This post is adapted from a very stimulating off-List discussion that I
have been having with someone who sought clarification of the following
comments that I offered on Friday.

JAS:  Consequently, there can be no *act* of determining a Matter to a
Form, because an act is individual and has a Matter as its subject; but a
Sign in itself is not Matter, since it only *exists* in Replicas.  In this
sense, there is no *Sign*-action at all, only *Replica*-action.  What
Peirce wrote specifically about a Qualisign pertains to *every* Sign--"It
cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has
nothing to do with its character as a sign" (CP 2.244, EP 2:291; 1903).

Neither a Mark nor a Type can *act *as such unless and until it is
*embodied *in a Token.  Both Marks (1ns) and Types (3ns) are *real*,
because they are as they are independent of how anyone thinks about them;
but strictly speaking, they do not *exist *apart from their instantiations
as Replicas or Tokens (2ns), because existence is *reaction*.  Peirce often
gave the example of a word.

CSP:  We speak of writing or pronouncing the word "man"; but it is only a
*replica*, or embodiment of the word, that is pronounced or written. The
word itself has no existence, although it has a real being, *consisting in* the
fact that existents *will *conform to it. (CP 2.292, EP 2:274; 1903)

Unfortunately, Peirce was not always consistent about carefully maintaining
this distinction in his writings, so he sometimes (often?) talked about
"Signs" when referring to Replicas/Tokens (2ns), rather than reserving that
designation for Types (3ns).  An obvious example is his treatment of
Qualisigns and Sinsigns--not just Legisigns--as Signs in his 1903
taxonomy.  The names themselves reflect this, and correspond to a division
"according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent,
or is a general law" (EP 2:291).  However, already in 1904 he made the
following statements that suggest otherwise.

   - "[A sign] is of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*" (EP 2:303,
   emphasis in original).
   - "It is of the nature of a sign to be an individual replica and to be
   in that replica a living general" (EP 2:324).
   - "The sign *only *exists in replicas" (NEM 4:300, emphasis added).

In 1908, Peirce situated "everything which is essentially a Sign" in the
third Universe of Experience, distinct from both "mere Ideas" and "the
Brute Actuality of things and facts" (EP 2:435).  When he returned to Sign
classification later that year, he initially divided the Sign itself into
Tone/Token/Type on the basis of its "Mode of Being" (EP 2:480).  However,
within days he changed this to a division instead based on the Sign's "Mode
of Apprehension" (EP 2:482) or "Modes of possible Presentation" (EP
2:483).  He initially chose new names that once again implied that all
three were Signs (Potisign/Actisign/Famisign), but then hedged--"I dare say
some of my former names are better than those I now use" (EP 2:488)--and
offered Mark/Token/Type as a possible improvement.

My tentative interpretation of this is that rather than the Sign
*being *(metaphysically)
a mere quality, actual existent, or general law, it was now a matter of how
it *seems *(phenomenologically) in the Phaneron of the interpreting
Quasi-mind.  Taking a closer look at the entire 1908 taxonomy (EP
2:482-490) ...

   - The three *internal *Correlates (IO, S, II) are divided
   *phenomenologically*, according to their Mode of Apprehension or
   - The two *external *Correlates (DO, DI) are divided *metaphysically*,
   according to their Nature or Mode of Being.
   - The one *habitual *Correlate (FI) is divided *normatively*, according
   to its Purpose.

As for the relations, the S-DO division into Icon/Index/Symbol is
straighforwardly metaphysical, and the S-DO-FI division into
Instinct/Experience/Form (or Abducent/Inducent/Deducent in 1906) according
to "the Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance" is straightforwardly
normative.  Similarly, I would expect the S-DI division to be metaphysical,
like that of the DI itself; and the S-FI division to be normative, like
that of the FI itself.

With this in mind, I once again posit that S-DI should correspond to
Seme/Pheme/Delome (or Rheme/Dicisign/Argument in 1903) as a division
according to "the Nature of the Influence of the Sign," while S-FI should
correspond to Suggestive/Imperative/Indicative (or
Presented/Urged/Submitted in 1904) as a division according to "the Manner
of Appeal."  As I have admitted before, this is a clear deviation from *all
*of Peirce's many taxonomic attempts; but it just makes much more sense to
me to align "Influence" with the Sign's *actual *effect (DI), divided
metaphysically, and "Appeal" with the Sign's *intended *effect (FI),
divided normatively.

Assuming that S-DI precedes S-FI in the order of determination--"It is
evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally
so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP
2:481)--this switch is consistent with Peirce's 1904 assertion that a Rheme
can only be presented, while only an Argument can be submitted (CP 8.338).
Moreover, assuming that a relation *cannot *precede any of its own
constituent Correlates in the order of determination, it is also consistent
with a Rheme's only purpose being to produce a habit of feeling (Gratific),
while only an Argument's purpose can be to produce a habit of thought


Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman -
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