Again, in this context, the concepts of truth and perfection are ideals or
regulative hopes. A Sign is truthful or perfect to the extent that it
conforms to its Object, and we can recognize lying Signs only because there
are such truthful Signs. A lying Sign takes advantage of our Collateral
Experience with actual Things and real Qualities, but connects them in a
way that *does not* constitute Entelechy, the *genuine *unity of Matter and
Form. Fortunately, inquiry tends to be self-correcting, whether we like it
or not; the "outward clash" confronts us with unpleasant surprises when our
beliefs--manifested as our Habits of Interpretation--are false.
CSP: ... the objectivity of truth really consists in the fact that, in the
end, every sincere inquirer will be led to embrace it--and if he be not
sincere, the irresistible effect of inquiry in the light of experience will
be to make him so ... I hold that truth's independence of individual
opinions is due (so far as there is any "truth") to its being the
predestined result to which sufficient inquiry *would *ultimately lead. (CP
5.494, EP 2:419; 1907)
Only at the ultimate limit--in the *infinite *future, which will never
arrive--would the final opinion *perfectly *coincide with the Absolute
CSP: The true and perfect reality, the very thing, is the thing as it
might be truly represented, as it would be truly represented were thought
carried to its last perfection. As a perissid curve passing further and
further toward the positive side traversed infinity and appears coming
nearer and nearer from the negative side, so thought passing always from
object to interpretation at its extremest point reaches the absolute
reality of objectivity. The real and true thing is the thing as it might be
known to be. (NEM 4:300; 1904)
On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 4:16 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
> Jon, List,
> I agree and try to correct myself. A sign has to do with truth. Your post
> seems to me as a generalization of Karl Otto Apel´s "Letztbegründung der
> Diskursethik" (Final foundation of discourse ethics?) from human discourse
> towards communications, signs, in general. But with this point and the way
> you put it, each and every sign is connected to truth somehow, and there
> cannot be a distinction between perfect and imperfect signs. If truth is
> being looked for by every sign, but achieved by none, who could justifiedly
> assign a perfection value to a sign, or define a perfection scale for signs?
> One more complication: If the sign is a lie, then the final interpretant
> is a lie too, not the truth. Except one might say: It is the truth that
> this lie is put up, or: It is the truth that people believe in this sign or
> are influenced by it. But you hardly can say, that the sign is perfect or
> true. Maybe in his time, Karl Otto Apel could not foresee how bold and
> unscrupulous people today design alternative facts and forge signs of them.
> But these signs are rid of (regulative) hope, thank you for this term, and
> I think it is justified to hope, that in a false sign the absence of
> regulative hope is easily detectable.
> Best, Helmut
> 10. März 2018 um 22:50 Uhr
> "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> Helmut, Edwina, List:
> HR: I do not think, that a sign has to do with truth ... Truth is a
> concept of transcendental philosophy, but not of sign theory, I think.
> And yet Peirce stated quite plainly, "Every sign that is sufficiently
> complete refers to sundry real objects ... [that] are parts of one and the
> same Universe of being, the 'Truth' ... All these characters are elements
> of the 'Truth.' Every sign signifies the 'Truth' ... The 'Truth,' the fact
> that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every
> sign" (EP 2:304). It seems to me that Peirce himself considered Signs and
> Sign-theory as having *everything *to do with truth.
> ET: I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect sign',
> etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.
> And yet Peirce stated quite plainly, "We may adopt the word [entelechy] to
> mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect,
> and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very
> matter denoted united with the very form signified by it" (EP 2:304); and
> he later drafted a lengthy definition of "a *perfect *sign" (EP
> 2:545n25). It seems to me that Peirce himself considered the very idea of
> perfection (i.e., Entelechy; cf. NEM 4:292-300) to be an *essential
> aspect* of Peircean semiosis.
> ET: That is - there is no Final State of Perfection ... There can be no
> necessitarian perfection or 'final state'.
> Who has stated or implied otherwise? As Gary R. just pointed out, the
> text that I quoted clearly treats perfection as an ideal, a *regulative
> hope*. It is much like Peirce's notion of "the final opinion," which
> will never *actually *be achieved, either.
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 2:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
>> List -
>> I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion of
>> 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect
>> sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.
>> The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a system that
>> is innately capable of infinite growth, complexity, diversity - and Peirce
>> himsels says this, referring to "the phenomenon of growth and developing
>> complexity, which appears to be universal" 6.64. That is - there is no
>> Final State of Perfection, for the reality of growth and complexity prevent
>> such a linear and closed path.
>> That is, the mode of Firstness provides a constant source of novelty,
>> spontaneity, chance, freshness - which would provide a deviation from any
>> stable format. The mode of Thirdness functions both to constantly reduce
>> diversity, mould commonality and generality - and this too would again,
>> provide a method of deviation from any stable format [of perfection]. The
>> mode of Secondness, with its focus on the particular and the linear, is
>> frankly the only mode that would be available for a path-to-perfection,
>> but not only does it not exist alone - Peircean semiosis has three modes -
>> but its very individuality precludes perfection.
>> And the fact that semiosis is triadic, with a mediative node that
>> transforms the DO to the II/DI - means that this is a constantly
>> interactive and individual semiosis which is transformative and
>> complex rather than linear. There can be no necessitarian perfection or
>> 'final state'.
> On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 1:08 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
>> I do not think, that a sign has to do with truth (aka perfection,
>> nonquasiness, geninunity...). It has to do with force, need, or volition,
>> depending on the utterer-interpreter-weldedness, whether it/she/he/they
>> is/are nonorganic, organic, or nervous. Truth is a concept of
>> transcendental philosophy, but not of sign theory, I think. Best, Helmut
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