Gary F., List: My interpretation of EP 2:481 seems to be exactly the opposite of yours; I think that Peirce was clearly describing a *logical* order there, not a *serial *order. After all, right before what you quoted, he stated, "It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant." Surely he was not claiming that a Possible can only be *temporally succeeded* by another Possible, and that a Necessitant can only be *temporally preceded* by another Necessitant. On the contrary, that was his summation of the *logical *principle that governs which Sign classes are feasible once two or more trichotomies are arranged in the proper sequence--what Bellucci called R1 and R2. It is why the three trichotomies of 1903 produce only ten Sign classes (rather than 27), the six Correlate trichotomies produce only 28 Sign classes (rather than 729), and all ten trichotomies produce only 66 Sign classes (rather than 59,049).
Moreover, I am now convinced that what Peirce called the Destinate Intepretant corresponds to the Final Interpretant, and the Explicit Interpretant corresponds to the Immediate Interpretant. That is inconsistent with the *temporal *sequence of semiosis, in which the Immediate Interpretant comes first (internal to the Sign itself) and the Final Interpretant comes last (if it ever occurs at all). However, it makes sense from a *logical *standpoint--the nature/purpose of the Interpretant that is "destined" limits what kinds of Interpretants can actually occur, and those circumscribe what kinds of Interpretants can be "explicit" within the Sign. I laid out my complete reasoning about this in the thread on "Order of Determination" a few months ago. With all of that in mind, I accept your correction that "determines" is also a *logical relation*--i.e., a *genuine *triadic relation--when we say that the (Dynamic) Object determines the Sign, which determines the (Final) Interpretant. However, I still hold that when we talk about a *concrete instance* of semiosis, we are describing a *temporal sequence* when we say that the (Dynamic) Object determines the Sign (Replica), which determines the (Dynamic) Interpretant. Lately I have been characterizing this as a *degenerate *triadic relation, which can thus be decomposed into the dyadic DO-SR and SR-DI relations. Every Sign has a Dynamic Object and a Final Interpretant (by definition), as well as an Immediate Object and an Immediate Interpretant (since those are internal to it); but not every Sign *actually *produces a Dynamic Interpretant by means of a Sign-Replica, and in that sense, the Dynamic Interpretant *is *in the future relative to the Sign. I need to get some work done this afternoon and would like to ponder your comments about Rhemes a bit further before responding to them. For the moment, I will just mention that Peirce's comments about non-propositional Signs are actually from CP 4.583, and a careful reading of that entire paragraph is warranted in order to understand the context of what you quoted. Dredging up a previous example of mine, would you claim that the word "vase" by itself does not and cannot exist as a Rheme unless and until it is incorporated into a proposition? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 11:31 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, > > Yes, that’s close to the distinction I had in mind. But … > > Please read this through carefully before you begin composing a response. > (Not that you’re obligated to respond at all, of course.) > > When Peirce says (EP2:481) that “the Dynamoid Object determines the > Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the > Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which > determines the Explicit Interpretant,” it’s hard to see that as anything > other than a serial order, like a sequence of events. Logical > *consequence*, on the other hand, does not refer to a temporal or serial > ordering. It’s like the difference between “thinking” and “thought” in > Peirce’s usage of those terms. Thinking is temporal, thought is relational. > > Let me put it this way: When we consider one of Peirce’s definitions, such > as this one — “A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First which stands in > such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its *Object,* as to > be capable of determining a Third, called its *Interpretant,* to assume > the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the > same Object” — we don’t (or at least don’t *necessarily*) read that as a > sequence of events. The actions denoted by the verbs (“standing,” > “determining,” “assuming”) can all be understood as happening > *simultaneously* if they “happen” at all, because they constitute a > single *genuine triadic relation*. The Interpretant, then, is *not in the > future* relative to the sign, nor is the Object in the past. The terms > “First,” “Second” and “Third” do not refer to a serial order. So here > “determination” appears as a *logical* relation and *not a temporal* one. > > This feels like I’m belaboring the obvious, but let me give an example of > its implications. Consider the definitions Peirce gives in NDTR for his > third trichotomy: “A *Rheme* is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a > Sign of qualitative Possibility”; “A *Dicent Sign* is a Sign, which, for > its Interpretant, is a Sign of actual existence”; “An *Argument* is a > Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of law.” Each of these is > defined by what it is *for its interpretant* — not by its relation to its > object (like the icon/index/symbol trichotomy), but by *what its > interpretant represents it to be a sign of.* > > Take the Rheme, for instance: “Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some > information; but it is not interpreted as doing so.” It follows that a sign > which *is* interpreted as affording information about some subject or > object is not a Rheme in this definitive sense. It might be a Rheme in the > “peculiar” sense that it is the rhematic component of a Dicisign: “A > Dicisign necessarily involves, as a part of it, a Rheme, to describe the > fact which it is interpreted as indicating. But this is a peculiar kind of > Rheme; and while it is essential to the Dicisign, it by no means > constitutes it.” It’s this peculiar kind of Rheme which “perhaps, will > afford some information” — because it is not interpreted separately from > the Dicisign or “informational sign.” A Rheme-in-itself is not interpreted > as affording information; a sign which is interpreted (now or in the > future) as doing so is not a Rheme by this definition. > > On the other hand, the “Rheme-in-itself” is a somewhat artificial product > of analysis; Peirce says in 1906 “that no sign of a thing or kind of thing > — the ideas of signs to which concepts belong — can arise except in a > proposition; and no logical operation upon a proposition can result in > anything but a proposition; so that non-propositional signs can only exist > as constituents of propositions” (CP 4.581). So a Rheme can only *exist* > as a constituent of a proposition — in which case it can and “perhaps, will > afford some information.” > > I hope all this makes sense to you, but it may be something you are > already fully aware of … in which case it conveys no information! > > Gary f. >
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