Dear list,
I’m convinced our construction and communication of Peirce’s system is a unicorn; or even more appropriately- a phoenix. For I distinctly recall this conversation to have happened before.. then it died.. And now, it bursts forth to reliably disappear again.. It is predictable that we will itch, and we will scratch it again- perhaps fated forever to never leave a mark. What a peaceful existence.. Best, Jerry R On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 2:22 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > ok, but "unlimited and final study would" not show what a phoenix or a > unicorn would be, because if it does not exist, why "would" it anything? > This study would only show the concept´s extension. And: "What unlimited > and final study would show it to be" is *now*: A concept. So I am not > merely reconstructing, but think that my view might also pass for some sort > of hermeneutics with, admittedly, slight deviations, which I hope may be > seen as within the interpretational range. > Best, > Helmut > > 06. August 2018 um 21:10 Uhr > > "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> > wrote: > Helmut, List: > > Peirce's example was a phoenix, rather than a unicorn. > > > CSP: A Replica of the word "camel" is likewise a Rhematic Indexical > Sinsign, being really affected, through the knowledge of camels, common to > the speaker and auditor, by the real camel it denotes, even if this one is > not individually known to the auditor; and it is through such real > connection that the word "camel" calls up the idea of a camel. The same > thing is true of the word "phoenix." For although no phoenix really exists, > real descriptions of the phoenix are well known to the speaker and his > auditor; and thus the word is really affected by the Object denoted. (CP > 2.261, EP 2:295; 1903) > > > CSP: For, after all, collateral observation, aided by imagination and > thought, will usually result in some idea, though this need not be > particularly determinate; but may be indefinite in some regards and general > in others. Such an apprehension, approaching, however distantly, that of > the Object strictly so called, ought to be, and usually is, termed the > "immediate object" of the sign in the intention of its utterer. It may be > that there is no such thing or fact in existence, or in any other mode of > reality; but we surely shall not deny to the common picture of a phoenix or > to a figure of naked truth in her well the name of a "sign," simply because > the bird is a fiction and Truth an *ens rationis*. > If there be anything *real *(that is, anything whose characters are true > of it independently of whether you or I, or any man, or any number of men > think them as being characters of it, or not) that sufficiently corresponds > with the immediate object (which, since it is an apprehension, is not > real), then whether this be identifiable with the Object strictly so called > or not, it ought to be called, and usually is called, the "real object" of > the sign. (EP 2:409; 1907) > > > CSP: We must distinguish between the Immediate Object,--i.e., the Object > as represented in the Sign,--and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object > is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term; therefore:), say > rather the Dynamical Object ... (EP 2:498; 1909) > > > A word like "unicorn" or "phoenix" has an Immediate Object (the idea that > it calls up) and a Dynamic Object (what unlimited and final study would > show it to be), even though it has no Real Object. > > > HR: I think, consistency beats hermeneutics. > > > This is true when creating one's own system with consistency as a > desideratum. It is a false dichotomy when attempting to reconstruct > someone else's system--in this case, Peirce's--since the principle of > charity in hermeneutics is to *presuppose *consistency unless and until > it proves to be untenable to do so. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > > On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 1:24 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Jon, List, >> I just want to tell how I came to my view: To understand a theory or a >> mathematical equation, it is good to look at the extreme conditions. An >> extreme condition for a DO would be, that it does not exist, like a >> unicorn. In the unicorn case, people (somebody in this list many years ago) >> said, that in this case the DO would be its concept. But a binary switch >> (this case so, other case other) is not consistent. So it must be the >> concept in any case, is what I concluded. >> And: Peirce was not the burning bush. I think, consistency beats >> hermeneutics. >> Best, >> Helmut >> 06. August 2018 um 19:58 Uhr >> "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> Helmut, List: >> >> With all due respect, that does not solve any problems, it just changes >> the terminology in a way that deviates from Peirce's own consistent usage. >> The DO *is* "the thing itself," while the IO is closer to "the thing's >> concept." >> >> >> CSP: ... the *immediate* object, if it be the idea which the sign is >> built upon, the *real* object, if it be that real thing or circumstance >> upon which that idea is founded, as on bedrock. (EP 2:407; 1907). >> >> >> CSP: As to the Object, that may mean the Object as cognized in the Sign >> and therefore an Idea, or it may be the Object as it is regardless of any >> particular aspect of it, the Object in such relations as unlimited and >> final study would show it to be. The former I call the *Immediate* >> Object, the latter the *Dynamical* Object. (EP 2:495; 1909) >> >> >> A Sign does not *consist* (functionally or otherwise) of Sign, Object, >> and Interpretant; rather, it is one of the three Correlates in a genuine >> triadic Relation. According to Peirce, Sign and Representamen *are >> *synonyms, >> unless we maintain the distinction--which he abandoned in 1905--that "A *Sign >> *is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant" (CP 2.274, EP 2:273; >> 1903). >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 12:22 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> >> wrote: >>> >>> Jon, Edwina, List, >>> Jon, you wrote: >>> >>> "What I find problematic is any claim that the Dynamic Object is a *part >>> *or *component *of the Sign, since Peirce clearly stated (in what I >>> quoted below and elsewhere) that it is *external *to and *independent *of >>> the Sign.". >>> >>> To solve this problem, I propose: There is more than one kind of >>> composition. Regarding *functional* composition, the dynamic object is >>> a functional part of the sign, but regarding *spatiotemporal* >>> composition, it is not. The DO is not the thing itself, entity, subject, >>> thing, german "Gegenstand", but its function for signs in the world >>> independently of the actual sign, the thing´s concept (german: "Begriff"). >>> Concept (DO, (2.2.)) consists again of two parts: Intension (2.2.1.), and >>> extension (2.2.2.). >>> >>> The IO (2.1.) is the part of the intension that is brought along with >>> the sign. When the sign is over, and its interpretant is the new sign, the >>> old IO (2.1.old) is absorbed by the new concept intension (2.2.1.new). >>> >>> *Functional* composition has other rules than *spatiotemporal* >>> composition, e.g. can something (functionally) consist of itself plus other >>> parts, like a sign consists of sign, object, interpretant (which in >>> spatiotemporal composition is not possible). Sign and representamen may be >>> synonyms this way. You see, seeing it like that can solve many problems. >>> >>> Best, >>> Helmut >>> >> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/ > peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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