Edwina, List: Perhaps you missed my post last night quoting Peirce's own unambiguous opinion about the merits of exact terminology in all scientific (including semiotic) inquiry.
CSP: As to the ideal to be aimed at, it is, in the first place, desirable for any branch of science that it should have a vocabulary furnishing a family of cognate words for each *scientific *conception, and that each word should have a single exact meaning, unless its different meanings apply to objects of different categories that can never be mistaken for one another. To be sure, this requisite might be understood in a sense which would make it utterly impossible. For every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense that is no mere figure of speech. The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off old ones. But the effort of all should be to keep the essence of every scientific term unchanged and exact; although absolute exactitude is not so much as conceivable. (CP 2.222, EP 2:264; 1903) This is obviously not a case of someone *unfamiliar *with Peirce's thought using natural language on the List and being criticized for it; I am confident that all of us would be much more charitable than that. However, I think that it is quite reasonable to expect those who are *very familiar* with Peirce's thought to adjust their use of language in List discussions accordingly, for the sake of clarity and consistency. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 8:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Gary R, list > > To reject the use of natural language in the study and use of Peirce > confines this study and use to essentially an isolate cult of specialists. > No-one else can explore Peirce because they will be jumped on for 'misuse > of terms'. And so- we see how Peircean analysis becomes confined and owned > by almost an elite set of people who reject open exploration of Peircean > semiosic research unless and until the discussants 'use the correct words'. > It becomes almost an insider's cult, where one focuses on which term to > use, the year it was introduced, the exact references and so on. That's not > what I like to see. And I don't think you want to see that either. > > There ARE indeed specific technical terms that one has to learn within > Peircean research - such as the categories [Firstness, Secondness, > Thirdness and the terms of the parts of the semiosic action [DO, IO, R, II, > DI, FI]…..But to insist that the words we use in basic common natural > language cannot be used - because in Peirce, they have strictly singular > meanings, is, in my view, not merely isolationist but inhibits the study > and use of Peirce. > > After all - to say that the word 'action' cannot be used when one is > exploring the pragmatics of Thirdness is, I think, unreasonable. It denies > the FACT that 'something is going on' - and the basic 'something going on' > IS an action! A particular action within the format of Thirdness. JAS > informed us that 'what is going on in Thirdness' is a 'manifestation'. But, > in natural language, a manifestation is AN ACTION!. And yet, we are told > that we cannot use the term. > > I also reject the isolation of the term 'semiotics' to purely intellectual > discussions of logic and metaphysica - The field of semiosis in my view > INCLUDES all the pragmatic examination of its functionality in economics, > biology, physics, societal. I disagree that if one uses the term > 'semiotics', then, examples and analysis is confined to the purely > intellectual and not its pragmatic functionality. > > My view is that if someone has a particular personal and research focus on > terminology - fine, that's his focus. But to insist that one cannot use > natural language in the study of Peirce and must instead move natural > language out of its meaning and into 'Peircean-only' usage inhibits and > prevents the use of Peirce in the broader study of what is going on in the > world. I repeat - I consider the Peircean semiosic framework a powerful > analytic tool for examining what is going on - in the real world - and I > think that a 'cultlike hold on language' prevents many people from using > that framework. > > Edwina > > On Thu 09/08/18 11:30 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent: > > Mike, Jon, Edwina, List, > > Mike wrote: "Are not 'binding' and 'sense' expressions of action, both > Peirce's words for Thirdness? There are many ways to interpret natural > language, including what is meant by the word 'action'." > > Please offer some context and some textual support for your notion that > 'binding' and 'sense' are employed as expressions of action in any of > Peirce's discussion of 3ns. I think that this is not only highly unlikely, > but actually would contradict most everything he had to say about not only > 3ns but also 2ns. > > Whatever you might mean by "natural language" in the present context, we > are concerned here with technical scientific terminology, specifically > Peirce's in consideration of his three universal categories. > Action-Reaction and Interaction are concepts clearly connected in Peirce's > phenomenology and semeiotic to 2ns, so that it seems peculiarly obdurate to > suggest that they are not, that they may be associated in any integral way > with 3ns. You will certainly have to offer more support for your comment > than your mere assertion that it is so. > > Best, > > Gary > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > 718 482-5690 > >
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