Helmut, list

        I think it's very difficult, not at all due to Peirce, but to our
own developed knowledge bases and our own agendas, to find agreement.

        For example, many view 'the Sign' as a conceptual re-presentation of
an object, with the human agent as an interpreter of some object or
word 'out there'. The focus is on 'the ultimate truth' of the image,
in this interpreter's mind, of that 'out there' object/word.

        I, on the other hand, view 'the Sign' not as an intellectual
construct but as a actual morphological unit, as an existential
spatiotemporal unit of matter, formed by Mind, existent within
constant relations with other Signs/morphological units.  So, for me,
this Sign is itself existential as a crystal, a rock, a spider, a
plant, a word..and even, a society. Operating within the three
categorical modes. Constantly interactive via the basic format of the
Sign Process of DO-[IO-R-II]-DI....

        Not many people are interested in such a perspective - and, I
maintain, that it does not deny or contradict any Peircean theory.
Most people are interested in the human conceptual domain - where a
human interprets what someone said or did - and this re-presentation
is deemed 'the Sign'. 

        So- again, our difficulties, I maintain, have nothing to do with
Peirce. His insights permit both views - our difficulties are based
on our own knowledge bases and agendas.

        Edwina
 On Tue 10/04/18 12:04 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, Mike, list, I too don´t see a versus there. Maybe that is
because I see sign, object, interpretant as examples for 1ns, 2ns,
3ns. But I guess that this is a subject both fundamental and
controversial like some others (e.g whether sign is the same as
representamen or not, whether the DO (same problem with the DI and
the FI) is external to the sign, being the subject it is about, or
the subject´s function in the sign, therefore internal, which
controversalities appear as obstacles in every discussion again and
again. I wonder what could we do about this. Best, Helmut     10.
April 2018 um 14:35 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
        Mike, list 

        Nice post - I'll just comment briefly before specifically commenting
on Gary R's post. 

        I'm not in the camp of 'signs and semiosis' vs the three categories.
I don't see how the one can function without the other. I self-define
my perspective as a focus on morphology - on how energy, so to speak,
transforms into matter or how the unformed becomes the formed. This
matter can be within the physical-chemical realm, the biological, the
conceptual, the societal. I'm NOT focused on re-presentation, which
is, in my view, a purely cerebral focus on words; or words to images.
I'm focused on morphology, and view this transformation as taking
place within the semiosic triad and the three categories. 

        So, a plethora of cells is transformed from one morphological
primitive form into a more complex form via the habit formations
[Thirdness]...But Thirdness is complex with three types [3-3, 3-2,
3-1] and this enables information exchange with the environment [via
3-2] rather than simple repetition of type [3-1]. So, Firstness is
involved to enable adaptation, and Secondness is involved to enable
direct contact with the local environmental realities. The result -
is an adapted insect. 

        Edwina
 On Mon 09/04/18 10:34 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:  

        Hi Gary R, List, 

        I thought this exchange was very worthwhile, esp. your current
response. I have read your points multiple times and tried to think
clearly about what you said. I find that I am in 'general agreement'
with all that you have written in this response. As a result, I
changed the subject line from 'Re: Order of Determination' to reflect
my view. We have found at least one overlap in the Venn diagram. 

        What I especially like is your basing your points on the universal
categories. Thirdness is the mode of habit, mediation, generality,
continuity. Genuine Thirdness must, as Peirce says and you quote, be
a medium "between a Second and its First." In the sense I frequently
use it, namely categorization of things for knowledge representation,
this is the same as saying we find general types (Thirdness) of
particulars (Secondness) by looking at their essences and shared
qualities (Firstness). I frankly do not see why we need to use
language such as "quasi-necessarily" as Edwina poses. I can not see
where habit or any of the other senses of Thirdness may occur without
Secondness and Firstness.  

        I also like your pointing to the use of prescission to look at these
questions. One observation I would make is that there is a community
of Peirce researchers who see their investigations primarily through
the lens of signs and semiosis. I believe Edwina would place herself
in this group. That is well and good and in the sense of sign use and
making and representation may indeed be the best perspective. But, for
me, I see the universal categories as the governing primitives. (I
believe Peirce did as well.) For example, in the pure sense of the
phaneron, the reality of Firstness, I presently believe, is outside
of the process of semiosis. Once we try to signify Firstness, a
reification of sorts, we make it actual, which places it as a monadic
idea in Secondness. (Not dissimilar from quantum effects.) We can talk
about it and describe it, but it remains removed from the essence of
Firstness. One can take these viewpoints based on Peirce's own
statements about the categories and prescission. (CP 1.353) I guess
put another way, for me, the universal categories are the
adjudicators in how I try to think about Peirce, not semiosis, which
is a process of representation. However, of course, from the vantage
of representation, semiosis naturally holds sway.  

        Thanks for trying to find common ground. From my perspective, you
did an admirable job. 

        Mike On 4/9/2018 6:10 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:   Edwina, list,  
Thanks for responding to my post, Edwina. I'm sorry that it's taken
me a couple of days to reply, but this weekend happened to be
especially busy.   In the spirit of trying to see if it's possible to
come to agreement on certain recent points of contention, I'd like to
begin my response with a principle upon which we appear to be in
agreement. You quoted me, then commented.    3] Gary R: Similarly
Peirce uses the phrase "regulative hope" in consideration of just
those habits of thought and action which, through hetero- and
homo-correction (science as critical commonsense writ large) tend
toward a belief wholly congruent with Reality, whatever you, I, Jon,
or any given community of inquirers might think.  EDWINA: Agree.    
Mike and John S suggested that it might be a valuable strategy to see
if through dialogue here that there might be some significant ideas or
principles of Peircean semeiotics and philosophy more generally with
which we might come to at least some agreement. While I'm not looking
for anything like "general agreement" on any point, I'd be interested
to see if there's anyone in the forum who disagrees that this (stated
perhaps too tersely above) is what Peirce means by the expression
"regulative hope," that is, in referring it to the sense of how
inquiry taken up in the scientific spirit brings us closer to a grasp
of the Real?   Now, on to the other points.      1] Gary R: Edwina,
all the things that you question, disagree, or reject here will be
found in Peirce. He himself, for example, says that 'the subject
matter of normative science consists of the relations of phenomena to
ends'.               EDWINA: I'm not questioning their being 'found'
in Peirce. One can cherry pick a zillion quotes from Peirce. I'm
questioning their pragmatic use within an analysis.          I agree
in a general sense. But in this particular matter of the quotation,
'the subject matter of normative science consists of the relations of
phenomena to ends,'  I don't believe that there is any cherry picking
going on whatsoever The subject matter of the other two branches of
cenoscopic philosophy, phenomenology and metaphysics, are different
from that of the normative sciences. One can agree or disagree with
with what Peirce saw as the purpose of each of these three branches,
but at least in a pragmatic analysis of his architectonic philosophy
in consideration of scientific inquiry, it is important, I believe,
to distinguish them. This is principally, I believe,  because he
develops his architectonic philosophy, outlined in his Classification
of Sciences, as an aid to pragmatic inquiry, including what you
referred to above as "their pragmatic use within an analysis."       
2] Gary R: Similarly, the 'ideal end of semiosis is the development of
habits that would never be confounded by subsequent experience -
including, but not limited to, true beliefs' is a decidedly Peircean
notion concerning an asymptotic tendency of scientific inquiry
towards the Truth such that Truth == Reality. It is not Hegelian
whatsoever in my view as Reality in Peirce's sense itself involves
all three categories, not just 3ns.        

        EDWINA: Here, I question the view that 'the development of habits
that would never be confounded by subsequent experience - including
but not limited to, true beliefs'.  I'm not questioning this
statement. I'm questioning the view that a 'final state' exists,
where habits are no longer open to the realities of 1ns and 2ns. Let
me explain. I can, for example, analyze the biological and chemical
nature of a lion - such that I can determine the essentially true
nature of it as a biological species.  And - this analysis would not
be 'confounded by subsequent experience' of the lion species. It's a
'scientific truth'.           

        I agree that a final state does not, cannot exist in Peirce science
exactly because it involves an evolutionary philosophy. That's why I
suggested that the expression 'final state' refers to a regulative
principle, and so I earlier used the term 'asymptotic' to suggest
that while one can, perhaps, get closer and closer to the complete
facts, principles, laws regarding the truth of any reality into which
one might inquire, one can never  definitively or fully arrive there
(this is not to suggest that we can't grasp many specific 'truths',
such as the real characteristics of an plant or animal species--see
below). Peirce's term 'final' is misleading if one doesn't keep this
in mind. So, in my view Peirce's notion is not Hegelian in the sense
the 3ns is the be all and end all. For as long is there is
evolutionary growth of any sort in the cosmos,  all three categories
will be in effect.       

        In the case of the true (real) nature of the lion as a species, I
fully agree that what we now know represents scientific truth even
should that species evolve. Peirce suggests that there are no doubt
many of these "scientific truths," but that we can't be certain that
any one in particular will 'hold' in the future. But there's no
reason to doubt what we've no reason to doubt as to what science has
already discovered.          

        ET: BUT - just because I have analyzed the scientifically valid
nature of this species - does NOT mean that its habits are closed to
adaptation and evolution. They could - and probably will - evolve and
change. So, habit formation and truth are not the same thing.         


        I agree that "habit formation and truth are not the same thing."
What I suggested was that our human striving to understand the nature
of reality together in a scientific way is the optimal way to arrive
at whatever truths we may ever hope to achieve in whatever areas of
inquiry we may take up. We could, of course, be wrong at any point in
our inquiry, while the history of science will show that this has been
the case any number of times. But, again, we clearly make scientific
discoveries or we wouldn't see, for example, the development of the
technologies we've witnessed even in our own lives--but our
understandings remain fallible especially as we continue our
inquiries.           

        4] Gary R: It is Peirce who says that the habit-taking tendency is
the primordial law of mind, I believe first in the essay "The Law of
Mind" (1892). Habits, 3ns, in the involutional sense I recently
commented on as it appears in "The Logic of Mathematics," involve the
other two categories quasi-necessarily.          

        EDWINA:  My view is that habit-taking is ONE of the primordial laws
of Mind . Indeed, the formation of habits is vital. . . However, I
don't see that habits 'involve' the other two categories
quasi-necessarily.  That is, Thirdness does not, in its own nature,
require 1ns or 2ns. . .          Here I will have to partially
disagree. Although one can abstract (prescind) 1ns and 2ns from 3ns,
it is of the very nature of the categories that in the phaneron and
in reality that they are all present, that in particular that 3ns
involves (cf 'involutional' as Peirce uses it) 2ns and 1ns.      1903
| Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture III | CP 5.66 

        Category the Third is the Idea of that which is such as it is as
being a Third, or Medium, between a Second and its First. That is to
say, it is Representation  as an element of the Phenomenon.  You
agree that this is so apparently only for semiosis: ET (continuing
from above): . . .but semiosis certainly, absolutely, does. . .  

        I am beginning to see what you've been aiming at as regards habits
in your writing, for example:          

        ET (continuing): . . .a universe made up only of habits is obviously
dead - in the sense that all life has ended, all individuation has
ended, and the universe is one huge crystal [see 6.33]. Peirce
himself saw this only as pure theoretical speculation in the infinite
[i.e., never] future.          

        And I see you as actually resolving the whole question in writing in
the snippet above that for Peirce this virtual cessation of all life,
growth, and evolution is but "speculation in the infinite [i.e.,
never] future" (which is why I just used the term 'virtual' and not
'actual').          

        ET: . . . [Semiosis] exists as Mind - which functions within all
three primordial modes: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns - and I see all of them as
equal and basic primordial forces.          

        I wouldn't use 'exists' or 'forces' as you have here because I
associate both those terms with 2ns, but I agree that semiosis
involves all three of Peirce's categories and further agree that they
are 'equal', 'basic' and 'priordial'. I don't, however, see them in
reality as ever occurring apart from each other even while one may
(at least seemingly) dominate in any given situation.          

        ET: As for 'entelechy' - Peirce may have used the term, but what did
he mean by it?           I personally think that Peirce was clear
enough by what he meant by entelechy in writing:             1904
[c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) |  EP 2:304           

        . . . The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe qua
fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the “Truth”
of being. The “Truth,” the fact that is not abstracted but
complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign.       I expect
that you'll disagree with much of what I've written above. But I
believe that besides that one clear point of agreement at the top of
this post as well as some apparent partial agreement in a few other
points, that, with further inquiry, we might arrive at others.  
Meanwhile, I very much look forward to your response to this message
should you offer one. But, I think that for now I'll leave the last
word to you. Thank you again for your very thoughtful response to my
last post.   Best,   Gary                   Gary Richmond Philosophy
and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the
City University of New York 718 482-5690           On Sat, Apr 7,
2018 at 5:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote: Gary R - see my responses
below:
 On Sat 07/04/18 1:06 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:   Edwina, Jon, list,   1] Gary R: Edwina, all the things that
you question, disagree, or reject here will be found in Peirce. He
himself, for example, says that 'the subject matter of normative
science consists of the relations of phenomena to ends'.   EDWINA:
I'm not questioning their being 'found' in Peirce. One can cherry
pick a zillion quotes from Peirce. I'm questioning their pragmatic
use within an analysis. 
-----------------------------------------------------  

        2] Gary R: Similarly, the 'ideal end of semiosis is the development
of habits that would never be confounded by subsequent experience -
including, but not limited to, true beliefs' is a decidedly Peircean
notion concerning an asymptotic tendency of scientific inquiry
towards the Truth such that Truth == Reality. It is not Hegelian
whatsoever in my view as Reality in Peirce's sense itself involves
all three categories, not just 3ns.  

        EDWINA: Here, I question the view that 'the development of habits
that would never be confounded by subsequent experience - including
but not limited to, true beliefs'.  I'm not questioning this
statement. I'm questioning the view that a 'final state' exists,
where habits are no longer open to the realities of 1ns and 2ns. Let
me explain. I can, for example, analyze the biological and chemical
nature of a lion - such that I can determine the essentially true
nature of it as a biological species.  And - this analysis would not
be 'confounded by subsequent experience' of the lion species. It's a
'scientific truth'.  

        BUT - just because I have analyzed the scientifically valid nature
of this species - does NOT mean that its habits are closed to
adaptation and evolution. They could - and probably will - evolve and
change. So, habit formation and truth are not the same thing. 

        -------------------------------------------- 

        3] Gary R: Similarly Peirce uses the phrase "regulative hope" in
consideration of just those habits of thought and action which,
through hetero- and homo-correction (science as critical commonsense
writ large) tend toward a belief wholly congruent with Reality,
whatever you, I, Jon, or any given community of inquirers might
think.  

        EDWINA: Agree. 

        ------------------------ 

        4] Gary R: It is Peirce who says that the habit-taking tendency is
the primordial law of mind, I believe first in the essay "The Law of
Mind" (1892). Habits, 3ns, in the involutional sense I recently
commented on as it appears in "The Logic of Mathematics," involve the
other two categories quasi-necessarily.  

        EDWINA:  My view is that habit-taking is ONE of the primordial laws
of Mind . Indeed, the formation of habits is vital. Peirce himself
said that without it - mass would at one instant weigh a pound and at
the next instant, weigh a ton' [memory quote]. However, I don't see
that habits 'involve' the other two categories quasi-necessarily. 
That is, Thirdness does not, in its own nature, require 1ns or 2ns,
but semiosis certainly, absolutely, does - for a universe made up
only of habits is obviously dead - in the sense that all life has
ended, all individuation has ended, and the universe is one huge
crystal [see 6.33]. Peirce himself saw this only as pure theoretical
speculation in the infinite [i.e., never] future.  

         So, semiosis is, in my view, above all a dynamic process of
Mind-becoming-Matter. There is no need for the 'sop to Cerberus of
bringing in a human observer. Therefore, it is not a communication
system, not an 'interpretation  system' but an actual pragmatic
system of how matter exists in our universe. It exists as Mind -
which functions within all three primordial modes: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns -
and I see all of them as equal and basic primordial forces.   

        -------------------------------------------------------- 

        4] Gary R: Finally, it is Peirce who calls the Sign an entelechy.  

        EDWINA; Again, we have to each of us clarify what we mean by 'Sign'.
I mean, by Sign, the full irreducible triad of DO-[IO-R-II]. The
reason I insist on the relation of DO with this triad is because no
Sign can exist in isolation; it is always within some interaction.  

        However, others mean by Sign - what I refer to only as the
Repesentamen, the node of mediation.  

        So- I think one has to be very specific about this meaning.  

        As for 'entelechy' - Peirce may have used the term, but what did he
mean by it? After all, his comparison of it with Thirdness does not
mean that there is an a priori agenda of Mind-forming-Matter. As he
says, Thirdness, as habits, providing predictive constraints, 'is
essentially of a general nature, and cannot ever be completely
fulfilled' 1.26. Again, "this mode of being which consists, mind my
word, if you please, the mode of being which consists in the fact
that future facts of Secondness will take on a determinate general
character, I call a Thirdness" 1.26.  

        Thirdness is general and not specific; it is not 'a priori' and with
a  specific potential/purpose [which is what is suggested in some uses
of the term 'entelechy']  but, as general -its articulation within an
individual form of matter -  is open to local stimuli. That is,  with
the reality of both Secondness, which is the local individual
'articulation' of Mind-as-Matter [and thus, susceptible to local
stimuli] and the reality of Firstness, which is the reality of chance
deviations from the norm - then, this  general character of habits, is
open to adaptation and change. There is no predetermined future
identity of the Universe or of how Mind-as-Matter will function.  

        Edwina 
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