"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
Helmut, list:
I don't think that 'theism' means 'reality as functionality'. Theism to my understanding means a belief in a god/gods, understood as a Supreme Reality or Being. That is, the notion of hierarchy is introduced; this hierarchy is understood to mean that this god/gods is in itself a conscious agent, eternal, i.e., existing before and outside of matter, and, also understood, as hierarchical, as the first and final cause of all such material existences.
This supreme cause may or may not be 'revealed' to minor human consciousness. [notion of revelation]
This also assumes that there is some kind of distinction between the Creator of material objects - and the objects. [not pantheism]
I think that Peirce's notion of god-as-mind, is completely different from this basic definition of God and Theism. His Mind has no hierarchical nature, it most certainly has no reality much less existence before and outside of matter; and is neither the first nor final cause of material existences. And, of course, Mind is not equivalent to consciousness.
That's how I see the difference between theism and Peirce's Mind.
Edwina
On Sun 13/05/18 12:14 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Supplement: If what i wrote below is correct, then there is a problem with the term "theist", because in terms of reality as functionality hardly anybody would be able to call her/himself an atheist: God as a self-stabilizing (self-upstepping, homeostatic) concept is not easy to refute, is it?----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .Thank you, Gary f., for correcting my use of the term "proof". I now recall, that K.O. Apel didn´t say "final proof", but "ultimate foundation" ("Letztbegründung") "of discourse ethics". He also wrote of "self-upstepping of reality" ("Selbstaufstufung der Realität") in this context. I think, this means a circular (retroductive) argument.I see that "proof of existence" needs direct experience. But I think, that this direct experience may also be in a premiss of a deductive argument- or even in a pre-premiss which has formed the premiss by a deductive argument, or a pre-pre-premiss...So the direct experience needed for calling something existent is a spatiotemporal one, I think.Now my guess about what is needed to call something "real" or "being" or "ens" or "ontological" is a direct experience too: The direct experience of fixation of belief by a retroduction ("self-upstepping of reality", maybe badly translated). Of course spatiotemporal direct experience does the job too, as existence is a subset of reality.Well, I am just trying to get the concepts in order. Existence is spatial, I think, and reality is functional.Best, Helmut13. Mai 2018 um 17:07 Uhr
g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .Helmut, since you ask,
The only “proof of existence” is direct experience; no kind of reasoning is up to the task of verifying the genuine Secondness of anything that exists — as opposed to an ens rationis, which may or may not be real, but its reality is not that of an existing thing.
Usually in logic, if not in religion, “proof” refers to a deductive argument, and that is the milieu in which a circular argument is invalid. Peirce’s “Neglected Argument” is much more retroductive than deductive.
I think Peirce preferred not to use terms like “theism” or “theist” (or “deist”) because those are technical terms in theology. One thing Peirce apparently shared with William Fox is that they both became impatient with theology and simply avoided it as they grew older. “God” on the other hand is a vernacular term, and a supremely vague one (as Peirce pointed out more than once), so using “belief in God” rather than “theism” is a way of placing the matter in the realm of instinctive common sense, where he thought the concept of God belonged. If we regard his NA as deductive, we have to say that its premisses are that belief in a Creator is instinctive, and that such instinctive beliefs are more reliable than beliefs based on reasoning. Both of those premisses are questionable, in my opinion, but if we grant them, then the deductive argument has some validity. But the deductive argument is not the one that matters to Peirce anyway, as far as I can see.
Gary f.
} You can't depend on your judgment when your imagination is out of focus. [Mark Twain] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
From: Helmut Raulien
Sent: 13-May-18 04:22
Gary, Gary, list,
I understand that when it is about reality (of God), Peirce was a theist, and when it is about existence, not. Now i have a more general question about real versus existent:
Is it so, that for the proof of reality a circular argument is valid, but for the proof of existence it is not?
Examples for circular arguments that prove (or even create) a reality: K.O. Apel´s final proof of discourse ethics, Anselm´s God-proof.
Best, Helmut
Sonntag, 13. Mai 2018 um 06:35 Uhr
"Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:Gary F, list,
GF: After Gary’s post I did a quick search to see what Peirce might have to say about “theism” (the word). To the Century Dictionary he didn’t contribute a definition of it, but he did define an “atheist” as “One who denies the existence of God, or of a supreme intelligent being” (CD 1.362). Since Peirce consistently denied the existence (as opposed to the reality) of God, that would seem to make him an “atheist,” but I’m sure he never self-applied that term.
On this list and elsewhere we've discussed how difficult it is (or how lax one can become) sometimes in discussing Reality without using words like 'is', 'existence', and so forth. Peirce sometimes expresses himself about matters pertaining to reality in such truly inappropriate existential language. So, you knowing this, I will assume that you are merely playing with words in what you wrote above. For if in Peircean terms one more properly defines an "atheist" as "One who denies the reality of God" Peirce was most certainly not an atheist.
GF: I doubt that he self-applied the term “theist” either, though. Nor did I find him applying it to anyone else.
That he did or did not self- or other-apply the word "theist" seems of little importance in my view. For, as Jon S. wrote today: "If Peirce was not a theist, then what other term should we use instead for someone who very explicitly, on more than one occasion, in no uncertain terms, affirmed his belief in the Reality of God? So, a theist, properly understood in Peircean terms, is simply one who believes in the Reality of God. In this sense Peirce was most certainly a theist.
GF: So as Gary said, the “Peirce on God” page on my website probably tells us more about Peirce’s “theology” (he would not call it that!) than any other source I know of. The first sentence of the NA pretty well sums it up:
“The word “God,” … is the definable proper name, signifying Ens necessarium; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience.” (I wish I knew more about Ens necessarium … )
I too wish I knew more about Ens Necessarium. In his 1937 book, Ends & Means, Aldous Huxley offers a hint in remarking that a traditional theistic argument was "that if there is an ens necessarium it must be at the same time an ens realissimum."
That certainly makes good sense for Peirce's theism!
Best,
Gary R
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