Edwina, List,
As an example of growth in complexity in networked connections. I have been pondering the question whether the legisign of the spoken and written forms are of one or of two types. We can observe that the tokens of the spoken forms differ from the written ones. So they do depend on different tokens. My hunch is that from the point of view of the symbolic relation of the sign with its object it is the same lagisign but from the point of view of the apprehension of the sign they differ. Thus we have two varieties of legisign. The first stemming from a token (pattern recognition?) the second stemming from habits of interpretation, symbols (imputed). Auke van Breemen Van: Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> Verzonden: donderdag 9 augustus 2018 3:40 Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing Gary R, JAS, list 1] I question the claim that "The Type is not dependent on its Tokens--past, present, or future--any more than the hardness of a diamond is dependent on its ever actually being scratched. Such is the nature of a Real "would-be." My view is that the Type - which I understand as a general, as laws, is most certainly dependent on being articulated as a Token, for generals do not exist except as articulated within/as the particular. And it is the experiences of the particular instantiation that can affect the Types and enable adaptation and evolution of the general/laws.since, as we know, growth and increasing complexity is 'the rule' [can't remember section..] "I do not mean any existing individual object, but a type, a general, which does not exist but governs existents, to which individuals conform" 8.313. That is - I think the relation between the law/general and the instantiation is intimate and interactive [there's that terrible word again!]. 2] Symbols grow' - which to me, means that they become more complex in their laws and their networked connections with other Signs. But I will also suggest that symbols must have the capacity to implode as well! Edwina On Wed 08/08/18 9:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> sent: Gary R., List: GR: ... imagining that the word 'the' was once first spoken (or written, but more likely I think, spoken), what was the type that that first spoken "the" was token of, where does one locate its reality? Where does one "locate" the Reality of any general Type? Every Instance of the word "the"--first, last, and each one in between--is a Replica of the same Sign. The Type is not dependent on its Tokens--past, present, or future--any more than the hardness of a diamond is dependent on its ever actually being scratched. Such is the nature of a Real "would-be." GR: Yes, symbols grow, but what is the soil upon which they are rooted? What does it mean in this context to say that "symbols grow"? In order for them to get "larger," we must have a way to "measure" their size. Conveniently, Peirce provided one with the concept of Information as "area"--the product of a Sign's Logical Breadth and Depth. I am reminded again of Eco's comment that I quoted last week--" from interpretant to interpretant, the sign is more and more determined both in its breadth and in its depth." In other words, although every Sign (as a general) is indeterminate to some degree, it can "grow"--i.e., approach (however distantly) the ideal state of Substantial Information--by becoming more determinate. CSP: If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was in the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing ... Not determinately nothing ... Utter indetermination. But a symbol alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute beginning, is a symbol. That is the way in which the beginning of things can alone be understood. What logically follows? ... A symbol is essentially a purpose, that is to say, is a representation that seeks to make itself definite, or seeks to produce an interpretant more definite than itself ... ... the interpretant aims at the object more than at the original replica and may be truer and fuller than the latter. The very entelechy of being lies in being representable ... A symbol is an embryonic reality endowed with power of growth into the very truth, the very entelechy of reality. (EP 2:322-324; 1904) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com <javascript:top.opencompose('gary.richm...@gmail.com','','','')> > wrote: Jon AS, Gary f, Jon wrote: JAS: I am currently adopting the specific point of view that all Signs are Types and seeing how far I can get with that interpretative hypothesis. I am tending to find myself more and more disposed toward your line of thinking, Jon, especially as articulated in your last several posts. However, some questions remain for me. For example, imagining that the word 'the' was once first spoken (or written, but more likely I think, spoken), what was the type that that first spoken "the" was token of, where does one locate its reality? Despite this and a few other reservations which I'll comment on below, I found your argument refuting Gary f's examples of what he saw as signs which were not types rather convincing. As you summarized your position near the end of your post: JS: No one ever actually speaks, writes, hears, reads, or thinks a word (the Sign itself); we only actually speak, write, hear, read, and think Instances thereof. . . . when we do [such things], we usually say that we speak, write, hear, read, or think the word/Sign (not the Instance). This is the problematic inconsistency, in my view--not so much a criticism of Peirce as of our everyday colloquial usage of such terminology. I am basically advocating greater precision in logical/semeiotic inquiry by carefully distinguishing (individual) Instances of Signs from (general) Signs themselves (emphasis added). This may be leaping a bit ahead, but the thought occurred to me that if all Signs are legislative types which are expressed (i.e., find their being) as existential tokens (with attached qualitative tones), and if "The entire universe is perfused, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" ( "The Basis of Pragmaticism," footnote, CP 5.448, 1906), then the deepest and, as it were, most necessary Reality being, shall we say, universal legislative types (3ns), this Reality would seem to find its being in that Mind which underlies existential reality, manifests. As I noted, however, some questions remain for me regarding this view, perhaps the most important relating to the nature and purpose of semiotic evolution. Yes, symbols grow, but what is the soil upon which they are rooted? Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, particularly from likenesses or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of likenesses and symbols. . . . So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de symbolo (What Is a Sign?, 1894) This quotation now strikes me as perhaps more akin to Hegelian dialectical "evolution", than to Peirce's involution where indices and indexes are always-already involved in symbols. But on the other hand, Peirce wrote that, for example, biological evolution begins with "sporting" with 1ns (see, "A Guess at the Riddle." Admittedly both this and "What Is a Sign?" were written earlier than the late semeiotic material we've been reflecting on. Anyhow, this is just to point to the kinds of questions that have been coming to mind in light of your "interpretive hypothesis" that all signs are types. Enough for now. Suffice it to say that I am finding this a most interesting and valuable inquiry. Best, Gary R PS You were correct about the two proof-reading errors you found in my post of yesterday. I hurriedly threw it together just before a medical appointment with scarcely time to read it over once. Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690
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