> On Jun 19, 2018, at 8:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Hmm- I'm inclined to think that 'religions' - by which I am assuming a belief 
> in metaphysical powers, begins first at the individual psychological level, 
> where the individual becomes aware of his own finite nature and lack of power 
> to 'make things happen'. AND - his awareness that, despite his best 
> intentions, 'the best laid plans gang oft awry'.

It seems to me that viewing religion in terms of metaphysical claims ends up 
with a rather meager conception of religion. It’s true that some religions, 
medieval Christianity in particular, tended to emphasize belief. However many 
didn’t and even within pre-modern Christianity belief was only a component of 
the religion. For many religions practices rather than belief - particularly 
metaphysical claims - is the main focus. One can draw out metaphysics, but that 
tends to be rather distortive since it’s arguably not the focus of the 
religion. You then have in some religions, like Buddhism, the idea that 
metaphysics is at best serves an instrumental rather than literal function. 
(Here thinking of the Lotus Sutra and the allegory of the children in the 
burning building) Even within Christianity liberal theology tends to reject 
most of the traditional metaphysical claims as myths at best and elevates 
instead ethical duty or perhaps a more foundational sense of Being. (Here 
thinking of Tillich although heaven knows one can critique his ethical behavior)

All that said I think most evolutionary psychology does emphasize basic 
psychological behaviors such as agency detection along with the incentives of 
false positives versus false negatives as leading to religious comportments. 
(Atran’s In Gods We Trust is particularly good here although many other books 
analyze the subject)

It’s interesting again from a Peircean conception of common sense and its 
conservative nature to analyze these. Even if the beliefs are false (and some 
must be false given the varieties of religious belief) the underlying “common 
sense” makes sense. i.e. it’s better to be wrong about a predator being there 
than a predator not being there. What’s changed - and changed rapidly in the 
modern era - is that the context it which we live is radically different. Put 
an other way, the costs of being wrong about agents is simply quite different. 
(And I say that as a religious believer - but I think the underlying logic is 
quite interesting)

> Third - socialization rests on continuity, normative laws of behaviour and 
> belief, dependent expectations of how to interact with others. So- we develop 
> shared beliefs, a shared metaphysics of 'what happens when we die'; why do 
> bad/good things happen'.


This is true. And of course there are instrumentalist values to these beliefs 
to the community. Although one might also say that purported encounters also 
are reasonably common at the community level even if not the individual level. 
i.e. people who claim encounters with the dead souls. While especially in our 
“disenchanted world” we tend to dismiss such claims, they are quite widespread 
and thus have a social effect.
> I don't think this has anything to do with a 'religious leader' or medicine 
> man...Such a specialization will take place only in larger populations where 
> specialization of tasks does take place. But in small bands [about 30 people] 
> - there will rarely be a spiritual leader, much less a military!! Again - it 
> depends on the size of the population which is itself dependent on the 
> economic mode which is itself dependent on the ecological viability of the 
> land to support large populations. 
> 
This seems right. Again many religious experiences are happening on the 
individual level and are quite common. That’s not to dismiss the role of 
religious leaders - particularly in terms of transmitting religious 
interpretations of common phenomena. It matters whether your expectations of a 
phenomena is of false agency inference or a ghost. That in turn affects how 
stable the interpretations of phenomena are in a given community.

Again from a purely economical and evolutionary perspective though, communities 
that can get people to self-regulate are apt to be more successful at large 
sizes than those who don’t. So if you can convince people that someone is 
watching them and judging their actions, that allows for larger stable 
societies. Therefore there is an evolutionary value in such beliefs to make a 
community more successful than what government regulation and punishment alone 
can accomplish.

What’s interesting is to ask from a Peircean perspective how such things should 
be viewed. The way Peirce normally talks about critical common sensism tends to 
downplay, I think, the distinction between the instrumental value of a belief 
from its actual truth. That’s of course famously the difference Peirce has from 
James and to a degree Dewey. James I’d argue actually ends flattening the 
distinction too often at times as well. So a drug induced religious experience 
isn’t much different from a “real” religious experience, to use one of his 
examples. Yet from a Peircean perspective of course there’s a major difference 
even if Peirce doesn’t always emphasize it.




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