John S., List: Thank you for this helpful explanation of your perspective on all of this. Here is a longer excerpt from the beginning of that 1894 passage.
CSP: The *list of categories* ... is a table of conceptions drawn from the logical analysis of thought and regarded as applicable to being. This description applies not merely to the list published by me in 1867, and which I here endeavor to amplify, but also to the categories of Aristotle and to those of Kant ... I shall not here inquire how far it is justifiable to apply the conceptions of logic to metaphysics. For I hold the importance of that question, great as it is, to be perhaps secondary, and at any rate not paramount to that of the question what such conceptions would be. I may say, however, that in my own opinion, each category has to justify itself by an inductive examination which will result in assigning to it only a limited or approximate validity. (CP 1.300-301; 1894) The fact that Peirce directly characterized the (phenomenological) Categories as products of "the logical analysis of thought" warrants the inference that he intended the latter, the subject matter of the entire passage, to be understood as a definition of what he later called phenomenology (or Phaneroscopy). He also went on to mention "phanerons" and "the phaneron" at several points throughout the text. Presumably the "inductive examination" by which "each category has to justify itself" is the process of such investigation itself, which tests the hypotheses formulated mathematically (in the broad sense) and their necessary consequences as determined by means of a *logica utens*, per Gary R.'s suggestion. While noting that the Categories are "regarded as applicable to being," Peirce still clearly differentiated such inquiry from "apply[ing] the conceptions of logic to metaphysics," for which a *logica docens* is necessary because ... JFS: The question whether those signs refer to anything actual outside the mind requires the normative use of logic to determine truth. This, I suspect, is why Normative Science comes *between *phenomenology and metaphysics in Peirce's architectonic. However ... JFS: The subject matter of phenomenology is the totality of signs that appear to the mind, and CP 1.300 calls the semiotic categories "conceptions drawn from the logical analysis of thought". This does not seem right to me; it presupposes that *anything *that appears to the mind *must *be a Sign. My understanding is rather that Signs belong to the element of mediation (3ns), and there are *other *phenomena of quality (1ns) and/or reaction (2ns) that are *not *Signs--or at least, not *necessarily *Signs--yet are still present to the mind. Again, the Categories are fundamentally *phenomenological*, rather than semiotic; a matter of *appearances*, not representation. JFS: Therefore, the science of phenomenology is applied semiotic (logic in the broad sense). If this was really Peirce's view, why did he never say so explicitly? How could the more fundamental science of phenomenology be an *application *of a Normative Science? JFS: Logic as a normative science has a "partial and narrow" sense. I understand logic in the narrow sense to be Critic, the *middle branch* of the Normative Science of logic as semeiotic; and logic in the broad sense to be the *entire *Normative Science of logic as semeiotic, encompassing *all three branches* of Speculative Grammar, Critic, and Speculative Rhetoric (or Methodeutic). CSP: Logic is the science of the general necessary laws of Signs and especially of Symbols. As such, it has three departments. Obsistent logic, *logic in the narrow sense*, or *Critical Logic*, is the theory of the general conditions of the reference of Symbols and other Signs to their professed Objects, that is, it is the theory of the conditions of truth. Originalian logic, or *Speculative Grammar*, is the doctrine of the general conditions of symbols and other signs having the significant character. It is this department of general logic with which we are, at this moment, occupying ourselves. Transuasional logic, which I term *Speculative Rhetoric*, is substantially what goes by the name of methodology, or better, of *methodeutic*. It is the doctrine of the general conditions of the reference of Symbols and other Signs to the Interpretants which they aim to determine. (CP 2.93; 1902, bold added) Accordingly, I would want to correct your summary below by deleting the second sentence of #3 and #6 in its entirety. My understanding is that the Phaneron is not *limited *to Signs, and every *theory *of logic as semiotic (*logica docens*) falls under Normative Science, not mathematics or phenomenology. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 9:03 AM, John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon AS, Auke, and Jeff BD, > > Both subject lines are closely related. For modes of being, > I'll quote Bertrand Russell, whom I rarely cite: > > Mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know >> what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true. >> > > That is a dramatic way of making a point that Peirce repeated many > times in many ways: Every theorem in pure mathematics is hypothetical. > It has the form "If hypothesis (and/or axioms), then conclusion." > > That means the subject matter of pure mathematics is pure possibility, > and the theorems are necessary statements about those possibilities. > > If a mathematical theorem is applied to something actual in some > branch of science or in common sense, then its conclusion is a > prediction about those actual entities that must be tested by > methodeutic. For quotations by Peirce, search for the phrase > "pure mathematics" in CP. There are 49 instances. > > As for semiotic, there is a reason why CP 1.190 is just one line: > >> Phenomenology is, at present, a single study. >> > > Please look at CP 1.300 to 1.353, which he wrote in 1894. That is > his study of the "conceptions drawn from the logical analysis of > thought." Since he had previously written that long analysis, > there was no reason for him to say more about phenomenology in 1903. > > In 1905, he used the term 'phaneroscopy': > >> Phaneroscopy is the description of the _phaneron_; and by the >> _phaneron_ I mean the total of all that is in any way or in >> any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it >> corresponds to any real thing or not. (CP 1.284) >> > > Whether or not phaneroscopy/phenomenology are identical or closely > related, Peirce's writings from CP 1.284 to 1.353 include his > phenomenological categories -- a major part of semiotic. Then > CP 1.190 says that phenomenology is "at present a single study". > That study would be his 1894 version of semiotic (or some update). > But he left open the option that he might include more later. > > But CP 1.191 about normative science is longer because it's his first > statement about the normative sciences. In 1906, he wrote much more: > > Normative Science forms the mid-portion of coenoscopy and its >> most characteristic part.... Logic, regarded from one instructive, >> though partial and narrow, point of view, is the theory of >> deliberate thinking. To say that any thinking is deliberate is >> to imply that it is controlled with a view to making it conform >> to a purpose or ideal. (CP 1.573) >> > > Note that he says logic applied to the normative sciences is > a "partial and narrow" point of view as "the theory of deliberate > thinking." Since phenomenology/phaneroscopy includes anything > "present to the mind" in any way, the theory of deliberate thinking > would be a special case. > > JAS > >> JFS: Semiotic, the general theory of signs, would also be pure >>> mathematics, either formal or informal. >>> >> >> Not according to Peirce; he classified it as a Normative Science. >> > > Three points: (1) Peirce himself placed formal logic under mathematics; > (2) he put logic (without the word 'formal') under normative science; > and (3) the deliberate thinking in normative science is a "partial and > narrow" view of logic. > > JAS > >> As Auke noted, phenomenology is the study of appearances, >> not actualities. Actuality is a subset of Reality, and it is >> metaphysics that deals with the Reality of phenomena. >> > > Since phenomenology studies everything "present to the mind", it deals > with signs that occur in actuality. The question whether those signs > refer to anything actual outside the mind requires the normative use > of logic to determine truth. > > AvB > >> I would argue that: phenomenology is concerned with what appears, >> semiotics with signs... Since the sign evolves what is involved >> and a sign only can do this by appearing at some point, there seems >> some overlap between both sciences. >> > > Yes. The subject matter of phenomenology is the totality of signs > that appear to the mind, and CP 1.300 calls the semiotic categories > "conceptions drawn from the logical analysis of thought". Therefore, > the science of phenomenology is applied semiotic (logic in the broad > sense). Logic as a normative science has a "partial and narrow" sense. > > JBD > >> Here is one place where Peirce provides a relatively clear explanation >> of the relation between these tones of thought--considered as formal >> elements and as material categories--as they are studied in >> phenomenology and these three modal conceptions. >> > > Thanks for those citations (CP 1.530 to 1.532) from 1903. They follow > and develop themes in (CP 1.417 to 1.520) from 1896. The title of > the 1896 section is "the logic of mathematics: An attempt to develop > my categories from within." > > Both of these sections develop semiotic as a mathematical theory. > In 1894, Peirce developed the categories from "a logical analysis of > thought". That analysis started with observations of the phaneron. > But the title "logic of mathematics" implies a purely mathematical > development, and the phrase "from within" indicates a starting > point from axioms within the theory. > > Those passages and their dates show the steps in the development: > Semiotic was inspired by an analysis of thought (1894). But Peirce > later developed it further as a theory of pure mathematics (1896). > That mathematical development enabled him to generalize the theory > and make it more systematic. Then he could take the pure theory and > apply it to subjects beyond the ones that originally inspired it. > > See below for a summary of the points in these discussions. > > John > ____________________________________________________________________ > > Summary of what Peirce wrote or implied in his 1903 classification > as supplemented by the references cited above: > > 1. There are two sciences that do not depend on any other science > for their subject matter: mathematics and phenomenology. > > 2. Mathematics, formal and informal, contains all possible theories > that can be stated with a finite alphabet in any language, > natural or artificial. But before those theories are applied > to anything actual, the subject matter is hypothetical. Theorems > are necessary conclusions about the assumed possibilities. > > 3. Phenomenology is the subject that studies anything "present to > the mind" in any way from any source (internal to the body or > external through the senses). Its subject matter is any and > every sign that may appear in the phaneron. > > 4. Peirce said that every science depends on mathematics. Pure > mathematics contains all possible hypotheses -- formal or informal > -- before they have been applied to anything. Every theory of any > subject whatever is an application of mathematics. > > 5. When a pure theory is applied to something actual, indexes in > the theory (e.g., variables) are linked to actual entities. Its > theorems are claims that certain statements about those entities > are necessarily true. The reliability of those claims depends > on testing by methodeutic. > > 6. Every theory of logic or semiotic, before it is applied, is > a version of pure mathematics. The theories of phenomenology > are applied semiotic. Logic as a normative science is, as > Peirce said, "a partial and narrow" view.
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
