Mike, Edwina, Jon, list, Mike wrote: "Let's consider the entire world of Peirce aficionados, past and present. There is a reason both of you [Edwina and Jon S] study and feel so passionately about Peirce. I humbly suggest that intersection of interests is a more practical domain of inquiry than trying to find where your interpretations differ."
I would tend to *strongly* agree, Mike. I have always thought, and occasionally suggested on this list, that those who want to promote Peirce's philosophy in the world at large (whose achievements are most certainly not at all limited to semeiotics) ought attempt to find what is most powerful, potentially productive and heuristic in Peirce that we can more or less come to tentatively and fallibly agree on. Perhaps then we can explore ways to send his profound insights into the world, agreeing that some of these are considerable, perhaps inestimable potential value. On the other hand, little of value, at least it seems to me, comes of the tendency to debate (pro and con can tend to degenerate into 'my view' is correct and 'your view' is not and, further, even denying that this is happening). Peirce wrote both that* logic* is rooted in the *social principle* and the converse, that the *social principle* is rooted in *logic *(Ben Udell and I wrote a short book chapter on this theme). Conversely, ego is seen by Peirce as pretty much an impediment to the growth of science, and more generally, to the evolution of intelligence and the advance of humane culture (I personally have at times found it very difficult to 'check' my ego). The emphasis in my view ought be *much* less on debate than on collaborative inquiry. I personally think that if any forum members want to debate matters introduced on the list that they ought to take much--if not most--of it off-list when it's become clear that that is what it has, in my opinion, *degenerated* into. Debate can feel for observers of it here, exhausting, enervating and, in a word, tedious. So, I would only add to what Mike has written a question: What can we who value the vast intellect of Peirce, a scientist and philosopher who has been called "America's greatest thinker" by some rather substantial thinkers; again, what can those of us who resolutely believe that he has much of value to offer in consideration of, for prime example, methodological approaches not only to issues in science and philosophy, but to what some have called the "wicked problems" of our present era (including a number of ethical and metaphysical issues), what can we offer towards the explication and promulgating of Peirce's work? So, potentially working towards discovering "intersections of interest" as Mike put it, I'd ask: Is it possible for us to at least attempt to fathom together, make sense of together, try to find what in his vast philosophy that we can tend to agree is of importance and value? Can we begin to offer what we *together* might think could help clarify, develop, and, perhaps, *finally* promote the dissemination of what we, hopefully, can come to agree is important, even essential, in Peirce's thought? Lacking that, we'll just continue to endlessly debate--in vain. Perhaps this is nothing but a pipe dream, at least for this forum. So, I guess along with Mike I'm saying something like: Endless debate blocks the way of inquiry. Debate is *not* inquiry, it is *mere* debate, only contention. And, I'd add, almost always deeply infused with ego (while it seems to me that especially some, but by all means not all, very sharp intellects are prone to it--Peirce suggests in one place that, especially for keen intellects, the concept of involution, for example, is difficult to grasp). To conclude: As many of us here have come to see over the years and decades, Peirce is much too complex, subtle, contradictory (in the sense of Walt Whitman, I'd suggest), much too *profound* to be *debated*. As for being "a positive contributor" to the list, Mike, you've already proven yourself to be one. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Fri, Apr 6, 2018 at 11:46 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: > Hi Edwina, Jon, > > I have changed the subject line. It would not bother me if this is the > only item on the thread. > > Somehow, again, you two go hammer-and-tongs at one another. Edwina, you > know as well as any of us how closely Peirce tied semiosis to logic. Jon, > you will cite stanza and verse but also know well that form-matter-entelchy > is but one of scores of trichotomous relations using the universal > categories that Peirce put forward. > > Let's consider the entire world of Peirce aficionados, past and present. > There is a reason both of you study and feel so passionately about Peirce. > I humbly suggest that intersection of interests is a more practical domain > of inquiry than trying to find where your interpretations differ. > > Just saying. > > I know I have not been contributing much myself to the list recently. I > hope to be a more positive contributor going forward. > > Best, Mike > On 4/6/2018 10:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Edwina, List: > > As I have noted before when making this substitution, Peirce defined logic > (in the broad sense) *as *semeiotic and beliefs *as *habits. The subject > matter of normative science consists of the relations of phenomena to ends, > and the *ideal *end of semiosis is the development of habits that would > never be confounded by subsequent experience--including, but not limited > to, true beliefs. Again, this is a regulative *hope*, not something that > will ever *actually *be achieved. > > Turning to metaphysics, the habit-taking tendency is the primordial law of > mind, from which all physical laws--*inveterate *habits--are derived (cf. > CP 6.24-25; 1891). However, as you rightly point out, freedom and > spontaneity still prevent their *complete *induration (cf. CP 6.201; > 1898). Hence recognizing that a Sign is an Entelechy (3ns), as Peirce > himself explicitly did, does not at all deny the Reality of Form (1ns) and > Matter (2ns); on the contrary, I see it as an integral aspect of his robust > *three*-Category realism. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Fri, Apr 6, 2018 at 9:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon, List- >> >> With regard to the statement by Jon: >> >> "My long-term objective in all of this remains to understand how >> semeiotic may be defined as the science of the laws of the stable >> establishment of habits (cf. CP 3.429; 1896). That includes the inveterate >> habits of matter, as well as the self-controlled habits of Persons." >> >> The actual reference to Peirce is not about semeiotic but about logic: >> "Logic may be defined as the science of the laws of the stable >> establishment of beliefs". 3.429 >> >> Semeiosis is actually a 'far-from-equilibrium' or unstable process, >> functioning within three, not one, but three modal categories. Only one of >> them, Thirdness, refers to habits or stability. The vital, absolutely >> necessary mode of Firstness , inserts the capacity to break up, modify, >> adapt, change, evolve, those habits. And the equally necessary mode of >> Secondness locates both Firstness and Thirdness within individual, diverse, >> local, interactive, networking instantiations of both habits and novelty. >> >> To reduce semiosis to only one of the three modal categories is setting >> up an idealistic ontology - and this is not, in my view, Peircean semiosis. >> >> Edwina >> > > -- > __________________________________________ > > Michael K. Bergman > Cognonto Corporation > 319.621.5225skype:michaelkbergmanhttp://cognonto.comhttp://mkbergman.comhttp://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman > __________________________________________ > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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