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}Gary R, list

        Thanks for an excellent post. I agree with much of it - I'll make a
few comments

        2] I have never thought that Peirce's view was Hegelian! Peirce was
very specific in his opposition to Hegel's
thesis/antithesis/synthesis. I felt that Jon's outline was Hegelian.

        4] Habit-taking, as Thirdness, is one of the three vital
modes-of-being. But it is not the only action of mediation. Within
the ten classes, 6 of them do indeed view Thirdness as the mediation,
but, four do not - and we can't discount them.

         In addition, it is vital to consider that Thirdness is complex,
occurring in three forms: 3-3, 3-2, 3-1. In fact, I consider these
two 'degenerate' modes extremely important. That's because they
ground the action of Reason [Thirdness] within current
instantiations. So, 3-2 acts as habits-indexically-connecting with
local instantiations, gathering information from them, to 'inform'
the General Habits within Thirdness. And, 3-1 acts as
habits-iconically- privileging the dominant set of habits. An example
of 3-2 is a situation where a species will inform itself of changes in
its environment and will adapt its habit-base to better function in
that new environment. And example of 3-1 is Natural Selection where a
dominant Type will re-produce itself more than marginal types.

        As for 'entelechy - I consider that its practice belongs, more
often, in the heady confines of the seminar room rather than in the
messy realities of the pragmatic world, a world which, filled as it
is with the three categories in their six modes [1-1, 2-2, 2-1, 3-3,
3-2, 3-1] is always constructing and deconstructing
matter-to-different morphologies - and as such - there is no final or
'perfect' state of being- or even, of knowledge. 

        Edwina
 On Mon 09/04/18  7:10 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, list,
 Thanks for responding to my post, Edwina. I'm sorry that it's taken
me a couple of days to reply, but this weekend happened to be
especially busy.
 In the spirit of trying to see if it's possible to come to agreement
on certain recent points of contention, I'd like to begin my response
with a principle upon which we appear to be in agreement. You quoted
me, then commented. 
 3] Gary R: Similarly Peirce uses the phrase "regulative hope" in
consideration of just those habits of thought and action which,
through hetero- and homo-correction (science as critical commonsense
writ large) tend toward a belief wholly congruent with Reality,
whatever you, I, Jon, or any given community of inquirers might
think.  EDWINA: Agree. 
 Mike and John S suggested that it might be a valuable strategy to
see if through dialogue here that there might be some significant
ideas or principles of Peircean semeiotics and philosophy more
generally with which we might come to at least some agreement. While
I'm not looking for anything like "general agreement" on any point,
I'd be interested to see if there's anyone in the forum who 
disagrees that this (stated perhaps too tersely above) is what Peirce
means by the expression "regulative hope," that is, in referring it to
the sense of how inquiry taken up in the scientific spirit brings us
closer to a grasp of the Real?
 Now, on to the other points.  1] Gary R: Edwina, all the things that
you question, disagree, or reject here will be found in Peirce. He
himself, for example, says that 'the subject matter of normative
science consists of the relations of phenomena to ends'. 
 EDWINA: I'm not questioning their being 'found' in Peirce. One can
cherry pick a zillion quotes from Peirce. I'm questioning their
pragmatic use within an analysis. 
 I agree in a general sense. But in this particular matter of the
quotation, 'the subject matter of normative science consists of the
relations of phenomena to ends,'   I don't believe that there is any
cherry picking going on whatsoever The subject matter of the other
two branches of cenoscopic philosophy, phenomenology and metaphysics,
are different from that of the normative sciences. One can agree or
disagree with with what Peirce saw as the purpose of each of these
three branches, but at least in a pragmatic analysis of his
architectonic philosophy in consideration of scientific inquiry, it
is important, I believe, to distinguish them. This is principally, I
believe,  because he develops his architectonic philosophy, outlined
in his Classification of Sciences, as an aid to pragmatic inquiry,
including what you referred to above as "their pragmatic use within
an analysis." 2] Gary R: Similarly, the 'ideal end of semiosis is the
development of habits that would never be confounded by subsequent
experience - including, but not limited to, true beliefs' is a
decidedly Peircean notion concerning an asymptotic tendency of
scientific inquiry towards the Truth such that Truth == Reality. It
is not Hegelian whatsoever in my view as Reality in Peirce's sense
itself involves all three categories, not just 3ns. 

        EDWINA: Here, I question the view that 'the development of habits
that would never be confounded by subsequent experience - including
but not limited to, true beliefs'.  I'm not questioning this
statement. I'm questioning the view that a 'final state' exists,
where habits are no longer open to the realities of 1ns and 2ns. Let
me explain. I can, for example, analyze the biological and chemical
nature of a lion - such that I can determine the essentially true
nature of it as a biological species.  And - this analysis would not
be 'confounded by subsequent experience' of the lion species. It's a
'scientific truth'. 

        I agree that a final state does not, cannot exist in Peirce science
exactly because it involves an evolutionary philosophy. That's why I
suggested that the expression 'final state' refers to a regulative
principle,  and so I earlier used the term 'asymptotic' to suggest
that while one can, perhaps, get closer and closer to the complete
facts, principles, laws regarding the truth of any reality into which
one might inquire, one can never definitively or fully arrive there
(this is not to suggest that we can't grasp many specific 'truths',
such as the real characteristics of an plant or animal species--see
below). Peirce's term 'final' is misleading if one doesn't keep this
in mind. So, in my view Peirce's notion is not Hegelian in the sense
the 3ns is the be all and end all. For as long is there is
evolutionary growth of any sort in the cosmos,  all three categories
will be in effect.

        In the case of the true (real) nature of the lion as a species, I
fully agree that what we now know represents scientific truth even
should that species evolve. Peirce suggests that there are no doubt
many of these "scientific truths," but that we can't be certain that
any  one in particular will 'hold' in the future. But there's no
reason to doubt what we've no reason to doubt as to what science has
already discovered.

         ET: BUT - just because I have analyzed the scientifically valid
nature of this species - does NOT mean that its habits are closed to
adaptation and evolution. They could - and probably will - evolve and
change. So, habit formation and truth are not the same thing. 

        I agree that "habit formation and truth are not the same thing."
What I suggested was that our human striving to understand the nature
of reality together in a scientific way is the optimal way to arrive
at whatever truths we may ever hope to achieve in whatever areas of
inquiry we may take up. We could, of course, be wrong at any point in
our inquiry, while the history of science will show that this has been
the case any number of times. But, again, we clearly make scientific
discoveries or we wouldn't see, for example, the development of the
technologies we've witnessed even in our own lives--but our
understandings remain fallible especially as we continue our
inquiries.  

        4] Gary R: It is Peirce who says that the habit-taking tendency is
the primordial law of mind, I believe first in the essay "The Law of
Mind" (1892). Habits, 3ns, in the involutional sense I recently
commented on as it appears in "The Logic of Mathematics," involve the
other two categories quasi-necessarily.  

        EDWINA:  My view is that habit-taking is ONE of the primordial laws
of Mind . Indeed, the formation of habits is vital. . . However, I
don't see that habits 'involve' the other two categories
quasi-necessarily.  That is, Thirdness does not, in its own nature,
require 1ns or 2ns. . . Here I will have to partially disagree.
Although one can abstract (prescind) 1ns and 2ns from 3ns, it is of
the very nature of the categories that in the phaneron and in reality
that they are all present, that in particular that 3ns involves (cf
'involutional' as Peirce uses it) 2ns and 1ns.  
  1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture III | CP 5.66

        Category the Third is the Idea of that which is such as it is as
being a Third, or Medium, between a Second and its First. That is to
say, it is  Representation as an element of the Phenomenon. You agree
that this is so apparently only for semiosis: ET (continuing from
above): . . .but semiosis certainly, absolutely, does. . .
        I am beginning to see what you've been aiming at as regards habits
in your writing, for example: 

        ET (continuing): . . .a universe made up only of habits is obviously
dead - in the sense that all life has ended, all individuation has
ended, and the universe is one huge crystal [see 6.33]. Peirce
himself saw this only as pure theoretical speculation in the infinite
[i.e., never] future. 

        And I see you as actually resolving the whole question in writing in
the snippet above that for Peirce this virtual cessation of all life,
growth, and evolution is but "speculation in the infinite [i.e.,
never] future" (which is why I just used the term 'virtual' and not
'actual'). 
        ET: . . . [Semiosis] exists as Mind - which functions within all
three primordial modes: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns - and I see all of them as
equal and basic primordial forces. 

        I wouldn't use 'exists' or 'forces' as you have here because I
associate both those terms with 2ns, but I agree that semiosis
involves all three of Peirce's categories and further agree that they
are 'equal', 'basic' and 'priordial'. I don't, however, see them in
reality as ever occurring apart from each other even while one may
(at least seemingly) dominate in any given situation.
        ET: As for 'entelechy' - Peirce may have used the term, but what did
he mean by it?  I personally think that Peirce was clear enough by
what he meant by entelechy in writing:
  1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:304 

        . . . The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe qua
fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the “Truth”
of being. The “Truth,” the fact that is not abstracted but
complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign. I expect that
you'll disagree with much of what I've written above. But I believe
that besides that one clear point of agreement at the top of this
post as well as some apparent partial agreement in a few other
points, that, with further inquiry, we might arrive at others.
 Meanwhile, I very much look forward to your response to this message
should you offer one. But, I think that for now I'll leave the last
word to you. Thank you again for your very thoughtful response to my
last post. 
 Best,
 Gary
 Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718
482-5690
 On Sat, Apr 7, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
  Gary R - see my responses below:
 On Sat 07/04/18  1:06 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com [2]
sent:
 Edwina, Jon, list,
 1] Gary R: Edwina, all the things that you question, disagree, or
reject here will be found in Peirce. He himself, for example, says
that 'the subject matter of normative science consists of the
relations of phenomena to ends'.
 EDWINA: I'm not questioning their being 'found' in Peirce. One can
cherry pick a zillion quotes from Peirce. I'm questioning their
pragmatic use within an analysis.
-----------------------------------------------------

         2] Gary R: Similarly, the 'ideal end of semiosis is the development
of habits that would never be confounded by subsequent experience -
including, but not limited to, true beliefs' is a decidedly Peircean
notion concerning an asymptotic tendency of scientific inquiry
towards the Truth such that Truth == Reality. It is not Hegelian
whatsoever in my view as Reality in Peirce's sense itself involves
all three categories, not just 3ns. 

        EDWINA: Here, I question the view that 'the development of habits
that would never be confounded by subsequent experience - including
but not limited to, true beliefs'.  I'm not questioning this
statement. I'm questioning the view that a 'final state' exists,
where habits are no longer open to the realities of 1ns and 2ns. Let
me explain. I can, for example, analyze the biological and chemical
nature of a lion - such that I can determine the essentially true
nature of it as a biological species.  And - this analysis would not
be 'confounded by subsequent experience' of the lion species. It's a
'scientific truth'. 

        BUT - just because I have analyzed the scientifically valid nature
of this species - does NOT mean that its habits are closed to
adaptation and evolution. They could - and probably will - evolve and
change. So, habit formation and truth are not the same thing.

        --------------------------------------------

         3] Gary R: Similarly Peirce uses the phrase "regulative hope" in
consideration of just those habits of thought and action which,
through hetero- and homo-correction (science as critical commonsense
writ large) tend toward a belief wholly congruent with Reality,
whatever you, I, Jon, or any given community of inquirers might
think. 

        EDWINA: Agree.

         ------------------------

        4] Gary R: It is Peirce who says that the habit-taking tendency is
the primordial law of mind, I believe first in the essay "The Law of
Mind" (1892). Habits, 3ns, in the involutional sense I recently
commented on as it appears in "The Logic of Mathematics," involve the
other two categories quasi-necessarily. 

         EDWINA:  My view is that habit-taking is ONE of the primordial laws
of Mind . Indeed, the formation of habits is vital. Peirce himself
said that without it - mass would at one instant weigh a pound and at
the next instant, weigh a ton' [memory quote]. However, I don't see
that habits 'involve' the other two categories quasi-necessarily. 
That is, Thirdness does not, in its own nature, require 1ns or 2ns,
but semiosis certainly, absolutely, does - for a universe made up
only of habits is obviously dead - in the sense that all life has
ended, all individuation has ended, and the universe is one huge
crystal [see 6.33]. Peirce himself saw this only as pure theoretical
speculation in the infinite [i.e., never] future. 

         So, semiosis is, in my view, above all a dynamic process of
Mind-becoming-Matter. There is no need for the 'sop to Cerberus of
bringing in a human observer. Therefore, it is not a communication
system, not an 'interpretation  system' but an actual pragmatic
system of how matter exists in our universe. It exists as Mind -
which functions within all three primordial modes: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns -
and I see all of them as equal and basic primordial forces.  

        --------------------------------------------------------

        4] Gary R: Finally, it is Peirce who calls the Sign an entelechy. 

        EDWINA; Again, we have to each of us clarify what we mean by 'Sign'.
I mean, by Sign, the full irreducible triad of DO-[IO-R-II]. The
reason I insist on the relation of DO with this triad is because no
Sign can exist in isolation; it is always within some interaction.  

        However, others mean by Sign - what I refer to only as the
Repesentamen, the node of mediation. 

        So- I think one has to be very specific about this meaning. 

        As for 'entelechy' - Peirce may have used the term, but what did he
mean by it? After all, his comparison of it with Thirdness does not
mean that there is an a priori agenda of Mind-forming-Matter. As he
says, Thirdness, as habits, providing predictive constraints, 'is
essentially of a general nature, and cannot ever be completely
fulfilled' 1.26. Again, "this mode of being which consists, mind my
word, if you please, the mode of being which consists in the fact
that future facts of Secondness will take on a determinate general
character, I call a Thirdness" 1.26. 

        Thirdness is general and not specific; it is not 'a priori' and with
a  specific potential/purpose [which is what is suggested in some uses
of the term 'entelechy']  but, as general -its articulation within an
individual form of matter -  is open to local stimuli. That is,  with
the reality of both Secondness, which is the local individual
'articulation' of Mind-as-Matter [and thus, susceptible to local
stimuli] and the reality of Firstness, which is the reality of chance
deviations from the norm - then, this  general character of habits, is
open to adaptation and change. There is no predetermined future
identity of the Universe or of how Mind-as-Matter will function. 

        Edwina


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