A dream is a sign. A sign is anything that can be perceived. At this point,
you perceive your dream and someone else or others know you had a dream.
Reality has nothing to do with truth or falsehood. Nothing is unreal
including dreams, lies, and raindrops and whatever becomes of them. This
mode of seeing things seems to me to be semiotic and ordinary as I think
Peirce is.


On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 11:07 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> wrote:

> Edwina, Stephen R., List:
> Robert Lane's new book, *Peirce on Realism and Idealism*, helpfully
> clarifies Peirce's verbal and pragmaticistic definitions of "real," and how
> he carefully distinguished that term from "external."  On Peirce's account,
> the "real" is "that which is independent of what anyone thinks *about it*,"
> while the "external" is "that which is independent of what anyone thinks 
> *about
> anything at all*" (Lane, p. 3).  The upshot is that there are *internal
> realities*, such as the fact that I had a particular dream last night;
> but this by no means entails that *what I dreamed* was real.  On the
> contrary, since the contents of my dream are directly dependent on my
> (unconscious) thoughts *about them*, what I dreamed is most definitely *not
> *real (cf. CP 6.453).
> Likewise, according to Peirce a belief is not a reality merely by virtue
> of someone holding it; on the contrary, in order to be real, the *Dynamic
> Object *of the belief must be such as it is independently of anyone *holding
> *that belief.  Hence when Peirce described God as "*Ens necessarium*; in
> my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452),
> he was not merely asserting his (subjective) belief in God; he was
> explicitly claiming that the referent of the vernacular word "God" is
> (objectively) Real--"having Properties, i.e. characters sufficing to
> identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise
> attributed to it by any single man or group of men, or not" (CP 6.453).
> Based on this and other writings, those attributes include necessary Being,
> creative power/activity, omniscience, omnipotence, benignity, transcendence
> (vs. immanence), infinity, supremacy, and infallibility.
> Since you mentioned CP 6.502, I think that it is worth quoting at greater
> length.
> CSP:  If a pragmaticist is asked what he means by the word "God," he can
> only say that just as long acquaintance with a man of great character may
> deeply influence one's whole manner of conduct, so that a glance at his
> portrait may make a difference, just as almost living with Dr. Johnson
> enabled poor Boswell to write an immortal book and a really sublime book,
> just as long study of the works of Aristotle may make him an acquaintance,
> so if contemplation and study of the physico-psychical universe can imbue a
> man with principles of conduct analogous to the influence of a great man's
> works or conversation, then that analogue of a mind--for it is impossible
> to say that *any *human attribute is *literally *applicable--is what he
> means by "God" ... the discoveries of science, their enabling us to *predict
> *what will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, though we
> cannot think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His Thought,
> as it were.
> Peirce is clearly saying here that by carefully reading the "book of
> nature," we become acquainted with its Author, which is what we mean by
> "God"--not "the physico-psychical universe" itself, but the One who created
> it and is still creating it.
> Regards,
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 7:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>> Stephen, list:
>> This refers to the 'reality' of belief - as outlined by Peirce in his
>> Fixation of Belief.
>> In my view, a belief is - as you say, supposition. It does not function
>> in the realm of facts. However, since, as Peirce also pointed out, our
>> universe operates within the mode of Reason [Thirdness], then - can we
>> presume that all of our beliefs are not merely logical but also - real?
>> That is - because we rationally THINK of something, does this make that
>> belief a reality? The same kind of reality as, for instance, the reality of
>> generals - which are the commonality of the instantiation?
>> I don't think that we can conclude that IF we think of something, THEN,
>> this means that 'something' is real. That would commit the error of
>> 'affirming the consequent'. We can't declare that something is real.
>> BECAUSE we think of it. Therefore - my view is that views of 'the divine'
>> or any name you want to call it - can only be beliefs. And this is what I
>> see as a key problem: definitions. Until we define what we mean by our
>> terms, such as 'God' , 'theism', ...then, our arguments for or against them
>> are empty and subjective.
>> Peirce himself called this 'force' by many names, eg, Nature, as 'in 'Can
>> there be the slightest hesitation in saying, then, that the human intellect
>> is implanted in man, either by a creator or by a quasi-intentional effect
>> of the struggle for existence?...and "among the inscrutable purposes of God
>> or the virtual purposes of nature" [8.211] ..."Man seems to himself to have
>> some glimmer of co-understanding with God, or with Nature" [8.212]. And see
>> 6.502, where Peirce writes that 'the analogue of a mind...is what he means
>> by "God".
>> In the scientific realm, which is built around the acceptance of the use
>> of reason, when we come up with a hypothesis - this must then be tested
>> within the existential world. As Peirce said, "deduction is certain but
>> relates only to ideal objects" [8.209] So, "induction gives us the only
>> approach to certainty concerning the real that we can have
>> [ibid].... Therefore, my point is that claims based around only deduction
>> remain beliefs - held by tenacity or authority - but still, only beliefs.
>> But are our beliefs only valid - and I mean valid as differentiated from
>> 'real' - if they can be empirically proven? I think that as a species,
>> almost unique in our requirement for social networking and our use of
>> symbolic language - then, beliefs are necessary for social stability and
>> even, our individual psychological health. Again, this does not make our
>> beliefs 'real'; it makes them socially valid - and, as such, open to change
>> when the societal need for them changes.
>> Edwina
>> On Thu 17/05/18 5:17 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com sent:
>> In Triadic Philosophy if something is a matter of supposition like theism
>> the definition will not be anything more than supposition. Wittgenstein
>> understood this. This is why TP calls this mystery. It is real but it is
>> also a mystery. We can talk about our experience of what we call the divine
>> or any other name you want to give it. The replies to my post about life
>> beyond this planet are similar to posts about theism. They reference
>> mystery. Since we have no proof we do not know. It is just as
>> significant that something is not present as that it is. The triadic maxim
>> says the substance is practical and ordinary and accessible. That is what I
>> drive at. Everything else to me is binary thinking that often shields
>> another purpose than arriving at truth and beauty which I take to be the
>> aim of al consideration. You can reply to this in the list if you think it
>> is worth noting. Otherwise no problem. Cheers, S
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
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