Thanks, Helmut. I think the simple outline is the most productive
one.
Edwina
On Wed 21/03/18 4:29 PM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent:
List, I think, the whole matter is not so complicated. I think, the
sign (functionally) consists of sign (itself), object, interpretant.
The object (functionally) consists of IO and DO. The interpretant
(functionally) consists of II, DI, FI. Very simple. Functional
consistence (functional composition), other than spatial, means that
a function consists of other functions. The sign is a function, and
all its elements too. Reentry is possible: Sign consisting of itself
and two other functions (O and I). The dynamic object is not the
thing outside, not the subject outside in the world, but its function
for the sign. The FI is not the truth that would be achieved by
infinite research, but its function for the sign (like e.g. the
motive for it to happen). The truth, though unknown, and perhaps
never to be known, nevertheless has a function for the sign at the
moment it occurs, which function is the FI. I think, to see it this
way makes the whole affair quite easy to understand. And the
categorial functional composition tree is never ending: The DO
consists of two parts, the DI too, and the FI of three. And so on.
Best, Helmut 21. März 2018 um 21:00 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:
Jon, list:
And I continue puzzling over your statement below:
JAS: "Suppose that Quasi-mind A utters Sign Y, which determines
Quasi-mind B to a further Sign Z as its Effectual or Dynamic
Interpretant. The Communicational Interpretant of Sign Y is simply
its Immediate Interpretant--the Form that Sign Y communicates from
Quasi-mind A to Quasi-mind B as a determination of their overlap, the
Commens (A ∩ B). The Intended or Intentional Interpretant is Sign
X, the preceding determination of Quasi-mind A by the same Dynamic
Object, such that Sign Y is the Dynamic Interpretant of Sign X. Let
me also tentatively suggest that the Immediate Interpretant of Sign X
serves as the Immediate Object of Sign Y, and the Immediate
Interpretant of Sign Y serves as the Immediate Object of Sign Z."
1] Could we dispense with the Quasi-Mind term and simply say: Person
A, Person B. We can assume that both have a mind.
2] My first confusion comes - immediately. What do you mean by Sign
Y? Do you mean what I term the Representamen? Or do you mean the
triad of [IO-R-II]? Or do you mean the Peircean simple: O-R-I? For
example, the person utters a spontaneous cry: STOP! This is a
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.
I view this triad, in this example: functioning as a Dynamic Object
shouted by Person A. Person B hears it...as [IO-R-II]. And, he may
stop [DI].
3] But you don't say it like this so I'm unsure of YOUR meaning. Do
you mean that the DI is ALSO a (a) Representamen; or a triad
[IO-R-II]? Or do you mean that the original shout of STOP which I see
as functioning as a DO in Person A, has become a DI in Person B?
4] Sorry- but the next half of your paragraph is too convoluted for
me to figure out. You've added a set of Signs, eg, X, which you say
is an Interpretant of a previous Dynamic Object.....and..Z and...it
gets too muddy for me to deal with.
How can an 'Immediate Interpretant of Sign Y serves as the
Immediate Object of Sign Z". How can two internal Signs be
interactive without the work of a Dynamic Object and Dynamic
Interpretant - which moves the internal to the external??????
Edwina
On Tue 20/03/18 9:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
sent: Gary F., List: On the contrary, it merely implies that the
Intentional Interpretant of a given Sign is not determined by that
Sign itself, but by the Signs that come before it in the uttering
Quasi-mind; and I am assuming, along the same lines as Gary R., that
each Sign is determined by exactly two Objects and determines exactly
three Interpretants, but I am still trying to sort out the latter.
Perhaps an abstract example of what I am proposing, rather than a
concrete one, will be helpful for keeping everything straight.
Suppose that Quasi-mind A utters Sign Y, which determines Quasi-mind
B to a further Sign Z as its Effectual or Dynamic Interpretant. The
Communicational Interpretant of Sign Y is simply its Immediate
Interpretant--the Form that Sign Y communicates from Quasi-mind A to
Quasi-mind B as a determination of their overlap, the Commens (A ∩
B). The Intended or Intentional Interpretant is Sign X, the
preceding determination of Quasi-mind A by the same Dynamic Object,
such that Sign Y is the Dynamic Interpretant of Sign X. Let me also
tentatively suggest that the Immediate Interpretant of Sign X serves
as the Immediate Object of Sign Y, and the Immediate Interpretant of
Sign Y serves as the Immediate Object of Sign Z. The continuity of
semiosis is thus once again evident here. No matter how long or
short the interval of time that we posit from start to finish, there
is an inexhaustible continuum of Signs "beginning" at the Dynamic
Object (what they all denote) and "terminating" (in this particular
analysis) in Sign X, whose actual effect on Quasi-mind A is Sign Y,
whose actual effect on Quasi-mind B is Sign Z--and the process keeps
going from there. Each of these Signs, as "a Medium for the
communication of a Form" (EP 2:544n22; 1906), takes its predecessor's
Immediate Interpretant (the Form communicated by that Sign) as its
own Immediate Object (the Form signified by this Sign). Peirce's
theorem of "the science of semeiotics" is also relevant--"if any
signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes
one sign" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904). That is precisely why every
Quasi-mind "is itself a sign, a determinable sign" (SS 195; 1906); it
is the system that results from the connection of all of the Signs
that have previously determined it. Sign X is the Intentional
Interpretant of Sign Y, but it is not determined by Sign Y; it is
determined by the complex of Signs that constitutes the utterer,
Quasi-mind A. "For any set of Signs which are so connected that a
complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be
Determinations of one Sign which is a Quasi-mind" (CP 4.550; 1906).
Notice that I have not said anything yet about the Final Interpretant
of Sign Y. Is it the same as the Intentional Interpretant? This
would entail that, contrary to everything that I have ever read by
Peirce and others, the Final Interpretant determines the Sign itself.
On the other hand, it clearly does have a purposive or intentional
aspect, based on how Peirce labeled the divisions associated with it
in his late taxonomies. Is it perhaps a clue that he called it the
Eventual Interpretant in 1906 and (at least arguably) the Destinate
Interpretant in 1908? This warrants its own discussion once we are
ready to move on from the current one. Regards, Jon S.
On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 4:50 PM, wrote:
Jon,
OK, I think I can follow your reasoning, though I don’t find it
persuasive. It implies that there is no such thing as an intended
interpretant of any given sign, if that means an interpretant
intended by the utterer. This makes me wonder what Peirce could
possibly be referring to as “ the Influence the Sign is intended
to exert" (R 339:424[285r]” (quoted in your earlier message), if
neither Seme nor Pheme nor Delome can have an intended interpretant.
Are you assuming (or are you convinced) that the
Intentional/Effectual/Communicational trichotomy of interpretants
differs in name only from the Immediate/Dynamical/Final trichotomy?
Are there really only three interpretants, not six or more?
Gary f.
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