Dear Gary f, list,
You said: “To sum up: many of Peirce’s important ideas don’t need to be ‘brought into’ the 21stcentury because they are already here..” I agree. But there is an important point you neglect about this matter and is something that is not recognized by most persons. *In every investigation arguments stated in philosophical form are different from those that are non-philosophical*.. The above is not Peirce’s terminology and it may or may not matter;- to give one his due. As to whether Peirce was aware of these words, consider the Peirce you quote: *If the phenomenon, when it comes, fulfills that expectation, it strengthens the habits of thinking on which that expectation is based, but teaches us nothing new. * *But if it involves any surprise, as it mostly does, **our habits of thinking* *are deranged, whether little or much. * *We then feel the need of a new idea which shall serve to bind the surprising phenomenon to our preëxisting experience. * *One usual phrase is that we want the surprising fact *explained*.* *.. At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a possible Explanation, by which I mean a **syllogism** exhibiting the surprising fact as necessarily consequent upon the circumstances of its occurrence together with the truth of the credible conjecture, as premisses.* And about all these matters the endeavor must be made to seek to convince by means of rational arguments, using observed facts as evidences and examples. And this they will do if led to change their ground, for everyone has something relative to contribute to the truth, and we must start from this to give a sort of proof about our views; for from statements that are true but not clearly expressed, as we advance, clearness will also be attained, if at every stage we adopt more scientific positions in exchange for the customary confused statements. On How to make our Ideas Clear.. *From CP 5.402 to CP 5.189* With best wishes, Jerry R On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 3:48 PM, Stephen Curtiss Rose <stever...@gmail.com> wrote: > I think the case against materialism as the only explanation for things > has been successfully questioned if not confirmed. Quantom understandings > do not apply merely to particle research.Visible slit experiments have > validated its probability assumptions.I think both Newtonian and quantum > premises can and do coexist just as space and time coexists with spacetime. > So I would rank quantum understanding as evolving rapidly to challenge the > materialist world view. To these I would add near death research which has > been given no real scientific notice though its findings have been > scientifically tested. Behind nde research there are at least five other > avenues of the same general sort. Peirce was not unsympathetic to claims > from this seemingly unrespected quarter. There is a small legion of nondual > thinkers who hold forth on YouTube, among them Rupert Sheldrake who has > spoken admiringly of Peirce. Your mention of Gaia coincided with my > unfortunate encounter with that phenomenon in its Web related activities. I > would not say it has the heft of the other things I've mentioned but I > would be willing to be convinced otherwise. > > amazon.com/author/stephenrose > > On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 4:34 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > >> Yes, Gaia’s made her way into the mainstream now … you shouldn’t have to >> Google the *Science* article because it’s available for free at the link >> I posted. >> >> I don’t think quantum physics tells us much of anything about the >> capacity of human observation to affect matters *at any level above the >> ultra-microscopic*. I’m not sure if your message is saying that you’re >> for or against that idea. >> >> >> >> gary >> >> >> >> *From:* Stephen Curtiss Rose <stever...@gmail.com> >> *Sent:* 16-Sep-18 14:05 >> *To:* Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] bringing Peirce into the 21st century >> >> >> >> I long ago said goodbye to Gaia as a basis for nondual understandings and >> quamtum suppositions regarding the capacity of human observation to affect >> matters. I will have to Google your reference because there is a great real >> of other Gaia related stuff out there. As to the nondual and quantum slants >> I have little doubt that they are relevant and I have always assumed Peirce >> was in synch if only because his thought implies a cosmic victory for love >> -- agape. I think materiality is not as doomed as the nondualists suggest >> but that it is part of what i have suggested in my recurrent root premise >> that reality is all, t which I still hold. >> >> >> amazon.com/author/stephenrose >> >> >> >> On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 1:38 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >> >> List, >> >> The current issue of *Science* magazine features two articles that >> provoke me to share a few reflections on the subject line, which I’ve >> chosen to represent the recurring calls on this list for more postings that >> apply Peircean ideas to “real-world” issues and investigations (as opposed >> to postings about the minutiae of Peirce’s philosophy, including logic as >> semiotic). >> >> The first *Science* article is “Gaia 2.0”, by Timothy M. Lenton and >> Bruno Latour, which asks the question, “Could humans add some level of >> self-awareness to Earth’s self-regulation?” It’s accessible at >> http://science.sciencemag.org/content/361/6407/1066. I couldn’t help >> noticing that my blog post of September 5, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2018/0 >> 9/earthtypes/, deals with essentially the same question. I didn’t share >> that blog post with the peirce list, but Gary Richmond posted a link to it >> along with some very positive comments about it (thanks Gary R!). It does >> incorporate a quotation from Peirce introducing a semiotic idea (namely the >> type-token distinction), and tries to apply that concept to what may be the >> most significant real-world issue of our time, the challenge of the >> Anthropocene. >> >> The *Science* article does not mention any specifically Peircean ideas, >> but “Gaia 2.0” certainly overlaps with them in remarkable ways. As the >> authors say, it “establishes a new continuity between humans and nonhumans >> that was not visible before—a relation between free agents. This >> understanding offers the potential to learn from features of Gaia to create >> a Gaia 2.0. We focus here on three of these features: autotrophy, networks, >> and heterarchy.” Those are not Peircean terms, but “continuity” certainly >> is a central focus of Peirce, and I certainly see his logic/semiotic as a >> major contribution to making *visible* the continuity between humans and >> nonhumans. >> >> I also see Peirce as a major contributor to awareness of the continuity >> among various branches of science, notably by laying the groundwork for >> what we now call biosemiotics. The authors of “Gaia 2.0” exemplify such >> continuity: Lenton is a (British) Earth Systems scientist, while Latour is >> a (French) philosopher. Does it matter that they do not mention Peirce or >> use Peircean terminology? Well, it does to those interested in the history >> and philosophy of science who are concerned with giving credit where credit >> is due. Does it matter in terms of facing the challenge of the >> Anthropocene? I doubt it … but I’ll come back to this question below. >> >> The other current *Science* article is about “nervous system-like >> signaling in plant defense.” It’s one small contribution to the literature >> on plant “signaling” — even plant “intelligence” — which has become >> voluminous in recent years. Now, you might think this is fertile ground for >> *biosemiotics*. But in fact, neither this article nor the two full books >> about plant semiosis that I’ve recently read ever mentions the term >> “biosemiotics,” or cites any of the ‘usual suspects’ who publish in that >> field. Neither does David Attenborough, in his recent television programs >> which have dealt with various forms of semiosis observed in the vegetable >> world. Why not? I think the answer is simple: biology does not need >> semiotics *as a separate field* to investigate “signaling” in plants. >> >> The *Science* article I mention here is about the recent discovery that >> glutamate, which acts as a neurotransmitter in animals, also plays an >> important role in “plant defense,” i.e. in the relatively fast mechanisms >> by which a plant’s leaves can be informed of damage to other leaves >> elsewhere on the plant, and respond by activating whatever chemical >> defenses they may have. The fact that both plants and animals use the same >> chemical substance for similar semiosic purposes does suggest the >> continuity between these two aspects of the biosphere, but is (in my >> opinion) relatively trivial compared to the more general and formal aspects >> of semiosis which apply across the full spectrum of the life sciences. The >> value of biosemiotics, in my view, is its elucidation of those *formal* >> patterns, not in the discovery of specific details of the detailed >> mechanisms in which they are embodied in this or that life form. Biology >> can take care of that and is doing so in laboratories around the world. The >> importance of biosemiotics is more philosophical, even ethical in the sense >> of ‘global ethics.’ And I think the same applies to the matter of ‘bringing >> Peirce into the 21st century.’ >> >> Let me explain that by referring to my aforementioned blog post (and its >> larger context, the “netbook” *Turning Signs*). One of the central >> concepts in both is what I call “the meaning cycle,” which I take to be a >> basic pattern in all forms of semiosis. There’s a diagram of it in that >> blog post, and in *Turning Signs* at http://gnusystems.ca/TS/mdl.ht >> m#meancyc. In the course of transcribing Peirce’s Lowell Lecture 7, I >> came across this passage which seems to me fully congruent with the concept >> of the “meaning cycle,” although Peirce does not mention either “meanings” >> or “cycles”: >> >> [[ The course of events by which any new subject gets added to our >> knowledge is most clearly marked in the case of an addition to our >> scientific knowledge. >> >> In the first place we are already in a previous state of knowledge. Logic >> has quite nothing to say concerning the *primum cognitum*. In >> consequence of this we are in a state of expectation concerning a coming >> phenomenon,— being that expectation active or passive. If the phenomenon, >> when it comes, fulfills that expectation, it strengthens the habits of >> thinking on which that expectation is based, but teaches us nothing new. >> But if it involves any surprise, as it mostly does, our habits of thinking >> are deranged, whether little or much. We then feel the need of a new idea >> which shall serve to bind the surprising phenomenon to our preëxisting >> experience. One usual phrase is that we want the surprising fact >> *explained*. With this end in view we are led to frame a *hypothesis*, >> and the process of reasoning by which we come to set up a hypothesis is the >> kind of reasoning that I call *Abduction*. Now this hypothesis is a >> purely ideal state of things, and upon the basis of a purely ideal state of >> things as a premiss, we can only reason *deductively*. In fact, >> deduction always relates to a purely ideal state of things, in this sense, >> that if the premiss of deduction is known for anything more than that, its >> being more has nothing to do with the course of the deduction. The >> Deductions which we base upon the hypothesis which has resulted from >> Abduction produce conditional predictions concerning our future experience. >> That is to say, we infer by Deduction that if the hypothesis be true, any >> future phenomena of certain descriptions must present such and such >> characters. We now institute a course of quasi-experimentation in order to >> bring these predictions to the test, and thus to form our final estimate of >> the value of the hypothesis, and this whole proceeding I term Induction. I >> speak of quasi-experimentation because the term *experiment* is, >> according to the usage of scientific men, restricted to the operation of >> bringing about certain conditions. The noting of the results of experiments >> or of anything else to which our attention is directed in advance of our >> noting it, is called *Observation*. But by quasi-experimentation I mean >> the entire operation either of producing or of searching out a state of >> things to which the conditional predictions deduced from the hypothesis >> shall be applicable and of noting how far the prediction is fulfilled. ] >> http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell7.htm ] >> >> In *Turning Signs* I’ve brought in many specific references from >> biology, psychology, neuroscience, ecology, even sacred scriptures and >> sutras, to show how this basic pattern recurs in all these fields. I’ve >> also drawn heavily on Peircean semiotics. But I do not attribute the >> “meaning cycle” concept (or my diagram of it) to Peirce. That’s because I >> didn’t actually get it from Peirce; I got it from Robert Rosen’s work on >> “anticipatory systems”, and had incorporated it into the book before I >> found it in Peirce. When I do quote Peirce in the book (which happens quite >> a lot), I quote him for the same reason that I quote other writers: because >> I find their words to be clear statements of principles I consider >> important to the “ecology of meaning,” as I call it, across the whole >> spectrum of semiosis from the human down to the microbial, and from the >> collectively cultural to the individual. >> >> To sum up: many of Peirce’s important ideas don’t need to be ‘brought >> into’ the 21st century because they are already here. They may not be >> credited to Peirce, but they are further developments of thoughts he >> pioneered or picked up from his predecessors and carried further. I think >> our responsibility to Peirce, if we have any, is to carry his ideas >> further, and express them in new contexts which did not exist in Peirce’s >> time. Whether we mention Peirce or use his terminology, or cite him as an >> “authority,” is not all that important, pragmatically speaking. Each of us >> needs to adapt Peircean ideas and terms to the communicational context in >> which we find ourselves, in oder to carry them forward. But speaking for >> myself, the great value of this list is the contributions of those who are >> *actively >> reading* Peirce with the aim of refining (and sometimes reforming) our >> understanding of what he said. When we find something in Peirce that offers >> fresh insights into the Thought process of Gaia, or of even more inclusive >> universes, that’s what motivates us (or me at least) to bring Peirce >> current dialogues. >> >> Gary f. >> >> } Everything is always becoming something other than what it was >> becoming. [Floyd Merrell] { >> >> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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