Helmut, list,


There’s a clear response to your explicit assertion for your consideration
of what effects you conceive the object of your conception to have.  For
whenever there is any kind of feeling, there consciousness exists.



But perhaps given past experience, it’s better to leave the truth of that
matter to such things as are independent of the vagaries of me and you.



Still, I applaud you for keeping to earnest inquiry, in spite of the
warranted reputation Peirce carries on this list.



Best,
Jerry R


On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:31 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

> Dear Jerry, List,
> From the quotes you wrote, I get it that for Peirce ethics was 2ns, and
> logic 3ns. I think it is the other way around: Logic to me seems like a
> brute reaction to a thesis, telling whether it is consistent or not. And
> ethics seems like mediation to me: It mediates between logic´s reaction and
> the feeling, the valuing qualia "beautiful" or "ugly" that arise in one´s
> mind due to the thesis. For example the categorical imperative by Kant: It
> contains logic in the form of a syllogism, like you cannot act in a way
> opposing your concept of univerality, if you don´t want to contradict
> youself by performance. And it contains esthetics, as the motive of this
> logical reasoning: You want to feel well, have a good feeling with what you
> do.
> Best, Helmut
>
> 13. März 2018 um 00:48 Uhr
>  "Jerry Rhee" <jerryr...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Dear Helmut, list,
>
>
>
> I’m glad you think so.  Please consult the list of criteria to ensure
> that your conception passes the test of universality.  If not, please
> modify accordingly.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry R
>
>
>
> As Peirce concludes, “an aim which cannot be adopted and consistently
> pursued is a bad aim. It cannot properly be called an ultimate aim at all”
> (CP 5.133, 1903).
>
>
>
> What is important to note here, is that Peirce claims this to be an
> ethical test, not an esthetic one (CP 5.133, 1903).
>
>
>
> It is clear at this point, that the test for a summum bonum is not the
> domain of esthetics alone, but it must be evaluated by all three normative
> sciences. The test must pass the test of feeling (of admiration); *it
> must pass the ethical test of universality*, and it must pass the
> logical-scientific test, based on the effects of its implementation.
>
>
>
> This perhaps explains Peirce’s various pronouncements as to whether the
> determination of ends is the subject matter of esthetics or ethics
> Esthetics governs the first test of its admirableness, ethics its second
> test of universality, and logic, in the form of a methodology for inquiry,
> governs the third test, a study of the effects of its implementation.
>
> On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 6:35 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
>>
>> Dear Jerry, List,
>> I think, esthetics is 1ns, logic 2ns, and ethics 3ns (Quality or feeling
>> // reaction // mediation). This way, logic would imply esthetics, as 1ns of
>> 2ns (2.1.): Does the logic feel beautiful or ugly. Ethics would be an
>> interpretant too, becoming a sign (1ns) again, so ethics is also esthetics
>> again. Best, Helmut
>>
>> 12. März 2018 um 01:41 Uhr
>>  "Jerry Rhee" <jerryr...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Dear list,
>>
>>
>>
>> This conversation is so esthetically pleasing.
>>
>>
>> The books do seem so feeble…
>>
>> Esthetics and logic seem, at first blush, to belong to different
>> universes.
>>
>> It is only very recently that I have become persuaded that that seeming
>> is illusory, and that, on the contrary, logic needs the help of esthetics.
>>
>> The matter is not yet very clear to me; so unless some great light should
>> fall upon me before I reach that chapter, it will be a short one filled
>> with doubts and queries mainly..
>>
>>
>>
>> With best wishes,
>>
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 6:49 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Sorry, I think it was wrong supposing platonic idealism to you. But
>>> truth is a complicated subject. I donot think, that a sign denotes a
>>> certain true thing. Signs can be unclear, denoting something not yet
>>> specified. In the future there may be bifurcations: Concepts can split up.
>>> I can see truth only in the path, not in the goal. Seeing life not as
>>> open-end-evolution, but as approximation towards an asymptote, wouldn´t
>>> that be boring hell? And real blasphemy, I would say: God as a clockmaker.
>>> Jon, List,
>>> I guess, our truth concepts differ slightly. Maybe it is about platonic
>>> idealism versus transcendental pragmatism. Does the "meta"- thing in
>>> metaphysics consist of many discrete blueprints, or is it just one simple
>>> rule? Is entelechy a complicated, obscure force we cannot analyse, or is it
>>> a reasonable principle of nature we might understand? Because "Logos" is
>>> logical?
>>> Best, Helmut
>>>
>>>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Helmut, List:
>>>
>>> Again, in this context, the concepts of truth and perfection are ideals
>>> or regulative hopes.  A Sign is truthful or perfect to the extent that it
>>> conforms to its Object, and we can recognize lying Signs only because there
>>> are such truthful Signs.  A lying Sign takes advantage of our Collateral
>>> Experience with actual Things and real Qualities, but connects them in a
>>> way that *does not* constitute Entelechy, the *genuine *unity of Matter
>>> and Form.  Fortunately, inquiry tends to be self-correcting, whether we
>>> like it or not; the "outward clash" confronts us with unpleasant surprises
>>> when our beliefs--manifested as our Habits of Interpretation--are false.
>>>
>>>
>>> CSP:  ... the objectivity of truth really consists in the fact that, in
>>> the end, every sincere inquirer will be led to embrace it--and if he be not
>>> sincere, the irresistible effect of inquiry in the light of experience will
>>> be to make him so ... I hold that truth's independence of individual
>>> opinions is due (so far as there is any "truth") to its being the
>>> predestined result to which sufficient inquiry *would *ultimately lead.
>>> (CP 5.494, EP 2:419; 1907)
>>>
>>>
>>> Only at the ultimate limit--in the *infinite *future, which will never
>>> arrive--would the final opinion *perfectly *coincide with the Absolute
>>> Truth.
>>>
>>>
>>> CSP:  The true and perfect reality, the very thing, is the thing as it
>>> might be truly represented, as it would be truly represented were thought
>>> carried to its last perfection. As a perissid curve passing further and
>>> further toward the positive side traversed infinity and appears coming
>>> nearer and nearer from the negative side, so thought passing always from
>>> object to interpretation at its extremest point reaches the absolute
>>> reality of objectivity. The real and true thing is the thing as it might be
>>> known to be. (NEM 4:300; 1904)
>>>
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon S.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 4:16 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Jon, List,
>>>> I agree and try to correct myself. A sign has to do with truth. Your
>>>> post seems to me as a generalization of Karl Otto Apel´s "Letztbegründung
>>>> der Diskursethik" (Final foundation of discourse ethics?) from human
>>>> discourse towards communications, signs, in general. But with this point
>>>> and the way you put it, each and every sign is connected to truth somehow,
>>>> and there cannot be a distinction between perfect and imperfect signs. If
>>>> truth is being looked for by every sign, but achieved by none, who could
>>>> justifiedly assign a perfection value to a sign, or define a perfection
>>>> scale for signs?
>>>>
>>>> One more complication: If the sign is a lie, then the final
>>>> interpretant is a lie too, not the truth. Except one might say: It is the
>>>> truth that this lie is put up, or: It is the truth that people believe in
>>>> this sign or are influenced by it. But you hardly can say, that the sign is
>>>> perfect or true. Maybe in his time, Karl Otto Apel could not foresee how
>>>> bold and unscrupulous people today design alternative facts and forge signs
>>>> of them. But these signs are rid of (regulative) hope, thank you for this
>>>> term, and I think it is justified to hope, that in a false sign the absence
>>>> of regulative hope is easily detectable.
>>>> Best, Helmut
>>>>
>>>>  10. März 2018 um 22:50 Uhr
>>>>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>>>>
>>>> Helmut, Edwina, List:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> HR:  I do not think, that a sign has to do with truth ... Truth is a
>>>> concept of transcendental philosophy, but not of sign theory, I think.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> And yet Peirce stated quite plainly, "Every sign that is sufficiently
>>>> complete refers to sundry real objects ... [that] are parts of one and the
>>>> same Universe of being, the 'Truth' ... All these characters are elements
>>>> of the 'Truth.'  Every sign signifies the 'Truth' ... The 'Truth,' the fact
>>>> that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every
>>>> sign" (EP 2:304).  It seems to me that Peirce himself considered Signs and
>>>> Sign-theory as having *everything *to do with truth.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ET:  I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect sign',
>>>> etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> And yet Peirce stated quite plainly, "We may adopt the word [entelechy]
>>>> to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite
>>>> perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the
>>>> very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it" (EP 2:304);
>>>> and he later drafted a lengthy definition of "a *perfect *sign" (EP
>>>> 2:545n25).  It seems to me that Peirce himself considered the very idea of
>>>> perfection (i.e., Entelechy; cf. NEM 4:292-300) to be an *essential
>>>> aspect* of Peircean semiosis.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ET:  That is - there is no Final State of Perfection ... There can be
>>>> no necessitarian perfection or 'final state'.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Who has stated or implied otherwise?  As Gary R. just pointed out, the
>>>> text that I quoted clearly treats perfection as an ideal, a *regulative
>>>> hope*.  It is much like Peirce's notion of "the final opinion," which
>>>> will never *actually *be achieved, either.
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/
>>>> JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 2:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> List -
>>>>>
>>>>>  I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion of
>>>>> 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect
>>>>> sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.
>>>>>
>>>>> The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a system
>>>>> that is innately capable of infinite growth, complexity, diversity - and
>>>>> Peirce himsels says this, referring to "the phenomenon of growth and
>>>>> developing complexity, which appears to be universal" 6.64. That is - 
>>>>> there
>>>>> is no Final State of Perfection, for the reality of growth and complexity
>>>>> prevent such a linear and closed path.
>>>>>
>>>>> That is, the mode of Firstness provides a constant source of novelty,
>>>>> spontaneity, chance, freshness - which would provide a deviation from any
>>>>> stable format. The mode of Thirdness functions both to constantly reduce
>>>>> diversity, mould commonality and generality - and this too would again,
>>>>> provide a method of deviation from any stable format [of perfection]. The
>>>>> mode of Secondness, with its focus on the particular and the linear, is
>>>>> frankly the only mode that would be available for a path-to-perfection,
>>>>> but not only does it not exist alone - Peircean semiosis has three modes -
>>>>> but its very individuality precludes perfection.
>>>>>
>>>>> And the fact that semiosis is triadic, with a mediative node that
>>>>> transforms the DO to the II/DI - means that this is a constantly
>>>>> interactive and individual semiosis which is transformative and
>>>>> complex rather than linear. There can be no necessitarian perfection or
>>>>> 'final state'.
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 1:08 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wro
>>>> te:
>>>>>
>>>>> List,
>>>>> I do not think, that a sign has to do with truth (aka perfection,
>>>>> nonquasiness, geninunity...). It has to do with force, need, or volition,
>>>>> depending on the utterer-interpreter-weldedness, whether
>>>>> it/she/he/they is/are nonorganic, organic, or nervous. Truth is a concept
>>>>> of transcendental philosophy, but not of sign theory, I think. Best, 
>>>>> Helmut
>>>>>
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