has a Matter as its subject; but a Sign in itself is not Matter, since it only *exists* in Replicas. In this sense, there is no *Sign*-action at all, only *Replica*-action. What Peirce wrote specifically about a Qualisign pertains to *every* Sign--"It cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign" (CP 2.244, EP 2:291; 1903). Neither a Mark nor a Type can *act *as such unless and until it is *embodied *in a Token. Both Marks (1ns) and Types (3ns) are *real*, because they are as they are independent of how anyone thinks about them; but strictly speaking, they do not *exist *apart from their instantiations as Replicas or Tokens (2ns), because existence is *reaction*. Peirce often gave the example of a word. CSP: We speak of writing or pronouncing the word "man"; but it is only a *replica*, or embodiment of the word, that is pronounced or written. The word itself has no existence, although it has a real being, *consisting in* the fact that existents *will *conform to it. (CP 2.292, EP 2:274; 1903) Unfortunately, Peirce was not always consistent about carefully maintaining this distinction in his writings, so he sometimes (often?) talked about "Signs" when referring to Replicas/Tokens (2ns), rather than reserving that designation for Types (3ns). An obvious example is his treatment of Qualisigns and Sinsigns--not just Legisigns--as Signs in his 1903 taxonomy. The names themselves reflect this, and correspond to a division "according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law" (EP 2:291). However, already in 1904 he made the following statements that suggest otherwise. - "[A sign] is of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*" (EP 2:303, emphasis in original). - "It is of the nature of a sign to be an individual replica and to be in that replica a living general" (EP 2:324). - "The sign *only *exists in replicas" (NEM 4:300, emphasis added). In 1908, Peirce situated "everything which is essentially a Sign" in the third Universe of Experience, distinct from both "mere Ideas" and "the Brute Actuality of things and facts" (EP 2:435). When he returned to Sign classification later that year, he initially divided the Sign itself into Tone/Token/Type on the basis of its "Mode of Being" (EP 2:480). However, within days he changed this to a division instead based on the Sign's "Mode of Apprehension" (EP 2:482) or "Modes of possible Presentation" (EP 2:483). He initially chose new names that once again implied that all three were Signs (Potisign/Actisign/Famisign), but then hedged--"I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now use" (EP 2:488)--and offered Mark/Token/Type as a possible improvement. My tentative interpretation of this is that rather than the Sign *being *(metaphysically) a mere quality, actual existent, or general law, it was now a matter of how it *seems *(phenomenologically) in the Phaneron of the interpreting Quasi-mind. Taking a closer look at the entire 1908 taxonomy (EP 2:482-490) ... - The three *internal *Correlates (IO, S, II) are divided *phenomenologically*, according to their Mode of Apprehension or Presentation. - The two *external *Correlates (DO, DI) are divided *metaphysically*, according to their Nature or Mode of Being. - The one *habitual *Correlate (FI) is divided *normatively*, according to its Purpose. As for the relations, the S-DO division into Icon/Index/Symbol is straighforwardly metaphysical, and the S-DO-FI division into Instinct/Experience/Form (or Abducent/Inducent/Deducent in 1906) according to "the Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance" is straightforwardly normative. Similarly, I would expect the S-DI division to be metaphysical, like that of the DI itself; and the S-FI division to be normative, like that of the FI itself. With this in mind, I once again posit that S-DI should correspond to Seme/Pheme/Delome (or Rheme/Dicisign/Argument in 1903) as a division according to "the Nature of the Influence of the Sign," while S-FI should correspond to Suggestive/Imperative/Indicative (or Presented/Urged/Submitted in 1904) as a division according to "the Manner of Appeal." As I have admitted before, this is a clear deviation from *all *of Peirce's many taxonomic attempts; but it just makes much more sense to me to align "Influence" with the Sign's *actual *effect (DI), divided metaphysically, and "Appeal" with the Sign's *intended *effect (FI), divided normatively. Assuming that S-DI precedes S-FI in the order of determination--"It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481)--this switch is consistent with Peirce's 1904 assertion that a Rheme can only be presented, while only an Argument can be submitted (CP 8.338). Moreover, assuming that a relation *cannot *precede any of its own constituent Correlates in the order of determination, it is also consistent with a Rheme's only purpose being to produce a habit of feeling (Gratific), while only an Argument's purpose can be to produce a habit of thought (Self-control/Temperative). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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